Lewis defense in New York

2013Lewis’ defense, that she did not know what caused the child’s injuries, was not “in irreconcilable conflict” with defendant’s claims that his state ments were involuntary and that the proof was insufficient to establish his guilt (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 184 [1989]; see People v Smith, 89 AD3d 1126, 1131 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 962 [2012]; People v Cordato, 85 AD3d 1304, 1308 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]).

2013Lewis’ defense, that she did not know what caused the child’s injuries, was not “in irreconcilable conflict” with defendant’s claims that his state ments were involuntary and that the proof was insufficient to establish his guilt (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 184 [1989]; see People v Smith, 89 AD3d 1126, 1131 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 962 [2012]; People v Cordato, 85 AD3d 1304, 1308 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]).

2014Rather, the shank was discovered during the process of unpacking Lewis’s belongings at the special housing unit after he had been transferred to that location for unrelated reasons, and the record contains evidence showing that Lewis was present during this unpacking process (see generally Matter of Argentina v Fischer, 98 AD3d 768 [2012]; Matter of Scott v Coughlin, 231 AD2d 727 [1996]).

2014Rather, the shank was discovered during the process of unpacking Lewis’s belongings at the special housing unit after he had been transferred to that location for unrelated reasons, and the record contains evidence showing that Lewis was present during this unpacking process (see generally Matter of Argentina v Fischer, 98 AD3d 768 [2012]; Matter of Scott v Coughlin, 231 AD2d 727 [1996]).

2009Neither Snow nor the Lewis defendants assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the plaintiff by virtue of their snow removal contracts (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d at 140 ; Carricato v Jefferson Val.

2009Neither Snow nor the Lewis defendants assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the plaintiff by virtue of their snow removal contracts (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d at 140 ; Carricato v Jefferson Val.

2009Nor is there any evidence that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on either Snow or the Lewis defendants’ performance of their duties or that the actions of those defendants “launched a force or instrument of harm” (Abbattista v King’s Grant Master Assn., Inc., 39 AD3d at 440 ; see Wheaton v East End Commons Assoc., LLC, 50 AD3d 675, 677 [2008]; Pavlovich v Wade Assoc., 274 AD2d 382, 383 [2000]; Bugiada v Iko, 274 AD2d 368, 369 [2000]).

2001Supreme Court’s finding that “[i]t appears from the submissions, including the movant’s own [a]ffidavit, that he is in default with regard to the underlying action” is a sua sponte determination of Lewis’ default status which was not authorized in this situation (see, e.g., Soggs v Crocco, 184 AD2d 1021 ; see also, Sena v Nationwide Mut.

2001Turning briefly to Lewis’ motion for reconsideration, this motion is based on the ground that Supreme Court made a mistake of fact and law in its original determination which requires us to treat it as a motion to reargue (see, Spa Realty Assocs. v Springs Assocs., 213 AD2d 781, 783 ).

1994Following a trial in January 1989, Lewis’ husband was convicted of leaving the scene of an incident without reporting (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 [2] [a]; People v Lewis, 162 AD2d 760 , lv denied 76 NY2d 894 ).

1990The guarantee of CBC’s obligations executed in 1984 contemplated the accrual of future indebtedness, and such credit was eventually extended by Bank Leumi to CBC (Columbus Trust Co. v Campolo, 110 AD2d 616 , affd 66 NY2d 701 ).

1990The guarantee of CBC’s obligations executed in 1984 contemplated the accrual of future indebtedness, and such credit was eventually extended by Bank Leumi to CBC (Columbus Trust Co. v Campolo, 110 AD2d 616 , affd 66 NY2d 701 ).

1983The jury, however, which “ ‘may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted’ ” (People v Malave, 21 NY2d 26, 29 , quoting People v Clemente, 285 App Div 258, 264 , affd 309 NY 890 ), might also have discredited Lewis’ testimony, especially in light of Lewis’ plea bargain in return for his testimony (see People v Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 371 ), and decided that defendant never intended to commit a crime in the lodge, thus satisfying only the elements of criminal trespass in the third degree (see People v Henderson, 41 NY

1983The jury, however, which “ ‘may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted’ ” (People v Malave, 21 NY2d 26, 29 , quoting People v Clemente, 285 App Div 258, 264 , affd 309 NY 890 ), might also have discredited Lewis’ testimony, especially in light of Lewis’ plea bargain in return for his testimony (see People v Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 371 ), and decided that defendant never intended to commit a crime in the lodge, thus satisfying only the elements of criminal trespass in the third degree (see People v Henderson, 41 NY

1983The jury, however, which “ ‘may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted’ ” (People v Malave, 21 NY2d 26, 29 , quoting People v Clemente, 285 App Div 258, 264 , affd 309 NY 890 ), might also have discredited Lewis’ testimony, especially in light of Lewis’ plea bargain in return for his testimony (see People v Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 371 ), and decided that defendant never intended to commit a crime in the lodge, thus satisfying only the elements of criminal trespass in the third degree (see People v Henderson, 41 NY

1983The jury, however, which “ ‘may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted’ ” (People v Malave, 21 NY2d 26, 29 , quoting People v Clemente, 285 App Div 258, 264 , affd 309 NY 890 ), might also have discredited Lewis’ testimony, especially in light of Lewis’ plea bargain in return for his testimony (see People v Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 371 ), and decided that defendant never intended to commit a crime in the lodge, thus satisfying only the elements of criminal trespass in the third degree (see People v Henderson, 41 NY