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10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adler v. American Standard Corp.green2 sentences2014Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 , 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981) (“The common law rule, applicable in Maryland, is that an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time.”); see also Stanley Mazaroff & Todd Horn, Maryland *12 Employment Law § 3.02[1] (2d ed. 2014) (“Recognizing the continued vitality of the employment at will doctrine, Maryland courts have held that an employment relationship presumptively is at will unless the parties clearly and expressly set forth their agreement that the contract is to last for a 2014Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 , 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981) (“The common law rule, applicable in Maryland, is that an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time.”); see also Stanley Mazaroff & Todd Horn, Maryland *12 Employment Law § 3.02[1] (2d ed. 2014) (“Recognizing the continued vitality of the employment at will doctrine, Maryland courts have held that an employment relationship presumptively is at will unless the parties clearly and expressly set forth their agreement that the contract is to last for a | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017MCPS argues that, pursuant to the employment factors the Court of Appeals set out in Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 304 Md. 67 , 497 A.2d 803 (1985), Donlon is not an employee of the State. 2017MCPS argues that, pursuant to the employment factors the Court of Appeals set out in Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 304 Md. 67 , 497 A.2d 803 (1985), Donlon is not an employee of the State. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater
green
1 sentence2011Op. at 696-98, 28 A.3d at 1189-90 . [6] Furthermore, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), holds that an employment claim against a church is more likely permissible if the plaintiff seeks not reinstatement but only money damages, because adjudication of such a claim "would not require extensive court oversight." Id. at 721 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Black v. Snyder
green
2 sentences2011Op. at 696-98, 28 A.3d at 1189-90 . [6] Furthermore, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), holds that an employment claim against a church is more likely permissible if the plaintiff seeks not reinstatement but only money damages, because adjudication of such a claim "would not require extensive court oversight." Id. at 721 . 2011Op. at 696-98, 28 A.3d at 1189-90 . [6] Furthermore, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), holds that an employment claim against a church is more likely permissible if the plaintiff seeks not reinstatement but only money damages, because adjudication of such a claim "would not require extensive court oversight." Id. at 721 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Wholey v. Roebuck
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 70 , 803 A.2d 482 . 2005Id. at 70 , 803 A.2d 482 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995In Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc., 86 Md.App. 116, 128 , 585 A.2d 294 (1991), we noted that, in order for a disclaimer to be effective in preventing the formation of an employment contract, the disclaimer must be “clear and unequivocal____” In Haselrig , the employer relied on two provisions in the employee handbook in support of its contention that it had effectively disclaimed any contractual liability in excess of that under the employment at will doctrine. 1995In Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc., 86 Md.App. 116, 128 , 585 A.2d 294 (1991), we noted that, in order for a disclaimer to be effective in preventing the formation of an employment contract, the disclaimer must be “clear and unequivocal____” In Haselrig , the employer relied on two provisions in the employee handbook in support of its contention that it had effectively disclaimed any contractual liability in excess of that under the employment at will doctrine. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995The second exception [was] adopted by this court in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985)____ [Citations omitted.] The exception to the employment at will doctrine that we adopted in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985), was that an employee handbook may, in some circumstances, become an unilateral contract. 1995The second exception [was] adopted by this court in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985)____ [Citations omitted.] The exception to the employment at will doctrine that we adopted in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985), was that an employee handbook may, in some circumstances, become an unilateral contract. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Chernick's Case
green
2 sentences1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. 1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
City of Dallas v. Bradford
green
1 sentence1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gwaltney's Case
green
2 sentences1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. 1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. 1992Professor Larson is not the only adherent of this exception; indeed, it seems to be the position of the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question. 3 Appellants ask us to disregard all of the cases which follow the own conveyance exception because “[i]t is submitted that those out-of-state cases which have rejected Larson’s ‘own conveyance’ rule are the better reasoned cases.” In support of their position, appellants cite four cases: In re Gwaltney’s Case, 355 Mass. 333 , 244 N.E.2d 314 (1969); City of Dallas v. Bradford, 646 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Ct.App.1983); Postal Telegraph v. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY
green
2 sentences1985As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the theory that public employment *464 which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 , 87 S.Ct. 675, 685 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). 1985As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the theory that public employment *464 which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 , 87 S.Ct. 675, 685 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
green
1 sentence1984The court referred to similar precedent limiting the common law doctrine of employment at will, citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.I. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). 4 . “ ‘The Permittee shall furnish an adequate police force whose duty it shall be to maintain order and exclude from the grounds all handbooks, touts, operators of gambling devices, or others whose conduct is objectionable to the public or contrary to the best interest of racing, including all persons ruled off by the stewards.’ Arizona Code of Rules and Regulations, R. 4-27-03.” 579 P.2d at 582 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, Inc.
green
1 sentence1984The court referred to similar precedent limiting the common law doctrine of employment at will, citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.I. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). 4 . “ ‘The Permittee shall furnish an adequate police force whose duty it shall be to maintain order and exclude from the grounds all handbooks, touts, operators of gambling devices, or others whose conduct is objectionable to the public or contrary to the best interest of racing, including all persons ruled off by the stewards.’ Arizona Code of Rules and Regulations, R. 4-27-03.” 579 P.2d at 582 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lawson v. Burgee
green
2 sentences1940J. sec. 185, p. 685; Lawson v. Burgee, 131 Md. 436, 443 , 103 A. 516 . 1940J. sec. 185, p. 685; Lawson v. Burgee, 131 Md. 436, 443 , 103 A. 516 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Provident Trust Co. v. Massey
green
1 sentence1940The court held that, under these circumstances, and of the accounting with respect to the subject matter of the employment under which the claim for compensation was made, there arose such a presumption of payment by the debtor as to compel the creditor to go forward with his proof that the indebtedness was in fact unpaid, and that it was error not so to instruct the jury. 146 Md. at pages 46 and 47, 125 A. at page 821 ; *486 48 C. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.