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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2006"However, just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]" ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; see Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 ["Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for 2006"However, just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]" ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ; see Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 ["Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2018(See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ["[J]ust as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion."]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ( Peevy ) [statement was voluntary and therefore admissible for purposes of impeaching the defendant even though it was taken in purposeful disregard of the defendant's invocation of Miranda rights].) Of 2018(See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ["[J]ust as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion."]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ( Peevy ) [statement was voluntary and therefore admissible for purposes of impeaching the defendant even though it was taken in purposeful disregard of the defendant's invocation of Miranda rights].) Of | 1 | 3 |
People v. Jamesred2 sentences2021The detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights before questioning her, which “tend[s] to show that” her subsequent “consent was voluntary.” (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 84 (Sloss); see People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686 (Ratliff) [“the failure to give Miranda warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary”].) Detective Wells also expressly requested Precious’s consent. “[S]uch a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704 ; see People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116 .) T 1991Case law has established, however, that a person’s in-custody status, even when he is handcuffed, does not automatically vitiate his consent; this is “ ‘but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter.’ ” (People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 110 , quoting People v. Valdez (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 750, 756 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Further, the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to obtaining consent does not render the consent involuntary, since the purpose of the search is to obtain ph | 1 | 2 |
Solem v. Stumesgreen2 sentences2002Noting the factual distinction between Elstad and Bradford's case, we nonetheless reasoned that "just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion ( [ Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 307, fn. 1 [ 105 S.Ct. 1285 ]), neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, or an Edwards violation, inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]" ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039 , 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 .) As we explained, the Edwards rule simply "`ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is 2002Noting the factual distinction between Elstad and Bradford's case, we nonetheless reasoned that "just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion ( [ Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 307, fn. 1 [ 105 S.Ct. 1285 ]), neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, or an Edwards violation, inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]" ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039 , 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 .) As we explained, the Edwards rule simply "`ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ratliffgreen2 sentences2021(Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 687 [“The trial court was . . . entitled to conclude that” officers’ “threat[ ] to secure a search warrant . . . unless defendant consented to a search” was “merely . . . a declaration of the officers’ legal remedies should defendant refuse to cooperate”].) Additionally, as the trial court observed, the detectives’ preliminary hearing testimony showed Precious “was totally responsive to their questions . . . in a pimp-protecting way,” and had “no hesitation” objecting to the detectives’ theory that she was working with a pimp. 2021The detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights before questioning her, which “tend[s] to show that” her subsequent “consent was voluntary.” (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 84 (Sloss); see People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686 (Ratliff) [“the failure to give Miranda warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary”].) Detective Wells also expressly requested Precious’s consent. “[S]uch a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704 ; see People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116 .) T | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ledesmagreen1 sentence2021The detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights before questioning her, which “tend[s] to show that” her subsequent “consent was voluntary.” (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 84 (Sloss); see People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686 (Ratliff) [“the failure to give Miranda warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary”].) Detective Wells also expressly requested Precious’s consent. “[S]uch a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704 ; see People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116 .) T | 1 | 1 |
People v. Slossgreen1 sentence2021The detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights before questioning her, which “tend[s] to show that” her subsequent “consent was voluntary.” (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 84 (Sloss); see People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686 (Ratliff) [“the failure to give Miranda warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary”].) Detective Wells also expressly requested Precious’s consent. “[S]uch a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704 ; see People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116 .) T | 1 | 1 |
Minnick v. Mississippired2 sentences2002Noting the factual distinction between Elstad and Bradford’s case, we nonetheless reasoned that “just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion ([Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 307, fn. 1 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 230-231 ]), neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, or an Edwards violation, inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]” (Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039 .) As we explained, the Edwards rule simply “ ‘ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pre 2002Noting the factual distinction between Elstad and Bradford’s case, we nonetheless reasoned that “just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion ([Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 307, fn. 1 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 230-231 ]), neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, or an Edwards violation, inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.]” (Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039 .) As we explained, the Edwards rule simply “ ‘ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pre | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut v. Barrettgreen2 sentences1997(Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-387].) Edwards , like Miranda , “is a prophylactic rule, designed to implement pre-existing rights.” (Solem v. Stumes (1984) 465 U.S. 638, 644, fn. 4, 645 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 579, 588 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 ]; Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 528 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 927-928 , 107 S.Ct. 828 ] [when accused states he wants an attorney, “prohibition on *1040 further questioning—like other aspects of Miranda—is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by refe 1997(Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-387].) Edwards , like Miranda , “is a prophylactic rule, designed to implement pre-existing rights.” (Solem v. Stumes (1984) 465 U.S. 638, 644, fn. 4, 645 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 579, 588 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 ]; Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 528 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 927-928 , 107 S.Ct. 828 ] [when accused states he wants an attorney, “prohibition on *1040 further questioning—like other aspects of Miranda—is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by refe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valdezgreen2 sentences1991Case law has established, however, that a person’s in-custody status, even when he is handcuffed, does not automatically vitiate his consent; this is “ ‘but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter.’ ” (People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 110 , quoting People v. Valdez (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 750, 756 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Further, the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to obtaining consent does not render the consent involuntary, since the purpose of the search is to obtain ph 1991Case law has established, however, that a person’s in-custody status, even when he is handcuffed, does not automatically vitiate his consent; this is “ ‘but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter.’ ” (People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 110 , quoting People v. Valdez (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 750, 756 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Further, the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to obtaining consent does not render the consent involuntary, since the purpose of the search is to obtain ph | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Monterroso
green
2 sentences2013(Ibid.) Assuming that the officers initially drew their weapons, the evidence did not indicate they kept their guns drawn when the actual request for consent was made; neither the failure to give Miranda warnings nor the handcuffing of the suspect rendered his consent involuntary; the trial court could reasonably conclude that the handcuffs played no role in the defendant‟s decision to consent since the request to search occurred minutes after he was handcuffed in another room; and the trial court was 4 P.A. argues that Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th 743 is distinguishable because the defendant 2013(Ibid.) Assuming that the officers initially drew their weapons, the evidence did not indicate they kept their guns drawn when the actual request for consent was made; neither the failure to give Miranda warnings nor the handcuffing of the suspect rendered his consent involuntary; the trial court could reasonably conclude that the handcuffs played no role in the defendant‟s decision to consent since the request to search occurred minutes after he was handcuffed in another room; and the trial court was 4 P.A. argues that Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th 743 is distinguishable because the defendant | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Peevy
green
2 sentences2018(See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ["[J]ust as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion."]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ( Peevy ) [statement was voluntary and therefore admissible for purposes of impeaching the defendant even though it was taken in purposeful disregard of the defendant's invocation of Miranda rights].) Of 2018(See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ["[J]ust as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion [citation], neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel ... inherently constitute coercion."]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ( Peevy ) [statement was voluntary and therefore admissible for purposes of impeaching the defendant even though it was taken in purposeful disregard of the defendant's invocation of Miranda rights].) Of | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Neal
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., People v. Neal , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 82 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650 , 72 P.3d 280 ["[I]n the course of the first interview, Detective Martin intentionally continued interrogation in deliberate violation of Miranda in spite of defendant's repeated invocation of both his right to remain silent and right to counsel. 2018(See, e.g., People v. Neal , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 82 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650 , 72 P.3d 280 ["[I]n the course of the first interview, Detective Martin intentionally continued interrogation in deliberate violation of Miranda in spite of defendant's repeated invocation of both his right to remain silent and right to counsel. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 478 .) Casual conversation by an officer with an arrestee not intended to elicit incriminating answers does not implicate Miranda. 2013(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 478 .) Casual conversation by an officer with an arrestee not intended to elicit incriminating answers does not implicate Miranda. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Coffman
green
2 sentences2006Our decision in People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ( Coffman ), is particularly instructive on this issue. 2006Our decision in People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ( Coffman ), is particularly instructive on this issue. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2002Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it "created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee."' ( Id., at p. 644 & fn. 4, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , citation omitted). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.