singular exception in California

2019The statute still remained without a definition of the term "victim." (Stats. 1991, ch. 657, § 1.) However, as the Supreme Court discussed in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 ( Birkett ), by this time, the term had a well-established meaning in the restitution context-" '[a] "victim" is a "person who is the object of a crime." ' " ( Id. at p. 232, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 , quoting People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952 , 957, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 864 P.2d 80 .) Given this legal landscape, the legislative history of the new provision authorizing r

2019The statute still remained without a definition of the term "victim." (Stats. 1991, ch. 657, § 1.) However, as the Supreme Court discussed in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 ( Birkett ), by this time, the term had a well-established meaning in the restitution context-" '[a] "victim" is a "person who is the object of a crime." ' " ( Id. at p. 232, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 , quoting People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952 , 957, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 864 P.2d 80 .) Given this legal landscape, the legislative history of the new provision authorizing r

2019The statute still remained without a definition of the term "victim." (Stats. 1991, ch. 657, § 1.) However, as the Supreme Court discussed in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 ( Birkett ), by this time, the term had a well-established meaning in the restitution context-" '[a] "victim" is a "person who is the object of a crime." ' " ( Id. at p. 232, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 , quoting People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952 , 957, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 864 P.2d 80 .) Given this legal landscape, the legislative history of the new provision authorizing r

2019The statute still remained without a definition of the term "victim." (Stats. 1991, ch. 657, § 1.) However, as the Supreme Court discussed in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 ( Birkett ), by this time, the term had a well-established meaning in the restitution context-" '[a] "victim" is a "person who is the object of a crime." ' " ( Id. at p. 232, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 980 P.2d 912 , quoting People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952 , 957, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 864 P.2d 80 .) Given this legal landscape, the legislative history of the new provision authorizing r

2024Finally, not only is a requirement for issue preclusion to apply lacking, the “application of collateral estoppel will [not] advance the public policies which underlie the doctrine”—namely, “ ‘ “ ‘ “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” ’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Murphy, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 .) The fact that the two rulings at issue here were decided as one at a

2023Finally, not only is a requirement for issue preclusion to apply lacking, the “application of collateral estoppel will [not] advance the public policies which underlie the doctrine”—namely, “ ‘ “ ‘ “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” ’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Murphy, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 .) The fact that the two rulings at issue here were decided as one at a

2000California has rejected that rule as a singular test of respondeat superior liability. ( Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 297 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 , 907 P.2d 358 ; Fields v. Sanders (1947) 29 Cal.2d 834, 839 , 180 P.2d 684 .) In addition, none of those cases involved a security guard who, like the one in the present case, patrolled the community in a marked vehicle, wearing a uniform, and carrying a weapon.

2000California has rejected that rule as a singular test of respondeat superior liability. ( Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 297 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 , 907 P.2d 358 ; Fields v. Sanders (1947) 29 Cal.2d 834, 839 , 180 P.2d 684 .) In addition, none of those cases involved a security guard who, like the one in the present case, patrolled the community in a marked vehicle, wearing a uniform, and carrying a weapon.

2024It explained: “[G]iven the ongoing nature of a hostile work environment claim, which is a singular claim predicated on a series of acts over a course of time, to the extent that Olivieri alleges post-Effective-Date conduct, the application of the statute to a claim arising in part from that conduct can’t properly be described as ‘retroactive.’ Defendants’ contractual rights are affected not just by ‘conduct arising before [the EFAA’s] enactment,’ [citation], but also by conduct that occurred after its enactment. [¶] Second, even if application of the EFAA to conduct predating the statute could

2009The trial judge remarked that he had “ ‘looked at these contract provisions and [had] serious reservations about whether there have been breaches sufficient even to bring these damages issues into account with the singular exception of the equipment allowances.’ ” (7-Eleven, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151 .) 12 Continental Illinois affirmed the trial court’s refusal to award any money to the named plaintiff, for whom an award of $10,000 was sought from a $45 million settlement, for what the court described as “modest services”; the plaintiff “was deposed, which took a few hours, and bore a s

1995The assailants and victims, the court noted, were "complete strangers" until their work brought them together; thus the dispute could not have derived from "personal malice unrelated to the employment." ( 50 Cal. App.3d at p. 621 .) Rather, a work-related dispute was the "proximate cause" of the attack. ( Ibid. ) Because an intentional tort gives rise to respondeat superior liability only if it was engendered by the employment, our disavowal of motive as a singular test of respondeat superior liability does not mean the employee's motive is irrelevant.

1995The assailants and victims, the court noted, were "complete strangers" until their work brought them together; thus the dispute could not have derived from "personal malice unrelated to the employment." ( 50 Cal. App.3d at p. 621 .) Rather, a work-related dispute was the "proximate cause" of the attack. ( Ibid. ) Because an intentional tort gives rise to respondeat superior liability only if it was engendered by the employment, our disavowal of motive as a singular test of respondeat superior liability does not mean the employee's motive is irrelevant.

1992“The [local coastal program] had characterized the project site as the most suitable location for the proposed development, and had further concluded, after an exhaustive regional and environmental survey, that no other property (with the singular exception of the one alternative site analyzed in the EIR) was appropriate for the land use under consideration.” (Goleta II, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 573 .) Against this factual background, it made good sense to permit administrative findings on the issue of infeasibility.