employment requirement in New York

2016In Felix and other cases relied upon by respondents, however, there was a local law, ordinance, or regulation setting forth the employment requirement (see Felix, 3 NY3d at 501-502 [local law]; Matter of Stolzman v New York State Dept, of Transp., 68 AD3d 1331, 1332 [2009] [civil service classification standard], Iv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010]; Mandelkern v City of Buffalo, 64 AD2d 279, 280 [1978] [ordinance]).

2016In Felix and other cases relied upon by respondents, however, there was a local law, ordinance, or regulation setting forth the employment requirement (see Felix, 3 NY3d at 501-502 [local law]; Matter of Stolzman v New York State Dept, of Transp., 68 AD3d 1331, 1332 [2009] [civil service classification standard], Iv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010]; Mandelkern v City of Buffalo, 64 AD2d 279, 280 [1978] [ordinance]).

2016At the outset, we are satisfied that claimant—an experienced, well-known and established writer, author and media critic— qualifies as a professional for purposes of our analysis. 2 Hence, our focus will be whether the company exercised “control over important aspects of the services performed” by claimant (Matter of Empire State Towing & Recovery Assn., Inc. [Commissioner of Labor], 15 NY3d at 437 ).

2013(Social Services Law §§ 341 [1]; 342 [1]; 18 NYCRR 351.26 [b]; 385.11 [a] [2] [ii]; [4]; 385.12 [c] [1]; see Earl v Turner, 303 AD2d at 282-283 ; Benjamin v McGowan, 275 AD2d at 291-292 .) Notwithstanding this obvious failure to apply the willfulness and good cause requirements, HRA still was obligated to review petitioner’s case record before taking adverse action. (18 NYCRR 358-4.1 [b].) Respondent’s own employment manual requires that “any steps that the individual took to address issues . . . which prevented compliance with the employment requirement must be explored . . . .” (Verified pet

2009The record reveals that petitioner received notice of her appointment (see Matter of Bonilla v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 219 AD2d 526 [1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 807 [1996]), but failed to appear due to a conflict with an internship she had started two weeks earlier.

2009There was substantial evidence to support the determination that petitioner’s failure to comply with the employment requirement for public assistance by missing a mandatory work activity evaluation appointment was willful and without good cause (see Matter of Tessler v Hammons, 251 AD2d 63 [1998]).

2007Contrary to the respondents’ contention, a claim that the termination of the petitioner’s employment was in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15, hereinafter the Human Rights Law) or the employee’s right to due process of law may be raised in the context of a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, and, if such an objection is sustained, the determination will be annulled (see Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506 [1991]; Matter of Singleton v Kerik, 282 AD2d 682 [2001]; Matter of Siano v Dolce, 256 AD2d 582 [1998]; cf. DiLauria v Town of Harrison, 32

2007Contrary to the respondents’ contention, a claim that the termination of the petitioner’s employment was in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15, hereinafter the Human Rights Law) or the employee’s right to due process of law may be raised in the context of a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, and, if such an objection is sustained, the determination will be annulled (see Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506 [1991]; Matter of Singleton v Kerik, 282 AD2d 682 [2001]; Matter of Siano v Dolce, 256 AD2d 582 [1998]; cf. DiLauria v Town of Harrison, 32

2007Contrary to the respondents’ contention, a claim that the termination of the petitioner’s employment was in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15, hereinafter the Human Rights Law) or the employee’s right to due process of law may be raised in the context of a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, and, if such an objection is sustained, the determination will be annulled (see Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506 [1991]; Matter of Singleton v Kerik, 282 AD2d 682 [2001]; Matter of Siano v Dolce, 256 AD2d 582 [1998]; cf. DiLauria v Town of Harrison, 32

2007Contrary to the respondents’ contention, a claim that the termination of the petitioner’s employment was in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15, hereinafter the Human Rights Law) or the employee’s right to due process of law may be raised in the context of a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, and, if such an objection is sustained, the determination will be annulled (see Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506 [1991]; Matter of Singleton v Kerik, 282 AD2d 682 [2001]; Matter of Siano v Dolce, 256 AD2d 582 [1998]; cf. DiLauria v Town of Harrison, 32

2001The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment since there are issues of fact as to whether the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was in violation of Executive Law § 296 (16) (see, Bacchi v Fritz Cos., 271 AD2d 558 ).

1996We note that, even if the employment claim could now be raised, defendant’s proof, based on unsworn statements and information obtained by its investigators, was not in admissible form and was therefore insufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 ).

1987One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity (Herman v State of New York, 94 AD2d 161 , affd 63 NY2d 822 , rearg denied 64 NY2d 755 ).

1987One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity (Herman v State of New York, 94 AD2d 161 , affd 63 NY2d 822 , rearg denied 64 NY2d 755 ).

1986In addition, subdivision (e) was amended to provide that actions and proceedings before the Housing Part would now be tried before Civil Court Judges, acting Civil Court Judges, or Housing Judges. * The reason for the change in terminology was pointed out in the then Senate Minority Leader’s memorandum in support of the 1978 amendment: "In Glass v. Thompson, 51 A.D.2d 69 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dept. 1976), the Appellate Division held constitutional the employment of hearing officers to preside over non-jury trials in the Housing Court.

1986In addition, subdivision (e) was amended to provide that actions and proceedings before the Housing Part would now be tried before Civil Court Judges, acting Civil Court Judges, or Housing Judges. * The reason for the change in terminology was pointed out in the then Senate Minority Leader’s memorandum in support of the 1978 amendment: "In Glass v. Thompson, 51 A.D.2d 69 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dept. 1976), the Appellate Division held constitutional the employment of hearing officers to preside over non-jury trials in the Housing Court.

1975Every technical violation of an employment rule does not rise to the level of misconduct (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 ; Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ).

1975Every technical violation of an employment rule does not rise to the level of misconduct (Matter of James [Levine], 34 NY2d 491 ; Matter of McHugh [Levine], 47 AD2d 676 ).

1964(See Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 ; Matter of Haglund v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 255 App. Div. 895 ; Herbert’s Case, 283 Mass. 348 .) Decision affirmed, without costs.

1964(U. S. Code, tit. 46, § 688.) Upon this record, the board was not bound to find either the employment or the waiver under section 113 within the rule which holds invalid a waiver or a waiver statute which “ contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 .) The awards were proper, upon the entire record, and are supported by a