Lewis motion in California

2019As the Licudine I court explained, "[i]n cases where the plaintiff is already part of the work force, courts have looked to the plaintiff's earning capacity in his or her chosen career." ( Licudine I , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 170 .) Such is the case here.

2019As the Licudine I court explained, "[i]n cases where the plaintiff is already part of the work force, courts have looked to the plaintiff's earning capacity in his or her chosen career." ( Licudine I , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 170 .) Such is the case here.

2015(People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 856, 932 .) Jordan contends that because his conviction was suffered in 1991, it was too remote to be probative, and because it was for robbery, it was of “lesser value in assessing a witness’ credibility.” At the same time, it was highly prejudicial because it minor contributor in the SERI results, any exclusion of that evidence was the result of Lewis’s motion, not the prosecution’s efforts. 19 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

2015(People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 856, 932 .) Jordan contends that because his conviction was suffered in 1991, it was too remote to be probative, and because it was for robbery, it was of “lesser value in assessing a witness’ credibility.” At the same time, it was highly prejudicial because it minor contributor in the SERI results, any exclusion of that evidence was the result of Lewis’s motion, not the prosecution’s efforts. 19 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

2026A warrantless search of Lewis’s trunk “would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [Lewis] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [it] that society accepts as objectively reasonable.” (California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 39 [addressing garbage bags left on the street].) Thus, to invoke Fourth Amendment protection, Lewis “ ‘ “must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “In other words, [he] must show that he . . . had a subjective expectation of privacy that was objectively 1

2024Moreover, “ ‘ “ ‘to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” [Citation.] When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1081 .) Lewis has failed to show that Lewis’ defense was so irreconc

2021And as we pointed out above, nothing in the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing conclusively refutes Davenport’s allegation that his conviction rests on now prohibited vicarious proof of evidence the petitioner could present at an evidentiary hearing to show he or she is entitled to relief.” (Id. at p. 906.) In Lewis, the Supreme Court rejected Verdugo’s three-step approach ( Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 961–962), holding that section 1170.95, subdivision (c) “clearly describes a single process.” (Lewis, at p. 962.) Lewis therefore obviates the Perez court’s concern that barring th

2021Specifically, neither felony murder nor murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine need be separately pleaded.” (Ibid., quoting People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712 .) Under an analysis dictated by the Drayton and Lewis framework, nothing in the preliminary hearing transcript precluded the prosecution from pursuing a conviction based on a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine at trial.

2019It is not our role to reweigh the evidence. ( Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970 , 981, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 158 .) And, contrary to Ukran's contentions, expert testimony is not vital to a claim for loss of earning capacity. ( Gargir v. B'Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1282, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 557 ["it is not necessary for a party to produce expert testimony on future earning ability ..."].) Finally, Ukran contends the court erred in characterizing Lewis's future earnings claim as "loss of earning capacity." Without citation to authority, Ukran argues Lewis's claim was "truly a claim f

2019It is not our role to reweigh the evidence. ( Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970 , 981, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 158 .) And, contrary to Ukran's contentions, expert testimony is not vital to a claim for loss of earning capacity. ( Gargir v. B'Nei Akiva (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1282, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 557 ["it is not necessary for a party to produce expert testimony on future earning ability ..."].) Finally, Ukran contends the court erred in characterizing Lewis's future earnings claim as "loss of earning capacity." Without citation to authority, Ukran argues Lewis's claim was "truly a claim f

2016(Lewis, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438 .) Here, for purposes of section 1042(a) under the Lewis standard of materiality, Officer Pajita, not the other undercover surveillance team officers who observed the transaction from their undisclosed locations, was the testifying officer who testified about the narcotics transaction itself and identified Palmer as the seller of the narcotics.

2016(Lewis, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438 .) Here, for purposes of section 1042(a) under the Lewis standard of materiality, Officer Pajita, not the other undercover surveillance team officers who observed the transaction from their undisclosed locations, was the testifying officer who testified about the narcotics transaction itself and identified Palmer as the seller of the narcotics.

2015(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293; see also People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 .) We address Lewis’s claim of cumulative prejudicial error later in this opinion.

2015The other cases cited by Lewis, including In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536 , 85 P.3d 444 ], are also inapposite.

2015The other cases cited by Lewis, including In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536 , 85 P.3d 444 ], are also inapposite.

2014(Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399 ; Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 .) Defendants argue Lewis’s motion for a continuance was procedurally improper under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b), having been presented orally and without documentary evidence.

2014Lewis concedes that any such error was harmless. 6 confession, prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.” (People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 .) The court may also order separate trials where a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the codefendants or prevent the jury from reaching a reliable verdict.

2014(Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399 ; Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 .) Defendants argue Lewis’s motion for a continuance was procedurally improper under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b), having been presented orally and without documentary evidence.

2014(Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399 ; Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 .) Defendants argue Lewis’s motion for a continuance was procedurally improper under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b), having been presented orally and without documentary evidence.

2008The Court emphasized in the recent case of People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 984 , footnote 11 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], that, despite having made past exceptions to the forfeiture doctrine, "we have never held that forfeiture is inapplicable to an entire class of cases...." We thus decline to apply the Lewis exception to the forfeiture doctrine in this case.

2008The Court emphasized in the recent case of People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 984 , footnote 11 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], that, despite having made past exceptions to the forfeiture doctrine, "we have never held that forfeiture is inapplicable to an entire class of cases...." We thus decline to apply the Lewis exception to the forfeiture doctrine in this case.

2001(People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 278 .) Also, the Lewis test for trial commencement furthers the statutory purpose of “preventing] a defendant from intentionally frustrating the orderly process of his trial by voluntarily absenting himself from the courtroom. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 276.) Furthermore, the court observed these policy goals were different from the policy goals underlying the attachment of jeopardy or determining the commencement of trial for purposes of subdivision (b)(1) of Evidence Code section 12 (the latter demarking the point of the proceedings where the then “

2001(People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 278 .) Also, the Lewis test for trial commencement furthers the statutory purpose of “preventing] a defendant from intentionally frustrating the orderly process of his trial by voluntarily absenting himself from the courtroom. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 276.) Furthermore, the court observed these policy goals were different from the policy goals underlying the attachment of jeopardy or determining the commencement of trial for purposes of subdivision (b)(1) of Evidence Code section 12 (the latter demarking the point of the proceedings where the then “

2001Next, to suggest that Lewis’s ability to merely hear the trial proceedings meant he was “participating” in the trial runs counter to the Lewis court’s characterization that the right of Lewis and others similarly situated “to be present and confront the witnesses . . . should not be surrendered lightly.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 281 .) 5 In People v. Granderson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 703 the defendant was not in custody and his absence began in the middle of jury selection.

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1999II A When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily, before or after receiving opposition; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171,178-180 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 . ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 , 838 P.2d 250 ( Kowis ); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290

1996Based on our analysis of Myers, Abarca, and Rhoden , documents prepared after conviction and sentencing are not part of the “record of conviction.” A document prepared after judgment, by definition, is not part of the record “leading to imposition of judgment.” (People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th atp. 1195 , italics added.) Likewise, such document is not generally considered a proper part of the record on appeal.

1996(See People v. Abarca, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1350 .) Exhibit A, however, is dated almost two months after Lewis’s plea and sentencing.

1967In 1923, however,—some six years after the Lewis decision—the Legislature did amend Penal Code section 270 to provide that a father is not relieved of his criminal liability for the wilful failure to provide for his minor child merely because the mother of such child is legally entitled to its custody nor because she or some other person has provided the necessities of life to such child. 3 In Dixon v. Dixon (1932) 216 Cal. 440 [ 14 P.2d 497 ], an action brought in this state for child support by a mother who had been awarded the custody of the child by a divorce decree in Oklahoma, the effect

1967In 1923, however,—some six years after the Lewis decision—the Legislature did amend Penal Code section 270 to provide that a father is not relieved of his criminal liability for the wilful failure to provide for his minor child merely because the mother of such child is legally entitled to its custody nor because she or some other person has provided the necessities of life to such child. 3 In Dixon v. Dixon (1932) 216 Cal. 440 [ 14 P.2d 497 ], an action brought in this state for child support by a mother who had been awarded the custody of the child by a divorce decree in Oklahoma, the effect