Lewis motion in Montana

1998It is thus apparent that the first tier' of the UCCJA’s jurisdictional test was met in the present case. ¶19 The second tier of the UCCJA’s jurisdictional test “demands that a court which has satisfied the prerequisites of Section 40-4-211, MCA, then determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised.” Bolton, 212 Mont. at 220 , 690 P.2d at 405 .

1998It is thus apparent that the first tier' of the UCCJA’s jurisdictional test was met in the present case. ¶19 The second tier of the UCCJA’s jurisdictional test “demands that a court which has satisfied the prerequisites of Section 40-4-211, MCA, then determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised.” Bolton, 212 Mont. at 220 , 690 P.2d at 405 .

2020State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 6 , 386 Mont. 86 , 385 P.3d 968 .

2020State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 6 , 386 Mont. 86 , 385 P.3d 968 .

2015State v. 6 Lewis, 2012 MT 157 , 365 Mont. 431 , 282 P.3d 679 .

2015State v. 6 Lewis, 2012 MT 157 , 365 Mont. 431 , 282 P.3d 679 .

2012In an analogous situation, this Court has held that “[i]f a defendant chooses to present information in support of a sentence he argues for, the State may counter with testimony to the effect that such information is misleading or untrue, without breaching the plea agreement.” State v. Bartosh, 2007 MT 59, ¶ 22 , 336 Mont. 212 , 154 P.3d 58 .

2012In an analogous situation, this Court has held that “[i]f a defendant chooses to present information in support of a sentence he argues for, the State may counter with testimony to the effect that such information is misleading or untrue, without breaching the plea agreement.” State v. Bartosh, 2007 MT 59, ¶ 22 , 336 Mont. 212 , 154 P.3d 58 .

2007Thus, we conclude that McCord’s second entry was not “clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry,” Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511 , 98 S. Ct. at 1951 , and we hold that McCord’s second entry, therefore, was a continuation of his initial entry. ¶34 For these reasons, we reverse the District Court’s order granting Lewis’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained by McCord during his second entry into the structure — namely, the physical evidence seized from the bed and the table and McCord’s photographs of that evidence.

2007Thus, we conclude that McCord’s second entry was not “clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless entry,” Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511 , 98 S. Ct. at 1951 , and we hold that McCord’s second entry, therefore, was a continuation of his initial entry. ¶34 For these reasons, we reverse the District Court’s order granting Lewis’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained by McCord during his second entry into the structure — namely, the physical evidence seized from the bed and the table and McCord’s photographs of that evidence.

2000Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 , 116 S.Ct. at 2179 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 616 .

2000Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 , 116 S.Ct. at 2179 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 616 .

1993We went on to point out that “... [w]hen third party rights are involved, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if the written agreement is certain and clear ... [and that] [i]n such cases, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from the signature card alone.” Seman, 830 P.2d at 1296-1297 .

1988Similarly, in South Central Iowa PCA v. Scanlan (Iowa 1986), 380 N.W.2d 699 , the Court found that application of the Lewis test lead to the conclusion that PCA’s could not claim agency status: “In Lewis the court followed the approach suggested in [U.S. v. Orleans [ 425 U.S. 807 , 96 S.Ct. 1971 , 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976)] to determine whether federal reserve banks were federal instrumentalities within the meaning of the FTCA.

1988Similarly, in South Central Iowa PCA v. Scanlan (Iowa 1986), 380 N.W.2d 699 , the Court found that application of the Lewis test lead to the conclusion that PCA’s could not claim agency status: “In Lewis the court followed the approach suggested in [U.S. v. Orleans [ 425 U.S. 807 , 96 S.Ct. 1971 , 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976)] to determine whether federal reserve banks were federal instrumentalities within the meaning of the FTCA.

1988Similarly, in South Central Iowa PCA v. Scanlan (Iowa 1986), 380 N.W.2d 699 , the Court found that application of the Lewis test lead to the conclusion that PCA’s could not claim agency status: “In Lewis the court followed the approach suggested in [U.S. v. Orleans [ 425 U.S. 807 , 96 S.Ct. 1971 , 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976)] to determine whether federal reserve banks were federal instrumentalities within the meaning of the FTCA.

1988Similarly, in South Central Iowa PCA v. Scanlan (Iowa 1986), 380 N.W.2d 699 , the Court found that application of the Lewis test lead to the conclusion that PCA’s could not claim agency status: “In Lewis the court followed the approach suggested in [U.S. v. Orleans [ 425 U.S. 807 , 96 S.Ct. 1971 , 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976)] to determine whether federal reserve banks were federal instrumentalities within the meaning of the FTCA.