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10 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1940–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Koger, C.green1 sentence2022Voelker is clearly distinguishable from the present matter. 7 We note the author of the Koger decision is the same in this memorandum. - 12 - J-S08042-22 Koger, 255 A.3d at 1289 (citations and quotations marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nec Corporationgreen1 sentence2021See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1) (tying the amount of the award to the level of contribution); NEC Corp., 11 F.3d at 139 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The FCA’'s qui tam provisions do not act as a penalty; rather, they provide incentive to government ‘whistleblowers’ and compensate such individuals for their time and trouble.”). [J-72-2021] - 26 “incentive payment” as compensation without regard to an employment relationship between the payor and payee.31 The Commonwealth Court’s non-statutory creation of an employment requirement in Section 303 does not account for the enumerated categories of compensation c | 1 | 1 |
Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Dairygreen2 sentences1992Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 280 , 203 A.2d 469, 471 (1964); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 358-9 , 162 A.2d 370, 372-3, 471 (1960). [5] A covenant not to compete can be viewed as antithetical to the employment at will principle, in the respect that it impinges on the ability of one party, the employee, from terminating an employment relationship. 1992Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 280 , 203 A.2d 469, 471 (1964); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 358-9 , 162 A.2d 370, 372-3, 471 (1960). [5] A covenant not to compete can be viewed as antithetical to the employment at will principle, in the respect that it impinges on the ability of one party, the employee, from terminating an employment relationship. | 1 | 1 |
Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloygreen2 sentences1992Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 280 , 203 A.2d 469, 471 (1964); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 358-9 , 162 A.2d 370, 372-3, 471 (1960). [5] A covenant not to compete can be viewed as antithetical to the employment at will principle, in the respect that it impinges on the ability of one party, the employee, from terminating an employment relationship. 1992Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 280 , 203 A.2d 469, 471 (1964); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 358-9 , 162 A.2d 370, 372-3, 471 (1960). [5] A covenant not to compete can be viewed as antithetical to the employment at will principle, in the respect that it impinges on the ability of one party, the employee, from terminating an employment relationship. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Renne v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
1 sentence2020Renne v. UCBR, 453 A.2d 318 , 321 n.4 (Pa. 1982). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Paul v. Lankenau Hospital
green
2 sentences1995In Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90 , 569 A.2d 346 (1990), we held that “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not an exception to the employment at will doctrine. 1995In Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90 , 569 A.2d 346 (1990), we held that “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not an exception to the employment at will doctrine. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Geary v. United States Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences1990The majority in a 4-3 decision 4 held that while some exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine might exist, especially in public policy areas, “this case does not require us to define in comprehensive fashion the perimeters of this privilege, and we decline to do so.” 319 A.2d at 180 . 1990The majority in a 4-3 decision [4] held that while some exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine might exist, especially in public policy areas, "this case does not require us to define in comprehensive fashion the perimeters of this privilege, and we decline to do so." 319 A.2d at 180 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Albertson v. Commonweath, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
neutral
2 sentences1987Albertson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 394 , 452 A.2d 275 (1982). 1987Albertson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 394 , 452 A.2d 275 (1982). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United States v. REESE
green
2 sentences1965To apply the rule of conclusiveness of a return in the case at bar brings to mind that which was said by Justice HUNT in U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 , 243: "I cannot but think that in some cases good sense is sacrificed to technical nicety, and a sound principle carried to an extravagant extent." Order reversed. 1965To apply the rule of conclusiveness of a return in the case at bar brings to mind that which was said by Justice Hunt in U. S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 , 243: “I cannot but think that in some cases good sense is sacrificed to technical nicety, and a sound principle carried to an extravagant extent.” Order reversed. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Macoluso's Naturalization
green
1 sentence1952There is nothing before us which marks this case as an exceptional one for the employment of a rule as original process, and in most cases where a rule has been so used it was an exercise of the court’s inherent power to correct its own records: Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, 318 Pa. 337 (1935) ; Macoluso’s Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132 (1912) ; Automobile Banking Corporation v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 422 (1947) ; Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 251 (1936). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Co.
green
1 sentence1952There is nothing before us which marks this case as an exceptional one for the employment of a rule as original process, and in most cases where a rule has been so used it was an exercise of the court’s inherent power to correct its own records: Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, 318 Pa. 337 (1935) ; Macoluso’s Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132 (1912) ; Automobile Banking Corporation v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 422 (1947) ; Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 251 (1936). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Automobile Banking Corp. v. Weicht
green
1 sentence1952There is nothing before us which marks this case as an exceptional one for the employment of a rule as original process, and in most cases where a rule has been so used it was an exercise of the court’s inherent power to correct its own records: Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, 318 Pa. 337 (1935) ; Macoluso’s Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132 (1912) ; Automobile Banking Corporation v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 422 (1947) ; Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 251 (1936). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Carey v. Carey
green
1 sentence1952There is nothing before us which marks this case as an exceptional one for the employment of a rule as original process, and in most cases where a rule has been so used it was an exercise of the court’s inherent power to correct its own records: Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, 318 Pa. 337 (1935) ; Macoluso’s Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132 (1912) ; Automobile Banking Corporation v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 422 (1947) ; Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 251 (1936). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Wright v. Bristol Patent Leather Co.
green
2 sentences1940If the principal has contracted to employ the agent for a specified time or until the happening of a specified contingency he has a duty not to exercise the power to terminate the employment.” 17 O.J.S. page 891, sec. 400, says: “The conditions imposed by the contract as precedent to the exercise of the right to terminate, including the method by which termination is to be effected, must be complied with and the grounds for termination must have accrued.” This court held in Wright v. Bristol Patent Leather Co., 257 Pa. 552 , 101 A. 844 , that where a contract prescribed the mode in which the r 1940If the principal has contracted to employ the agent for a specified time or until the happening of a specified contingency he has a duty not to exercise the power to terminate the employment.” 17 O.J.S. page 891, sec. 400, says: “The conditions imposed by the contract as precedent to the exercise of the right to terminate, including the method by which termination is to be effected, must be complied with and the grounds for termination must have accrued.” This court held in Wright v. Bristol Patent Leather Co., 257 Pa. 552 , 101 A. 844 , that where a contract prescribed the mode in which the r | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.