8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022A. Right to a Fair and Impartial Presentation ¶15 The State, relying on United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), argues that decades of Arizona appellate decisions “requiring the prosecutor to present the evidence in a ‘fair and impartial manner,’ and present all ‘clearly exculpatory’ evidence . . . were born out of a misinterpretation of the federal due process clause.” The State further asserts that “[t]hese standards are not required by the federal or state constitutions.” Misplaced reliance on Williams and the absence of any 5 WILLIS V. 2022BERNINI/STATE Opinion of the Court federal due process requirement aside, the State misconstrues Arizona’s Constitution. ¶16 In Williams, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural rule promulgated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring federal prosecutors to inform a grand jury of “substantial exculpatory evidence.” 504 U.S. at 45 . 1 The Court was not asked to consider the presentation of evidence to a grand jury premised on the Fifth Amendment and the Court did not elect to do so. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Speergreen2 sentences2014See Speer, 221 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 36, 212 P.3d at 795 ; Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507-08 , 844 P.2d at 1157-58 . ¶ 15 Many other state courts, however, have held that their state constitutions or evidentiary rules require measures similar to a Willits instruction when the state’s failure to preserve evidence does not involve bad faith. 2014See Speer, 221 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 36, 212 P.3d at 795 ; Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507-08 , 844 P.2d at 1157-58 . ¶ 15 Many other state courts, however, have held that their state constitutions or evidentiary rules require measures similar to a Willits instruction when the state’s failure to preserve evidence does not involve bad faith. | 1 | 1 |
Standhardt v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2008DeVries also argued subsection B violates the federal due process clause because its “onerous” requirements restrict a fundamental right, access to *322 the courts, but are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 12 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 , 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (access to courts is a fundamental right); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 206 Ariz. 276, 279, ¶ 8 , 77 P.3d 451, 454 (App.2003) (government cannot restrict fundamental right unless restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). 2008DeVries also argued subsection B violates the federal due process clause because its “onerous” requirements restrict a fundamental right, access to *322 the courts, but are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 12 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 , 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (access to courts is a fundamental right); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 206 Ariz. 276, 279, ¶ 8 , 77 P.3d 451, 454 (App.2003) (government cannot restrict fundamental right unless restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1990See Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 390 , 690 P.2d 105, 109 (App.1984). 1990See Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 390 , 690 P.2d 105, 109 (App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schreibergreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). 1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'Dell Fowlergreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). 1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Dimond v. Samaritan Health Servicegreen2 sentences1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . 1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Farmer v. Killingsworthgreen2 sentences1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . 1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Valley Nat. Bank of Phoenix v. Glovergreen2 sentences1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . 1981See Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44 , 424 P.2d 172 (1967), Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service, 27 Ariz.App. 682 , 558 P.2d 710 (1976), Cf. Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538 , 159 P.2d 292 (1945) (equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions have the same effect). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Arizona v. Robert Charles Glissendorf
green
1 sentence2018We have held that “the same bad-faith test applies to identify violations of either the Arizona due process clause or the federal due process clause.” State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147 , 151 ¶ 14 (2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences2014In assessing materiality in that context, Trombetta stated “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 . ¶ 18 The Trombetta standard, grounded in the due process clause, is inapposite for assessing the appropriateness of a Willits instruction, which, as discussed, does not turn on the subjective intent of the state’s agents. 2014In assessing materiality in that context, Trombetta stated “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 . ¶ 18 The Trombetta standard, grounded in the due process clause, is inapposite for assessing the appropriateness of a Willits instruction, which, as discussed, does not turn on the subjective intent of the state’s agents. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2014See Speer, 221 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 36, 212 P.3d at 795 ; Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507-08 , 844 P.2d at 1157-58 . ¶ 15 Many other state courts, however, have held that their state constitutions or evidentiary rules require measures similar to a Willits instruction when the state’s failure to preserve evidence does not involve bad faith. 2014See Speer, 221 Ariz. at 457 ¶ 36, 212 P.3d at 795 ; Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507-08 , 844 P.2d at 1157-58 . ¶ 15 Many other state courts, however, have held that their state constitutions or evidentiary rules require measures similar to a Willits instruction when the state’s failure to preserve evidence does not involve bad faith. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bounds v. Smith
red
2 sentences2008DeVries also argued subsection B violates the federal due process clause because its “onerous” requirements restrict a fundamental right, access to *322 the courts, but are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 12 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 , 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (access to courts is a fundamental right); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 206 Ariz. 276, 279, ¶ 8 , 77 P.3d 451, 454 (App.2003) (government cannot restrict fundamental right unless restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). 2008DeVries also argued subsection B violates the federal due process clause because its “onerous” requirements restrict a fundamental right, access to *322 the courts, but are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 12 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 , 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (access to courts is a fundamental right); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 206 Ariz. 276, 279, ¶ 8 , 77 P.3d 451, 454 (App.2003) (government cannot restrict fundamental right unless restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Melendez
green
2 sentences2003Melendez, 172 Ariz. at 71 , 834 P.2d at 157 . 2003Melendez, 172 Ariz. at 71 , 834 P.2d at 157 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2003In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), has now engrafted the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt onto the federal due process clause. 2 . 2003In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), has now engrafted the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt onto the federal due process clause. 2 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Cota
green
1 sentence1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Cota
green
1 sentence1990See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 115 Ariz. 555, 558-59 , 566 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1977); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 564 , 422 P.2d 125, 128 (1967); State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 236-37 , 408 P.2d 23 , 26 (1965). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.