employment doctrine in Indiana

2020In McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., we added that the public policy exception includes a “separate but tightly defined exception to the employment at will doctrine” that protects an employee when he is discharged by an employer “for refusing to commit an illegal act for which he would be personally liable.” 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1988).

2020In McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., we added that the public policy exception includes a “separate but tightly defined exception to the employment at will doctrine” that protects an employee when he is discharged by an employer “for refusing to commit an illegal act for which he would be personally liable.” 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1988).

2025A “Indiana follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which em- ployment may be terminated by either party at will, with or without rea- son.” Baker v. Tremco, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Wior v. Anchor Indus., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. 1996)).

2020“Indiana follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which employment may be terminated by either party at will, with or without reason.” Wior v. Anchor Indus., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. 1996).

2019Orr. v. Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997); see also Morgan Drive Away, Inc., v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ind. 1986) (“The employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this State.

2004Orr notes that, in Indiana, the presumption of at-will employment is strong, and the Indiana Supreme Court is disinclined to adopt a broad and ill-defined exception to the employment at will doctrine. 689 N.E.2d at 717-18 .

2002Rather, BMI argues that this case is governed by such cases as Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), trans. denied (1981), in which the courts have refused to extend the wrongful termination exception to the employment at will doctrine to employees whose employment is terminated for “whistle-blowing,” or reporting their employer’s misdeeds.

1986Campbell v. Eli Lilly and Co. (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1054 , affirmed summary judgment against an employee who claimed that his discharge was in retaliation for charging the employer with practices contrary to the federal drug regulatory scheme and regulations. [1] The employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this State.

2025A “Indiana follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which em- ployment may be terminated by either party at will, with or without rea- son.” Baker v. Tremco, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Wior v. Anchor Indus., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. 1996)).

2012“The presumption of at-will employment is strong, and [the Indiana Supreme Court is] disinclined to adopt broad and ill-defined exceptions to the employment at will doctrine.” Baker, 917 N.E.2d at 653 .

2019Orr. v. Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997); see also Morgan Drive Away, Inc., v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ind. 1986) (“The employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this State.

2007We find that the present case is controlled by Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ind.1986), in which we held that, regardless of Brant’s allegations regarding status as an employee or independent contractor, the employment at will doctrine precludes him from asserting an action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for asserting a claim for unpaid wages under Indiana Code § 22-2-4-4.

1981See, Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., (1980) Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Staton, J. dissenting: “[T]he inflexible application of the ‘employment at will’ doctrine simply is not always consonant with the ends of justice.”) In the instant case, Judge Ratliff, dissenting below, analyzed extensively the employment at will doctrine vis-a-vis the public policy considerations involved, and concluded: “ * I would not so strictly limit the Frampton rule as did the Third District in Martin v. Platt, supra. Instead, I would extend the protection of the ‘public policy exception’ to grant a right of action

1981Our continued inflexible application of the employment at will doctrine in circumstances such as those presented here, as well as in Martin v. Platt, supra, flies in the face of a rapidly growing tide of contrary authority.

2006Had Tony been fired, he would have been entitled to bring a claim for retaliatory discharge because he would have been terminated for filing a worker's compensation claim, which is an exeeption to the employment at will doctrine. 2 See Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 428 .

1990Smith admits she was an employee at will, but asserts that her discharge falls within a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine recognized by the court in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 .

2012Baker v. Tremco Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. 2009); Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied.

2012Baker v. Tremco Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind.2009); Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.1994), reh’g denied.

2009Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind.2007).

2007Retaliatory Discharge Generally, Indiana follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and employee to terminate the employment at any time for “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.” Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind.2007) (quoting Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind.2006)).

2008“There are three exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, one of which is a public policy exception.” Id. (citing Coutee, 792 N.E.2d at 911 (listing the three exceptions to employment at will doctrine)).

2008“There are three exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, one of which is a public policy exception.” Id. (citing Coutee, 792 N.E.2d at 911 (listing the three exceptions to employment at will doctrine)).

2007Agency, 700 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. not sought.

2006Agency, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

2007Retaliatory Discharge Generally, Indiana follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and employee to terminate the employment at any time for “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.” Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind.2007) (quoting Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind.2006)).

2007Indiana generally follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and the employee to terminate the employment at any time for a “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.” Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind. 2006); Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ind.2006); Sample v. Kinser Ins.

2005If there is no definite or ascertainable term of employment, then the employment is at will, and is presumptively terminable at any time, with or without cause, by either party. [2] Wior v. Anchor *432 Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind.1996); Speckman v. City of Indianapolis, 540 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind.1989).

2005If there is no definite or ascertainable term of employment, then the employment is at will, and is presumptively terminable at any time, with or without cause, by either party 2 Wior v. An chor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind.1996); Speckhman v. City of Indianapolis, 540 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind.1989).

1986Justice Hunter, dissenting to the denial of transfer ( Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 1099 ), also questioned blind adherence to the employment at will doctrine in cases where public policy interests are involved, stating: Rarely in the law do we confront such compelling circumstances for the re-examination of an existing legal principle... .

1986Justice Hunter, dissenting to the denial of transfer (Compbell v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 1099 ), also questioned blind adherence to the employment at will doctrine in cases where public policy interests are involved, stating: Rarely in the law do we confront such compelling cireumstances for the re-examination of an existing legal principle....

1995In Streckfus v. Gardenside Terrace Co-op, Inc. (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 273 , the court noted that: "[The employment at will doctrine is a rule of contract construction [and] not a rule imposing substantive limitations on the formation of a contract[,] [therefore, should parties to an employment contract choose to include a job security provision in the contract, enforcement of such a provision would not necessarily conflict with the employment at will doctrine." Id., 504 N.E.2d at 275 (citations omitted).

1995In Streckfus v. Gardenside Terrace Co-op, Inc. (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 273 , the court noted that: "[The employment at will doctrine is a rule of contract construction [and] not a rule imposing substantive limitations on the formation of a contract[,] [therefore, should parties to an employment contract choose to include a job security provision in the contract, enforcement of such a provision would not necessarily conflict with the employment at will doctrine." Id., 504 N.E.2d at 275 (citations omitted).

2008On the other hand, less than a year- earlier, in Cripe, 834 N.E.2d at 735 , this court expressed concern that “were we to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to demonstrate a retaliatory discharge, we would be overly extending that which was intended by the narrowly-defined exceptions [to the employment at will doctrine].” While acknowledging that exceptions to the employment at will doctrine are to be narrowly construed, see, e.g., McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 393 , today we adopt the approach of the Tony court and endorse the application of the constructive discharge doctrine in this c

2008On the other hand, less than a year earlier, in Cripe, 834 N.E.2d at 735 , this court expressed concern that "were we to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to demonstrate a retaliatory discharge, we would be overly extending that which was intended by the narrowly-defined exceptions [to the employment at will doctrine]." While acknowledging that exceptions to the employment at will doctrine are to be narrowly construed, see, e.g., McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 393 , today we adopt the approach of the Tony court and endorse the application of the constructive discharge doctrine in this co

2001Wior v. Anchor Indus., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind.1996) (quoting Ohio Table Pad Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)); see also Bee Window, Inc. v. Turman, 716 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (discussing independent consideration in the context of the employment at will doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that "simply surrendering another job or moving to another location, standing alone, does not constitute adequate independent consideration.").

1984Mead Johnson cites Ohio Table Pad Co. of Indiana v. Hogan, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 144 , for the proposition that Indiana courts have consistently followed the employment at will doctrine under which an employee at will may be discharged by his employer for any cause whatsoever, or for no cause, without giving rise to an action for damages.

1995See Martin v. Platt (1979), 179 Ind.App. 688, 692-93 , 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 ; Hamblen v. Danners, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 .

1988Hamblin v. Danners, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Indiana appellate courts "have consistently refused to create a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine in the absence of a statute defining the public policy.").

2014See Trail, 845 N.E.2d at 134 .

2007Indiana generally follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and the employee to terminate the employment at any time for a “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.” Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind. 2006); Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ind.2006); Sample v. Kinser Ins.

2007Indiana generally follows the employment at will doctrine, which permits both the employer and the employee to terminate the employment at any time for a “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.” Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind. 2006); Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ind.2006); Sample v. Kinser Ins.

2007See Eck & Associates, Inc. v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.

2005See Global Constr., 813 N.E.2d at 1167-68 ("March was required by his employer to eross the picket line at the Foundry."); see also Clemans v. Wishard Mem'l Hosp., 727 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (ordinarily an injury on a public street is not compensa-ble, but the employment requirement of crossing the street made it compensable).

2005Our stipreme court has expressed its "reluctance to adopt a generalized public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will[,]" McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind.1988), and this Court has stated that conclusory arguments do not discharge the appellant's burden of establishing reversible error." Pope v. Wabash Valley Human Servs., Inc., 500 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied.

2005See Global Constr., 813 N.E.2d at 1167-68 ("March was required by his employer to eross the picket line at the Foundry."); see also Clemans v. Wishard Mem'l Hosp., 727 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (ordinarily an injury on a public street is not compensa-ble, but the employment requirement of crossing the street made it compensable).