entrapment defense in Nebraska

2023In State v. Swenson, 217 Neb. 820 , 352 N.W.2d 149 (1984), we held that a defendant who testified that he was approached by a government informant and asked if he could obtain marijuana was not entitled to an entrapment instruction.

2023In State v. Swenson, 217 Neb. 820 , 352 N.W.2d 149 (1984), we held that a defendant who testified that he was approached by a government informant and asked if he could obtain marijuana was not entitled to an entrapment instruction.

2023Similarly, in State v. Pischel, 277 Neb. 412 , 762 N.W.2d 595 (2009), we held that a defendant was not entitled to an entrapment instruction in a prosecution for child enticement based on a series of online chats with a decoy that led to the arrangement of an in-person meeting.

2023Similarly, in State v. Pischel, 277 Neb. 412 , 762 N.W.2d 595 (2009), we held that a defendant was not entitled to an entrapment instruction in a prosecution for child enticement based on a series of online chats with a decoy that led to the arrangement of an in-person meeting.

2014The burden of going forward with evidence of government inducement is on the defendant.31 In assessing whether the defendant has satisfied this burden, the initial 27 See, Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel.

2009Id. [15, 16] In determining whether the court in this case erred in refusing the entrapment instruction, we must review whether Pischel satisfied his initial burden of demonstrating that there was more than a scintilla of evidence of inducement.

2002The distinction between predisposition which defeats an entrapment defense and criminal intent formulated only after governmental inducement is demonstrated by contrasting the fácts in Heitman with those presented in both Jacobson v. United States, supra, and U.S. v. Poehlman, supra. In Heitman , we stated that predisposition could not be established by statements made by Heitman in correspondence with undercover police officers subsequent to inducement when the statements were indicative of his state of mind and intent at only that time.

1993Ed. 2d 454 (1993), and U.S. v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1992), at least two courts, both of which utilize a subjective test for determining the presence of entrapment, have read Jacobson as refining the entrapment standard and, because the entrapment standard is not of constitutional dimension, have refused to change their law.

1992Swenson, supra. “[L]aw enforcement officers are not precluded from utilizing artifice and stratagem, such as the use of decoys or undercover agents, to apprehend a person engaged in a criminal enterprise, provided that they merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of an offense by one already predisposed or ready to commit it.” Van Egmond, 233 Neb. at 839 , 448 N.W.2d at 572 , quoting Lampone, supra. Certainly, overpersuasion, undue pressure, or coercion may indicate a reluctance or unwillingness on the part of the defendant to participate in the proposed criminal activity

1992Swenson, supra. “[L]aw enforcement officers are not precluded from utilizing artifice and stratagem, such as the use of decoys or undercover agents, to apprehend a person engaged in a criminal enterprise, provided that they merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of an offense by one already predisposed or ready to commit it.” Van Egmond, 233 Neb. at 839 , 448 N.W.2d at 572 , quoting Lampone, supra. Certainly, overpersuasion, undue pressure, or coercion may indicate a reluctance or unwillingness on the part of the defendant to participate in the proposed criminal activity

1987The Russell majority observed at 428 n.5 that “[t]he first case to recognize and sustain a claim of entrapment by government officers was apparently Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (CA9 1915),” while the first time, apparently, that this court recognized the defense was State v. Ransburg, 181 Neb. 352 , 148 N.W.2d 324 (1967).

1987“This Court first recognized and applied the entrapment defense in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).” 411 U.S. at 428 .

1987We observe first that the entrapment defense “is not of a constitutional dimension.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 , 93 S. Ct. 1637 , 36 L.

1987We observe first that the entrapment defense “is not of a constitutional dimension.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 , 93 S. Ct. 1637 , 36 L.

1987The Russell majority observed at 428 n.5 that “[t]he first case to recognize and sustain a claim of entrapment by government officers was apparently Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (CA9 1915),” while the first time, apparently, that this court recognized the defense was State v. Ransburg, 181 Neb. 352 , 148 N.W.2d 324 (1967).

1987The Russell majority observed at 428 n.5 that “[t]he first case to recognize and sustain a claim of entrapment by government officers was apparently Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (CA9 1915),” while the first time, apparently, that this court recognized the defense was State v. Ransburg, 181 Neb. 352 , 148 N.W.2d 324 (1967).

1982The court’s denial of the appellant’s motion for acquittal was proper.” Id. at 762 .