singular inquiry in New York

2012Indeed, were Storobin a judge, this singular violation would justify his removal from the bench since he was guilty of false swearing based upon the witness statement he signed (see Matter of Heburn, 84 NY2d 168, 171 [1994]). .

2012Indeed, were Storobin a judge, this singular violation would justify his removal from the bench since he was guilty of false swearing based upon the witness statement he signed (see Matter of Heburn, 84 NY2d 168, 171 [1994]). .

2025Nevertheless, we find that this singular error was harmless, as the evidence of guilt was overwhelming [*6]and, noting that defense counsel was still able to present various arguments that could have cast doubt on defendant's knowledge of the gun's presence, there was no significant probability, nor reasonable possibility, that the error would have resulted in a different outcome ( see People v Cole , 177 AD3d 1096 , 1102 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1015 [2019]; see also People v Mairena ,34 NY3d at 486; see generally People v Ortiz , 189 AD3d 891, 892-893 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY

2020Without some showing of how he has been prejudiced by this singular claim being rendered moot, we cannot conclude that defendant suffered a deprivation of due process by the delays alleged ( see People v Cousart , 58 NY2d at 68-69 ; Matter of Jermaine J. , 6 AD3d at 94 ; People v Beyor , 272 AD2d 929, 929 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 832 [2000]; People v Maddox , 272 AD2d 884, 885 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 867 [2000]; People v Moore , 100 AD2d 521, 521 [1984]).

2020Without some showing of how he has been prejudiced by this singular claim being rendered moot, we cannot conclude that defendant suffered a deprivation of due process by the delays alleged ( see People v Cousart , 58 NY2d at 68-69 ; Matter of Jermaine J. , 6 AD3d at 94 ; People v Beyor , 272 AD2d 929, 929 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 832 [2000]; People v Maddox , 272 AD2d 884, 885 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 867 [2000]; People v Moore , 100 AD2d 521, 521 [1984]).

2020Without some showing of how he has been prejudiced by this singular claim being rendered moot, we cannot conclude that defendant suffered a deprivation of due process by the delays alleged ( see People v Cousart , 58 NY2d at 68-69 ; Matter of Jermaine J. , 6 AD3d at 94 ; People v Beyor , 272 AD2d 929, 929 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 832 [2000]; People v Maddox , 272 AD2d 884, 885 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 867 [2000]; People v Moore , 100 AD2d 521, 521 [1984]).

2017“The singular inquiry in a disposi-tional hearing following an adjudication of permanent neglect is which disposition relating to the child’s future care and custody is in his or her best interests; there is no presumption that any particular disposition will promote such interests” (Matter of Merinda MM. [Sirena NN.], 143 AD3d 1095, 1096 [2016] [citations omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 910 [2016]; see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Landon U. [Amanda U.], 132 AD3d 1081, 1085 [2015]).

2017“The singular inquiry in a disposi-tional hearing following an adjudication of permanent neglect is which disposition relating to the child’s future care and custody is in his or her best interests; there is no presumption that any particular disposition will promote such interests” (Matter of Merinda MM. [Sirena NN.], 143 AD3d 1095, 1096 [2016] [citations omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 910 [2016]; see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Landon U. [Amanda U.], 132 AD3d 1081, 1085 [2015]).

2016While we agree with defendant that his counsel should have objected to this testimony as improper bolstering (see People v Buie, 86 *1183 NY2d 501, 510 [1995]; People v Vargas, 60 AD3d 1236, 1239 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 750 [2009]), it cannot be said that this singular error deprived defendant of meaningful representation.

2016The singular inquiry in a dispositional hearing following an adjudication of permanent neglect is which disposition relating to the child’s future care and custody is in his or her best interests; there is no presumption that any particular disposition will promote such interests (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d 1094 , 1098 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Matter of Kellcie NN. [Sarah NN.], 85 AD3d 1251, 1252 [2011]).

2016The singular inquiry in a dispositional hearing following an adjudication of permanent neglect is which disposition relating to the child’s future care and custody is in his or her best interests; there is no presumption that any particular disposition will promote such interests (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d 1094 , 1098 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Matter of Kellcie NN. [Sarah NN.], 85 AD3d 1251, 1252 [2011]).

2016Family Court may, in its discretion, commit guardianship and custody of the child to the petitioning agency or issue a suspended judgment, which provides a parent with “a brief grace period within which to become a fit parent with whom the child can be safely reunited” (Matter of Hazel OO. [Roseanne OO.], 133 AD3d 1126 , 1127 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 631 [b], [c]; Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d at 1098). *1097 The record establishes that, although she acted appropriately during her supervised visits with the child, the mother failed

2016Indeed, the grandmother’s repetition of the victim’s prior identification was ultimately harmless, as it “was brief in the overall context of her testimony [and] the People did not rely on it as direct evidence of defendant’s guilt” (People v Hughes, 114 AD3d 1021, 1023 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1038 [2014]).