employment doctrine in Ohio

2003THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COMMON LAW TORT AGAINST DEFENDANT NOTWITHSTANDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS PURSUANT TO STATUTE." {¶ 18} Barlowe claims that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against disability discrimination, arguing that it incorrectly concluded that she could not satisfy the jeopardy element of t

2003THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COMMON LAW TORT AGAINST DEFENDANT NOTWITHSTANDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS PURSUANT TO STATUTE." {¶ 18} Barlowe claims that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against disability discrimination, arguing that it incorrectly concluded that she could not satisfy the jeopardy element of t

2009Contreras v. Ferror Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 246-247 . {¶ 18} R.C. § 4113.52 states, in applicable part: {¶ 19} "(3) If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee's employment of a violation by a fellow employee of any state or federal statute, any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision, or any work rule or company policy of the employee's employer and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper sol

2006Id., citing Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 652 N.E.2d 940 , syllabus. {¶ 17} R.C. 4113.52 (A)(1)(a) states in pertinent part: "If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee's employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee's employer has authority to correct, and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicit

1997In an employment setting, “a promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the well-established doctrine of employment at will.” Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 110-111 , 570 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 .

1997In an employment setting, “a promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the well-established doctrine of employment at will.” Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 110-111 , 570 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 .

1999The statute does not provide for certain compensatory damages and does not specifically authorize recovery of punitive damages. * * * Clearly, the relief available to a whistleblower under a statutory cause of action comes nowhere near the complete relief available in an action based upon the Greeley public-policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will. * * * Thus, we find that the mere existence of statutory remedies for violations of R.C. 4113.52 does not operate as a bar to alternative common-law *307 remedies for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy embodied in the

1997Clearly, it is the responsibility of the Ohio judiciary to determine whether sufficiently clear public policy reasons exist to support a common-law exception to the doctrine of employment at -will * * Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 161 , 677 N.E.2d at 328 .

2006Anderson , 88 Ohio App.3d at 373 . {¶ 13} Subsequently, in Painter , the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its exception to the employment at will doctrine.

2005Id. {¶ 13} In Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377 , the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its exception to the employment at will doctrine.

1997Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus; Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 136 , 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 . ‘The test *582 in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.’ Mers at paragraph three of the syllabus.

1997Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus; Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 136 , 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 . ‘The test *582 in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.’ Mers at paragraph three of the syllabus.

2026Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy {¶17} Employment relationships in Ohio are governed by “the common-law doctrine of employment at will.” Dohme v. Eurand Am. Inc., 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 11 .

2022Conversely, Harmon contends she was employed during her base period due to her receipt of disability benefits from Honeywell's policy during that time. {¶ 24} In support of her position, Harmon relies extensively on Shepherd v. Wearever-Proctor Silex, Inc., 75 Ohio App.3d 414 (4th Dist.1991).

2020Under this exception, the common law doctrine of employment at will “yield[s] when it contravenes the public policy as established by the General Assembly in R.C. 4123.90.” Id. {¶47} Under this exception, an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy exists where a plaintiff establishes the following: -22- (1) a clear public policy exists and is manifested in a state or federal constitution, in statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law (the clarity element), (2) dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeo

2016Again, that provision states: If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation by a fellow employee of any state or federal statute, any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision, or any work rule or company policy of the employee’s employer and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or othe

2016Again, that provision states: If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation by a fellow employee of any state or federal statute, any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision, or any work rule or company policy of the employee’s employer and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or othe

2014The violation must be one that the “employer has authority to correct” and that the “employee reasonably believes * * * is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution.” Id. {¶ 21} To report a violation, the employee must start with his or her employer.

2014The violation must be one that the “employer has authority to correct” and that the “employee reasonably believes * * * is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution.” Id. {¶ 21} To report a violation, the employee must start with his or her employer.

2008Keefe v. Youngstown Diocese of the Catholic Church (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 1 , 5 , 698 N.E.2d 1009 .

2008Keefe v. Youngstown Diocese of the Catholic Church (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 1 , 5 , 698 N.E.2d 1009 .

2007Klopfenstein , supra at ¶ 23 . {¶ 15} Here, Feurer was terminated while on leave for a workplace injury and while receiving temporary total disability benefits.

2006Long v. Long , 162 Ohio App.3d 422 , 428 , 2005-Ohio-4052 , 833 N.E.2d 809 . {¶ 37} In the case sub judice, the trial court heard testimony from appellee's expert witness, Carl Hartung, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who completed *Page 315 an employment analysis on appellant on August 6, 2003.

2006Long v. Long , 162 Ohio App.3d 422 , 428 , 2005-Ohio-4052 , 833 N.E.2d 809 . {¶ 37} In the case sub judice, the trial court heard testimony from appellee's expert witness, Carl Hartung, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who completed *Page 315 an employment analysis on appellant on August 6, 2003.

2006Id., citing Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 652 N.E.2d 940 , syllabus. {¶ 17} R.C. 4113.52 (A)(1)(a) states in pertinent part: "If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee's employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee's employer has authority to correct, and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicit

2005See Dresher, supra ; Coventry, supra. {¶ 19} R.C. 4113.52 (A)(1)(a) states in relevant part: If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee's employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee's employer has authority to correct, and the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety or is a felony, the employee orally shall notify the employee's supervisor or othe

2005Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius and Hollister (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d 295 [, 663 N.E.2d 1030 ].

2005Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius and Hollister (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d 295 [, 663 N.E.2d 1030 ].

2004Ohio, 1991), 775 F. Supp. 1101 , 1105 .

2003Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 , 668 N.E.2d 498 . {¶ 15} The version of R.C. 4113.52 in effect at the time of appellant’s dismissal states: {¶ 16} “(A)(1)(a) If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee’s employer has authority to correct and if the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public healt

2003Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 , 668 N.E.2d 498 . {¶ 15} The version of R.C. 4113.52 in effect at the time of appellant’s dismissal states: {¶ 16} “(A)(1)(a) If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee’s employer has authority to correct and if the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public healt

2003THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COMMON LAW TORT AGAINST DEFENDANT NOTWITHSTANDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS PURSUANT TO STATUTE." {¶ 18} Barlowe claims that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against disability discrimination, arguing that it incorrectly concluded that she could not satisfy the jeopardy element of t

2002Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 , 677 N.E.2d 343 ; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . *559 {¶ 8} Ohio adheres to the doctrine of employment at will, which refers to the traditional rule that “a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either party, for any cause, no cause or even in gross or reckless disregard of any employee’s rights.” Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .

2002Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 , 677 N.E.2d 343 ; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . *559 {¶ 8} Ohio adheres to the doctrine of employment at will, which refers to the traditional rule that “a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either party, for any cause, no cause or even in gross or reckless disregard of any employee’s rights.” Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .

2002Civ.R. 50(A)(4); White v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 39 , 45 .

2002Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 , 677 N.E.2d 343 ; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . *559 {¶ 8} Ohio adheres to the doctrine of employment at will, which refers to the traditional rule that “a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either party, for any cause, no cause or even in gross or reckless disregard of any employee’s rights.” Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .

2002Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 , 677 N.E.2d 343 ; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . *559 {¶ 8} Ohio adheres to the doctrine of employment at will, which refers to the traditional rule that “a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either party, for any cause, no cause or even in gross or reckless disregard of any employee’s rights.” Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .