singular doctrine in Illinois

2016Thus, we hold that section 60 operates to recognize, as of the Act’s effective date, any civil union that was, at any time, legally entered into in a foreign jurisdiction. 2 The same analysis applies to a “same-sex marriage” and a “similar legal relationship.” However, in this case, confining our analysis to a “civil union” is sufficient. - 11 - ¶ 44 Respondent posits that the recent case of Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023 , supports her view of “prospectivity” and a “prospective” application of the Act that synchronizes the effective date

2015Thus, we hold that section 60 operates to recognize, as of the Act’s effective date, any civil union that was, at any time, legally entered into in a foreign jurisdiction. ¶ 44 Respondent posits that the recent case of Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023 , supports her view of “prospectivity” and a “prospective” application of the Act that synchronizes the effective date of the Act with the accrual of civil-union property, no matter when the civil union was legally entered into in another jurisdiction.

1922If the agreement is accepted by the mortgagee, each party to it is an original promisor for the payment of the incumbrance, but the contract rights of the mortgagee cannot be changed by any arrangement between the mortgagor and his grantee unless the mortgagee agrees to such change. ’ “The Supreme court in these cas.es, when it refers to an agreement by the mortgagee, means an agreement in fact, not one resting in any presumption of law, because there is no such presumption. * * * “Again, as the court said in Fish v. Glover, supra, so we say: ‘It would be a singular doctrine if the contract ri

1919Again, as the court said in Fish v. Glover, supra, so we say: “It would be a singular doctrine, if the contract rights of the mortgagee could be changed by any arrangement between the mortgagor and his grantee, to which the mortgagee was not a party. ’ ’ In Seeman v. Mills, supra, after the note in controversy secured by a real estate mortgage fell due, an agreement was made between the holder and a subsequent purchaser for an extension of the time of payment without the knowledge or consent of the maker of the note, and this court said: “Defendant says that because of these facts the grantee

2015Again, the singular requirement is that the civil union was legally entered into in the foreign jurisdiction. 2 Id.

1995In our view, this singular exception to the general exclusion of coverage for vehicles is insufficient to classify the policy as one of 'vehicle insurance’ as that term is used in section 143.01(a) in declaring invalid provisions in policies of vehicle insurance excluding coverage for third-party contribution claims against a member of the injured person’s family.” 152 Ill.

1995App. 3d at 452 , 504 N.E.2d at 973-74 .

1921In their favor, as against the rightful claimant, the decree would not operate.” In Fraser v. Page, 82 Ky. 73 , the opinion states (p. 76) : “They [the trustees] were compelled to obey the judgment of the court to which they had gone for advice. * * * Having the right to apply to a court of equity for such a purpose, it would be a singular rule that would adjudge the fiduciary liable by reason of an erroneous judgment by the court whose aid it was not only his right but his duty to invoke.” In Minor v. Purrington, 190 Mass. 336 , the court said (p. 341) : “We are of opinion that this decree of

1921In their favor, as against the rightful claimant, the decree would not operate.” In Fraser v. Page, 82 Ky. 73 , the opinion states (p. 76) : “They [the trustees] were compelled to obey the judgment of the court to which they had gone for advice. * * * Having the right to apply to a court of equity for such a purpose, it would be a singular rule that would adjudge the fiduciary liable by reason of an erroneous judgment by the court whose aid it was not only his right but his duty to invoke.” In Minor v. Purrington, 190 Mass. 336 , the court said (p. 341) : “We are of opinion that this decree of

1919Again, as the court said in Fish v. Glover, supra, so we say: “It would be a singular doctrine, if the contract rights of the mortgagee could be changed by any arrangement between the mortgagor and his grantee, to which the mortgagee was not a party. ’ ’ In Seeman v. Mills, supra, after the note in controversy secured by a real estate mortgage fell due, an agreement was made between the holder and a subsequent purchaser for an extension of the time of payment without the knowledge or consent of the maker of the note, and this court said: “Defendant says that because of these facts the grantee

1913But the mortgagee may treat both as principal debtors, and may have a personal decree against both, unless he has consented to accept such grantee of the mortgagor * * * as surety merely.” After more to the same effect the court quotes approvingly from Jones on Mortgages, secs. 741, 742a: “There is no novation unless there be something to show that the mortgagee has released the mortgagor, and has agreed to look solely to the purchaser for payment of the mortgage debt. * * * It would be a singular doctrine, if the contract rights of the mortgagee could be changed by any arrangement between the