9 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peyton v. Department of Human Rightsgreen2 sentences2016Peyton v. Department of Human Rights, 298 Ill. 2016Peyton v. Department of Human Rights, 298 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Village of Oak Parkgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 224 (7th Cir. 2015); cf. Robinson v. Village of Oak Park, 2013 IL App (1st) 121220, ¶ 36 (separately assessing religious-discrimination and reasonable-accommodation claims; stating that reasonable accommodation claim is established by first showing three-part prima facie case: (1) a religious practice/belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) communication by the employee to the employer of the need to observe the religious practice/belief; and (3) adverse employment action because of the employee’s religious practice/b 2016See, e.g., Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 224 (7th Cir. 2015); cf. Robinson v. Village of Oak Park, 2013 IL App (1st) 121220, ¶ 36 (separately assessing religious-discrimination and reasonable-accommodation claims; stating that reasonable accommodation claim is established by first showing three-part prima facie case: (1) a religious practice/belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) communication by the employee to the employer of the need to observe the religious practice/belief; and (3) adverse employment action because of the employee’s religious practice/b | 2 | 2 |
Keith Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corporationgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 224 (7th Cir. 2015); cf. Robinson v. Village of Oak Park, 2013 IL App (1st) 121220, ¶ 36 (separately assessing religious-discrimination and reasonable-accommodation claims; stating that reasonable accommodation claim is established by first showing three-part prima facie case: (1) a religious practice/belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) communication by the employee to the employer of the need to observe the religious practice/belief; and (3) adverse employment action because of the employee’s religious practice/b 2016See, e.g., Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 224 (7th Cir. 2015); cf. Robinson v. Village of Oak Park, 2013 IL App (1st) 121220, ¶ 36 (separately assessing religious-discrimination and reasonable-accommodation claims; stating that reasonable accommodation claim is established by first showing three-part prima facie case: (1) a religious practice/belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) communication by the employee to the employer of the need to observe the religious practice/belief; and (3) adverse employment action because of the employee’s religious practice/b | 2 | 2 |
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.green1 sentence2024That allegation is crucial to her claim because, under the common-law doctrine of employment at will, employees without a contract “serve[ ] at the employer’s will, and the employer may discharge such an employee for any reason or no reason.” Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 32 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Nees v. Hocksgreen2 sentences1980Such "motivational infringement upon public policy" has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court to be an exception to the employment at will rule. ( Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (1977), 98 Idaho 330, 334 , 563 P.2d 54, 58 .) Likewise, in Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 218 , 536 P.2d 512, 515 ( en banc ) the Supreme Court of Oregon held "that there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done." The court held that the plaintiff-employee should be awarded c 1980Such "motivational infringement upon public policy" has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court to be an exception to the employment at will rule. ( Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (1977), 98 Idaho 330, 334 , 563 P.2d 54, 58 .) Likewise, in Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 218 , 536 P.2d 512, 515 ( en banc ) the Supreme Court of Oregon held "that there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done." The court held that the plaintiff-employee should be awarded c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co.
green
2 sentences1997Considering that (1) a retaliatory discharge claim is a narrowly circumscribed exception to the common law doctrine of employment at will, and (2) the ultimate issue concerning the causation element is the employer’s motive for discharging the employee (see Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d at 163 , 601 N.E.2d at 730 ), we hold that a "valid basis” means valid in the context of plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory discharge for plaintiff’s having filed a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 1997Considering that (1) a retaliatory discharge claim is a narrowly circumscribed exception to the common law doctrine of employment at will, and (2) the ultimate issue concerning the causation element is the employer’s motive for discharging the employee (see Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d at 163 , 601 N.E.2d at 730 ), we hold that a "valid basis” means valid in the context of plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory discharge for plaintiff’s having filed a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994(Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 189 .) As a rule of construction, the employment at will rule mandates only a presumption that hiring without a fixed term is at will. 1980The Illinois Supreme Court also has recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 . | 2 | 1980–1994 |
Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center
green
1 sentence1994(Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 482, 489 .) That presumption can be overcome by demonstrating that the parties contracted otherwise. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State
green
2 sentences1993In AFSCME an employment rule similarly stated that employees mistreating service recipients were “subject to discharge.” (AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d at 257 .) Our supreme court noted: “While *** the collective-bargaining agreement could have provided that any employee found guilty of any mistreatment of a service recipient mandated discharge, it did not.” AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d at 258 . 1993In AFSCME an employment rule similarly stated that employees mistreating service recipients were “subject to discharge.” (AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d at 257 .) Our supreme court noted: “While *** the collective-bargaining agreement could have provided that any employee found guilty of any mistreatment of a service recipient mandated discharge, it did not.” AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d at 258 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
DeGrazio v. Civil Service Commission
green
1 sentence1983Phillips makes an effective argument that an administrative rule is subject to the same principles of construction as statutes (De-Grazio v. Civil Service Com. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482, 485 ) and that, where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the only proper function of the court is to apply that language (Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen
green
1 sentence1983Phillips makes an effective argument that an administrative rule is subject to the same principles of construction as statutes (De-Grazio v. Civil Service Com. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482, 485 ) and that, where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the only proper function of the court is to apply that language (Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Sventko v. Kroger Co.
green
2 sentences1980Stating that the employment at will rule is not absolute and termination is “the most powerful weapon at the disposal of the employer,” the court held “that an employer at will is not free to discharge an employee when the reason for the discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state.” 69 Mich. App. 644, 647 , 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 . 1980Stating that the employment at will rule is not absolute and termination is “the most powerful weapon at the disposal of the employer,” the court held “that an employer at will is not free to discharge an employee when the reason for the discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state.” 69 Mich. App. 644, 647 , 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District
green
2 sentences1980Such "motivational infringement upon public policy" has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court to be an exception to the employment at will rule. ( Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (1977), 98 Idaho 330, 334 , 563 P.2d 54, 58 .) Likewise, in Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 218 , 536 P.2d 512, 515 ( en banc ) the Supreme Court of Oregon held "that there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done." The court held that the plaintiff-employee should be awarded c 1980Such "motivational infringement upon public policy" has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court to be an exception to the employment at will rule. ( Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (1977), 98 Idaho 330, 334 , 563 P.2d 54, 58 .) Likewise, in Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 218 , 536 P.2d 512, 515 ( en banc ) the Supreme Court of Oregon held "that there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any injury done." The court held that the plaintiff-employee should be awarded c | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.