entrapment defense (Wisconsin) · Go Syfert
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entrapment defense in Wisconsin

17 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2022 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
cluster 93green
· · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). 36 See, e.g., 29 Wright & Gold, supra note 17, § 6269.8 (medical expert "opinion[s] also may be based on extensive personal observations, professional experience, education, and training even where the medical expert has not conducted an epidemiological study and even where the expert's opinion is not generally accepted and is unsupported by peer review"); Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d at 656 (a well qualified physician with sufficient expertise could reliably testify about defendant's brain tumor to establish an entrapment defense); Primiano, 598 F.3d at 568

2017Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). 36 See, e.g., 29 Wright & Gold, supra note 17, § 6269.8 (medical expert "opinion[s] also may be based on extensive personal observations, professional experience, education, and training even where the medical expert has not conducted an epidemiological study and even where the expert's opinion is not generally accepted and is unsupported by peer review"); Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d at 656 (a well qualified physician with sufficient expertise could reliably testify about defendant's brain tumor to establish an entrapment defense); Primiano, 598 F.3d at 568

22
Schneider v. Friedgreen
ca3 · 2003 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2003), the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a physician's "experience render[ed] his testimony reliable [and] demonstrate[d] that his testimony [was] based on 'good grounds.'" In light of his considerable professional experience, the physician's testimony on the standard of care was reliable, even if the content of the literature cited was irrelevant.

2017Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2003), the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a physician's "experience render[ed] his testimony reliable [and] demonstrate[d] that his testimony [was] based on 'good grounds.'" In light of his considerable professional experience, the physician's testimony on the standard of care was reliable, even if the content of the literature cited was irrelevant.

22
United States v. Eduardo Sandoval-Mendozagreen
ca9 · 2006 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). 36 See, e.g., 29 Wright & Gold, supra note 17, § 6269.8 (medical expert "opinion[s] also may be based on extensive personal observations, professional experience, education, and training even where the medical expert has not conducted an epidemiological study and even where the expert's opinion is not generally accepted and is unsupported by peer review"); Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d at 656 (a well qualified physician with sufficient expertise could reliably testify about defendant's brain tumor to establish an entrapment defense); Primiano, 598 F.3d at 568

2017Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). 36 See, e.g., 29 Wright & Gold, supra note 17, § 6269.8 (medical expert "opinion[s] also may be based on extensive personal observations, professional experience, education, and training even where the medical expert has not conducted an epidemiological study and even where the expert's opinion is not generally accepted and is unsupported by peer review"); Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d at 656 (a well qualified physician with sufficient expertise could reliably testify about defendant's brain tumor to establish an entrapment defense); Primiano, 598 F.3d at 568

22
State v. Hilleshiemgreen
wisctapp · 1992 · cited in 3 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2020–2022
2 sentences

2022As the circuit court correctly noted, the facts Viezbicke admitted to would not warrant an entrapment defense, which is an affirmative defense “available to defendants when a law enforcement officer has used improper methods to induce them to commit an offense they were not otherwise disposed to commit.” WIS JI— CRIMINAL 780; see also State v. Hilleshiem, 172 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9 , 492 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1992).

2022As the circuit court correctly noted, the facts Viezbicke admitted to would not warrant an entrapment defense, which is an affirmative defense “available to defendants when a law enforcement officer has used improper methods to induce them to commit an offense they were not otherwise disposed to commit.” WIS JI— CRIMINAL 780; see also State v. Hilleshiem, 172 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9 , 492 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1992).

13
State v. Saternusgreen
wis · 1986 · cited in 3 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1992–2019
2 sentences

1992NOTES [†] Petition to review denied. [1] The supreme court reviewed this instruction in Saternus and held that it "fully comports" with the law on entrapment in Wisconsin. 127 Wis. 2d at 472 , 381 N.W.2d at 295 . [2] Hilleshiem characterizes the continuing course of conduct between her and Owen as a "long-term, police-manufactured friendship." She argues that Owen's efforts to win her friendship, such as taking her to dinner, discussing the possible sponsorship of her band, or picking her son up at the roller rink, could prove inducement on all of the counts for which she requested the entrapm

1992NOTES [†] Petition to review denied. [1] The supreme court reviewed this instruction in Saternus and held that it "fully comports" with the law on entrapment in Wisconsin. 127 Wis. 2d at 472 , 381 N.W.2d at 295 . [2] Hilleshiem characterizes the continuing course of conduct between her and Owen as a "long-term, police-manufactured friendship." She argues that Owen's efforts to win her friendship, such as taking her to dinner, discussing the possible sponsorship of her band, or picking her son up at the roller rink, could prove inducement on all of the counts for which she requested the entrapm

13
Sherman v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1958 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1986–1992
2 sentences

1992First, relying on Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374 (1958), Hilleshiem claims that in a multiple-count case, it is appropriate for this court to view each count as part of a continuing course of conduct rather than as an isolated transaction. [2] With the former approach, it would not be necessary for Hilleshiem to prove that Owen explicitly offered her money or cocaine before each transaction to establish entrapment.

1992First, relying on Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374 (1958), Hilleshiem claims that in a multiple-count case, it is appropriate for this court to view each count as part of a continuing course of conduct rather than as an isolated transaction. 2 With the former approach, it would not be necessary for Hilleshiem to prove that Owen explicitly offered her money or cocaine before each transaction to establish entrapment.

12
Jae Lee v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2017 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2017). 11 No. 2018AP2367-CR ¶24 Here, the circuit court deemed Vesely’s decision not to pursue an entrapment defense as being “strategic,” “well-reasoned and based on professional judgment.” For several reasons, we agree.

11
State v. Pencegreen
wisctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See State v. Pence , 150 Wis. 2d 759 , 765, 442 N.W.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1989) ; State v. Saternus , 127 Wis. 2d 460 , 471-72, 381 N.W.2d 290 (1986). ¶18 The evidence in the record contains Taubel's testimony, as well as a Craigslist advertisement, emails, and text messages between Polchert and Lexi which were published to the jury.

2019See State v. Pence , 150 Wis. 2d 759 , 765, 442 N.W.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1989) ; State v. Saternus , 127 Wis. 2d 460 , 471-72, 381 N.W.2d 290 (1986). ¶18 The evidence in the record contains Taubel's testimony, as well as a Craigslist advertisement, emails, and text messages between Polchert and Lexi which were published to the jury.

11
Bennett v. Larsen Co.green
wis · 1984 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See Bennett v. Larsen Co. , 118 Wis. 2d 681 , 697, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984). ¶15 Polchert argues that the trial court erred in refusing to issue the entrapment defense jury instruction.

2019See Bennett v. Larsen Co. , 118 Wis. 2d 681 , 697, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984). ¶15 Polchert argues that the trial court erred in refusing to issue the entrapment defense jury instruction.

11
Forest County v. Goodegreen
wis · 1998 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000See Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654 , 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).

2000See Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654 , 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).

11
United States v. Joostgreen
ca1 · 1996 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999As in Kessee , the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the requested instruction, noting that, while "[i]t may well be that a jury would dismiss all of this as a pack of lies," because the defendant's story was "both detailed and corroborated by [other] evidence . . .," that was "a task for the jury, not the judge." Id. at 13.

11
In re the Medical Incapacity of Jurgensengreen
wis · 1981 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984See State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 431 , 307 N.W.2d 151, 156 (1981).

11
State v. Schulzgreen
wis · 1981 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984See State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 431 , 307 N.W.2d 151, 156 (1981).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Monsoor green
wis · 1973
2 sentences

1995As Jansen explains in his briefs, the supreme court's interpretation of the entrapment defense in State v. Monsoor, 56 Wis. 2d 689 , 203 N.W.2d 20 (1973), therefore precludes a trial court from considering the lesser included charges once it finds entrapment.

1995As Jansen explains in his briefs, the supreme court's interpretation of the entrapment defense in State v. Monsoor, 56 Wis. 2d 689 , 203 N.W.2d 20 (1973), therefore precludes a trial court from considering the lesser included charges once it finds entrapment.

21989–1995
State v. Balliette green
wis · 2011
2 sentences

2022State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18 , 336 Wis. 2d 358 , 805 N.W.2d 334 . “[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the postconviction court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9 , 274 Wis. 2d 568 , 682 N.W.2d 433 . 1 Absent a sufficient reason, a defendant is procedurally barred from using a WIS.

2022State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18 , 336 Wis. 2d 358 , 805 N.W.2d 334 . “[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the postconviction court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9 , 274 Wis. 2d 568 , 682 N.W.2d 433 . 1 Absent a sufficient reason, a defendant is procedurally barred from using a WIS.

12022–2022
State v. Allen green
wis · 2004
2 sentences

2022State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18 , 336 Wis. 2d 358 , 805 N.W.2d 334 . “[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the postconviction court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9 , 274 Wis. 2d 568 , 682 N.W.2d 433 . 1 Absent a sufficient reason, a defendant is procedurally barred from using a WIS.

2022State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18 , 336 Wis. 2d 358 , 805 N.W.2d 334 . “[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the postconviction court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9 , 274 Wis. 2d 568 , 682 N.W.2d 433 . 1 Absent a sufficient reason, a defendant is procedurally barred from using a WIS.

12022–2022
State v. McAttee green
wisctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2022Although he attempts to rely on the body camera videos for this argument, none of these videos are in the appellate record, and this court therefore “‘must assume that the missing material supports the trial court’s ruling.’” See State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262 , ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865 , 637 N.W.2d 774 (citation omitted) (appellant is responsible for “ensur[ing] completion of the appellate record,” and when he fails to include in the record the items connected to an issue he raises, this court “‘must assume’” the record supports the circuit court’s decision on that issue (citation omitted))

2022Although he attempts to rely on the body camera videos for this argument, none of these videos are in the appellate record, and this court therefore “‘must assume that the missing material supports the trial court’s ruling.’” See State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262 , ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865 , 637 N.W.2d 774 (citation omitted) (appellant is responsible for “ensur[ing] completion of the appellate record,” and when he fails to include in the record the items connected to an issue he raises, this court “‘must assume’” the record supports the circuit court’s decision on that issue (citation omitted))

12022–2022
State v. MacHner green
wis · 1979
2 sentences

2020The court denied the motions. 1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 3 No. 2019AP757-CR ¶6 On appeal, Blackshear first claims her guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because of faulty legal advice, as she was not told she could have mounted an entrapment defense.

2020The court denied the motions. 1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 3 No. 2019AP757-CR ¶6 On appeal, Blackshear first claims her guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because of faulty legal advice, as she was not told she could have mounted an entrapment defense.

12020–2020
State v. Bentley green
wis · 1996
2 sentences

2020“A defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only upon a showing of ‘manifest injustice’ by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311-12 , 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) (citation omitted).

2020“A defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only upon a showing of ‘manifest injustice’ by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311-12 , 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) (citation omitted).

12020–2020
State v. Schuman neutral
wisctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2019The essence of an entrapment defense is that the " 'evil intent' and the 'criminal design' of the offense originate in the mind of the government agent, and the defendant would not have committed an offense of that character except for the urging of the agent." State v. Schuman , 226 Wis. 2d 398 , 403, 595 N.W.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1999). ¶17 Thus, in order to be entitled to the entrapment instruction, Polchert must satisfy the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he was induced to commit the offenses by a government agent.

2019The essence of an entrapment defense is that the " 'evil intent' and the 'criminal design' of the offense originate in the mind of the government agent, and the defendant would not have committed an offense of that character except for the urging of the agent." State v. Schuman , 226 Wis. 2d 398 , 403, 595 N.W.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1999). ¶17 Thus, in order to be entitled to the entrapment instruction, Polchert must satisfy the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he was induced to commit the offenses by a government agent.

12019–2019
State v. Sarabia green
wis · 1984
2 sentences

1995In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State's argument that State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655 , 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984), "implicitly overruled Monsoor's unbending approach" and thus supports the trial court's application of the entrapment doctrine.

1995In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State's argument that State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655 , 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984), "implicitly overruled Monsoor's unbending approach" and thus supports the trial court's application of the entrapment doctrine.

11995–1995
United States v. Russell green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

1989The difference is that the entrapment inquiry focuses on the predisposition of the defendant whereas the question of governmental abuse of power focuses on whether the government "instigated the crime." See id. at 428-29 .

1989Although law enforcement in Russell supplied the defendant with the necessary ingredients for the unlawful manufacture of drugs, the court perceived no unfairness or shock to any sense of justice because law enforcement's participation related to criminal activity "already in progress." Id. at 431-32 .

11989–1989
Virgil v. State green
wis · 1978
2 sentences

1986In such a situation, the police are creating only the usual opportunity to commit this kind of an offense.] "If you are satisfied from the evidence in this case, under the instructions I have given you, that the defendant was entrapped into committing the crime charged, you must find him not guilty." 3 Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166 , 267 N.W. 2d 852 (1978). 4 A conference in chambers in respect to whether the court would permit the district attorney to ask Saternus whether he had ever been convicted of a crime revealed that none of his prior convictions (three misdemeanors) were drug related

1986In such a situation, the police are creating only the usual opportunity to commit this kind of an offense.] "If you are satisfied from the evidence in this case, under the instructions I have given you, that the defendant was entrapped into committing the crime charged, you must find him not guilty." 3 Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166 , 267 N.W. 2d 852 (1978). 4 A conference in chambers in respect to whether the court would permit the district attorney to ask Saternus whether he had ever been convicted of a crime revealed that none of his prior convictions (three misdemeanors) were drug related

11986–1986
Sorrells v. United States green
scotus · 1932
1 sentence

1986In Hawthorne , at 93, specifically repudiating the rationale of the dissenters in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), and of the concurring justices in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), this court chose to follow the subjective approach of the majority position of those two Supreme Court decisions.

11986–1986
Hawthorne v. State green
wis · 1969
2 sentences

1986However, if the evil intent and the criminal design originate in the mind of the government agent, and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him for it, when he would not have committed an offense of that character except for the urging of the agent, no conviction may be had." 6 The "origin of intent" doctrine, i.e., a focus on the reason for, or the genesis of, the defendant's state of mind leading to the intent to commit the crime came to full expression in Hawthorne v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 82 , 168 N.W. 2d 85 (1969).

1986However, if the evil intent and the criminal design originate in the mind of the government agent, and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him for it, when he would not have committed an offense of that character except for the urging of the agent, no conviction may be had." 6 The "origin of intent" doctrine, i.e., a focus on the reason for, or the genesis of, the defendant's state of mind leading to the intent to commit the crime came to full expression in Hawthorne v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 82 , 168 N.W. 2d 85 (1969).

11986–1986
State v. Hochman green
wis · 1957
1 sentence

1986Kubiak, supra, 256 Wis. at 520 , refers to Piper, supra, for a statement of the proposition that entrapment is not available to a defendant where the "intent to commit a crime originates in the mind of a defendant." State v. Hochman, supra, 2 Wis. 2d at 414 , additionally explained this court's view of the entrapment defense when it stated: "[T]he general rule is that if the criminal intent or the willing disposition to commit the crime originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that the opportunity is furnished or that the accused is aided in the com

11986–1986
State Ex Rel. Kowaleski v. Kubiak green
wis · 1950
1 sentence

1986Kubiak, supra, 256 Wis. at 520 , refers to Piper, supra, for a statement of the proposition that entrapment is not available to a defendant where the "intent to commit a crime originates in the mind of a defendant." State v. Hochman, supra, 2 Wis. 2d at 414 , additionally explained this court's view of the entrapment defense when it stated: "[T]he general rule is that if the criminal intent or the willing disposition to commit the crime originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that the opportunity is furnished or that the accused is aided in the com

11986–1986
Price v. State green
wis · 1967
2 sentences

1975By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 “939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor’s co-conspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another and which causes him so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act except that if the prosecution is for murder the degree of the crime is reduced to manslaughter.” 2 State v. Cassel (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 619 , 180 N. W. 2d 607 ; Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117 , 154 N. W. 2d 222 . 3 See: Judic

1975By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 “939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor’s co-conspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another and which causes him so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act except that if the prosecution is for murder the degree of the crime is reduced to manslaughter.” 2 State v. Cassel (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 619 , 180 N. W. 2d 607 ; Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117 , 154 N. W. 2d 222 . 3 See: Judic

11975–1975
State v. Cassel green
wis · 1970
2 sentences

1975By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 “939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor’s co-conspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another and which causes him so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act except that if the prosecution is for murder the degree of the crime is reduced to manslaughter.” 2 State v. Cassel (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 619 , 180 N. W. 2d 607 ; Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117 , 154 N. W. 2d 222 . 3 See: Judic

1975By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 “939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor’s co-conspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another and which causes him so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act except that if the prosecution is for murder the degree of the crime is reduced to manslaughter.” 2 State v. Cassel (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 619 , 180 N. W. 2d 607 ; Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117 , 154 N. W. 2d 222 . 3 See: Judic

11975–1975
United States v. Foster Lumber Co. green
scotus · 1975
1 sentence

1975Ed. 2d 366 (1973), but he nevertheless argues that such a theory may represent a proper basis for an entrapment defense where, as here, the defendant’s version of the evidence discloses that the Government supplied the contraband without which there would be no crime,” but holding: “We believe that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Russell forecloses us from considering any theory other than predisposition with respect to Hampton’s entrapment defense.” (The United States Supreme Court has granted review of this decision in Hampton v. United States (1975), 420 U. S. 1003 , 95 Sup. Ct. 1445, 43 L.

11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WI § Wis. Stat. § 808.10 (4) WI § Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 133 (1964–2023) FL 104 (1963–2019) TX 95 (1937–2026) MI 86 (1972–2026) GA 73 (1974–2016) PA 63 (1973–2026) CA 62 (1944–2026) NY 60 (1963–2026) IN 55 (1970–2019) LA 51 (1978–2024) WA 46 (1939–2026) MS 42 (1986–2024) OH 41 (1911–2025) NM 31 (1974–2024) MA 30 (1978–2023) NC 26 (1978–2021) AZ 26 (1968–2024) AL 22 (1974–2026) IA 20 (1974–2019) NJ 19 (1976–2025) MO 19 (1973–2022) UT 18 (1978–2026) WI 17 (1975–2022) CO 17 (1972–2025) ID 16 (1984–2026) MT 15 (1955–2020) HI 15 (1966–2024) TN 14 (1980–2024) MN 14 (1979–2023) ND 13 (1978–2015) NV 13 (1978–2024) VA 12 (1937–2026) CT 12 (1965–2019) ME 11 (1976–2003) OK 11 (1973–2024) OR 11 (1967–2026) AK 11 (1977–2025) KY 10 (1992–2023) NE 9 (1982–2023) KS 9 (1981–2010) MD 9 (1970–2011) AR 9 (1980–2019) DC 9 (1974–2024) WY 7 (1984–2020) DE 6 (1982–2023) NH 6 (1964–2021) SD 6 (1975–1989) VT 5 (1988–2021) WV 5 (1981–2015) SC 3 (2004–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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