federal due process violation in Texas

2026“If the State withholds material exculpatory evidence still in its possession, a federal due process violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004)).

2026App. 2011)). “[In] contrast, to prove a federal due process violation based on [the S]tate’s destruction of merely ‘potentially useful evidence,’ a defendant must show that the State acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence.” Id. (quoting Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547–48); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57–58; see Payne v. State, No. 11-19-00298-CR, 2021 WL 4998788 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 28, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Misjudgment is not bad faith.”).

2008The federal due process test consists of two parts: (1) whether the nonresident defendant purposely established “minimum contacts” in the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462 , 475–76, 105 S. Ct. 2174 , 2183–84 (1985); Guardian Royal Exch.

2008The federal due process test consists of two parts: (1) whether the nonresident defendant purposely established “minimum contacts” in the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462 , 475–76, 105 S. Ct. 2174 , 2183–84 (1985); Guardian Royal Exch.

2021See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 ; Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559 .

2003Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471 -72 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ).

2000See Griffin , 765 S.W.2d at 430 ; In re J.T.H. , 779 S.W.2d at 958 . 995 S.W.2d 778 , 784-85 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, pet. denied).

2000See Griffin, 765 S.W.2d at 430 ; In re 779 S.W.2d at 958 .

2017See Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2015Although we use the federal due process standard in analyzing minimum 2 144163.06501/101794599v.1 contacts, see, e.g., Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990), we do not use federal procedural rules in determining how such proof must be made.”).

1998In Schlobohm , the court further set out Texas’s three-part formula for ensuring compliance with the federal due process standard: (1)The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative conven

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2012Id. at 172–73. "'Voluntariness' under both constitutional and state law doctrines is to be measured according to the totality of the circumstances.'" Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 427 (Tex. Crim.

2011Id. at 172–73. ―‗Voluntariness' under both constitutional and state law doctrines is to be measured according to the totality of the circumstances.‖ Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 427 (Tex. Crim.

2010Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 729-30 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 962 , 126 S.Ct. 481 , 163 L.Ed.2d 367 (2005) (stating sufficiency of evidence review requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt).

2010We review a federal due process challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the “substantive elements of the offense as defined by state law” beyond a reasonable doubt. *80 Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 729-30 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 546 U.S. 962 , 126 S.Ct. 481 , 163 L.Ed.2d 367 (2005) (stating sufficiency of evidence review requires viewing the evidenc

2017See Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim.

2015Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 211 .

2025Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. Crim.

2023Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. Crim.

2025Castle- The "due course of law" provision of the Texas constitution man v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018). provides protections similar to, and in some instances, greater When the statute is considered as a whole, the only reasonable than the protections in the federal due process clause.

2025Castle- The "due course of law" provision of the Texas constitution man v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018). provides protections similar to, and in some instances, greater When the statute is considered as a whole, the only reasonable than the protections in the federal due process clause.

2018Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995) (“in matters of procedural due process, we have traditionally followed contemporary federal due process interpretations of procedural due process issues”); see also Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (en banc) (“[I]f a federal due process violation was proved, the evidence will prove a state violation, as well.”). 11 See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 . 12 See Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929 . 13 See id. at 929–31. 9 element and the trial court therefore appropriately granted its plea to the jurisd

2018Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995) (“in matters of procedural due process, we have traditionally followed contemporary federal due process interpretations of procedural due process issues”); see also Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (en banc) (“[I]f a federal due process violation was proved, the evidence will prove a state violation, as well.”). 11 See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 . 12 See Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929 . 13 See id. at 929–31. 9 element and the trial court therefore appropriately granted its plea to the jurisd

2015See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977). [19] [20] We recently recognized that “Texas courts have not been consistent in articulating a standard of review under the due course clause.” Trinity River Authority, 889 S.W.2d at 263 .

1996Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 525 ; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977).

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2015See Jones v. State, 437 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no. pet.); Higginbotham v. State, 416 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d at 751 ; McGee v. State, 210 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Salazar v. State, 185 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, No. 07–06–0086–CR, 2006 WL 2860973 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 7 contained in the car’s shell was exculpatory or inculpatory.

2011Scott v. State, 36 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing U.S. CONST. amends.

2011A year later, the First Court of Appeals, in Scott v. State, overruled a federal due process challenge against section 22.011(a)(2)(A), finding the provision furthered a legitimate state interest and did not offend any fundamental individual right. 36 S.W.3d 240, 241-42 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).

2009See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 , 82 S.Ct. 955 , 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962) (every misapplication of state law does not constitute a federal due process violation). 16 .

2009See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 , 82 S.Ct. 955 , 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962) (every misapplication of state law does not constitute a federal due process violation). 16 .

2026App. 2011)). “[In] contrast, to prove a federal due process violation based on [the S]tate’s destruction of merely ‘potentially useful evidence,’ a defendant must show that the State acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence.” Id. (quoting Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547–48); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57–58; see Payne v. State, No. 11-19-00298-CR, 2021 WL 4998788 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 28, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Misjudgment is not bad faith.”).

2020When the State fails to preserve or disclose material-exculpatory-evidence, it violates the defendant’s due process rights regardless of the State’s motives, and therefore, the question of whether the State acted in bad faith is “irrelevant.” Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 229 , citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 ; see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (recognizing that if the State withholds material-exculpatory-evidence, a federal due process violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith).

2008Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C. , 815 S.W.2d 223 , 230–31 (Tex. 1991).

2008Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223 , 230–31 (Tex. 1991).

2021State v. Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see Stoernell v. State, No. 14-14-00371-CR, 2015 WL 5025630 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 25, 2015, no pet.) (analyzing, under federal law, issues of pre-indictment delay as they relate to the Fifth Amendment and to the Texas due-course-of-law clause). 2 There is no statute of limitations for the offense of murder in Texas.

2015The Texas due-course-of-law clause generally “does not provide any greater protection than the federal due process clause.” State v. Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2026“If the State withholds material exculpatory evidence still in its possession, a federal due process violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004)).

2020When the State fails to preserve or disclose material-exculpatory-evidence, it violates the defendant’s due process rights regardless of the State’s motives, and therefore, the question of whether the State acted in bad faith is “irrelevant.” Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 229 , citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 ; see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (recognizing that if the State withholds material-exculpatory-evidence, a federal due process violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith).

2025See id.

2025Patel interpretation is that all retail sales associated with a single place v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 , 86-87 of business are consummated at that single place of business, (Tex. 2015) ("the Texas due course of law protections in Article regardless of whether the order was placed in person there, the I, §19, for the most part, align with the protections found in the order was received there from a purchaser at another location, or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2007Comm’n v. Patient Advocates, 136 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex.2004) (“Texas’s due course of law clause and the federal due process clause are textually different, but we generally construe the due course clause in the same way as its federal counterpart.”).

2007Comm’n v. Patient Advocates , 136 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex. 2004) (“Texas’s due course of law clause and the federal due process clause are textually different, but we generally construe the due course clause in the same way as its federal counterpart.”).

2010However, unlike a legal sufficiency review, which is a federal due process requirement, a factual sufficiency review “is a creature of state law.” Id.

2009The court of criminal appeals has recently explained that, “unlike a legal sufficiency review, which is a federal due process requirement, a factual sufficiency review is a creature of state law.” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim.

2015The evidence was not sufficient to sustain Walker’s possession with intent conviction as a principal. (a) Standard of review Sufficiency of the evidence under the federal due process standard is now reviewed under the legal sufficiency standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

2010We review a federal due process challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the “substantive elements of the offense as defined by state law” beyond a reasonable doubt. *80 Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 729-30 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 546 U.S. 962 , 126 S.Ct. 481 , 163 L.Ed.2d 367 (2005) (stating sufficiency of evidence review requires viewing the evidenc

2022Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2002Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 .