federal due process clause in Pennsylvania

2018“When the state fails to disclose evidence that is materially exculpatory to a defendant, a federal due process violation occurs and the evidence must be suppressed without regard to the good or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 408 (emphasis added), citing Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2018In contrast, when the state fails to preserve potentially useful evidence — characterized as “evidentiary material of which not more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant” — “the failure to preserve such evidence does not violate due process ‘unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.’” Snyder, 963 A.2d at 408 , citing, inter alia, Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48 .

2018“When the state fails to disclose evidence that is materially exculpatory to a defendant, a federal due process violation occurs and the evidence must be suppressed without regard to the good or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 408 (emphasis added), citing Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2018In considering a federal due process claim that the Commonwealth failed to preserve evidence, a court first determines whether the evidence was “materially exculpatory” or “potentially useful.” Snyder, 963 A.2d at 405 .

2020See Elliott, 80 A.3d at 442 .

2020See Elliott, 80 A.3d at 442 .

2018See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 ( l 988)(whether a federal due process violation occurs depends on whether the evidence can be considered materially exculpatory or merely potentially useful to a defendant; "potentially useful" evidence is evidence that "could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.").

2018See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 ( l 988)(whether a federal due process violation occurs depends on whether the evidence can be considered materially exculpatory or merely potentially useful to a defendant; "potentially useful" evidence is evidence that "could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.").

2021(Secretary’s Preliminary Objection ¶ 15; Secretary’s Brief at 8-9.) “‘The substantive component of the Due Process Clause limits what government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures that it employs[]’ . . . in order to ‘guarantee protect[ion] against government power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised.’” Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 11 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); Boyanowski v. Cap.

2013See Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109 , 950 A.2d 294, 320 (2008) (rejecting claim that prior counsel were ineffective for not challenging introduction of other crime evidence as violating due process or seeking limiting instruction in light of holding on direct appeal that any error in admitting evidence was harmless).

2013See Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109 , 950 A.2d 294, 320 (2008) (rejecting claim that prior counsel were ineffective for not challenging introduction of other crime evidence as violating due process or seeking limiting instruction in light of holding on direct appeal that any error in admitting evidence was harmless).

2012Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853 (3d Cir.1992) (“Ineffectiveness of [PCRA] counsel does not provide sufficient cause to excuse procedural default when counsel is not constitutionally mandated”); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 373 (W.D.Pa. 2002) (“the due process clause does not require counsel for state post-conviction proceedings, whether state law requires such counsel or not.”); In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273 (5th Cir.2001).

2012Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853 (3d Cir.1992) ("Ineffectiveness of [PCRA] counsel does not provide sufficient cause to excuse procedural default when counsel is not constitutionally mandated"); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 373 (W.D.Pa. 2002) ("the due process clause does not require counsel for state post-conviction proceedings, whether state law requires such counsel or not."); In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273 (5th Cir.2001).

2011See Commonwealth v. Deans, 530 Pa. 514 , 610 A.2d 32, 34 (1992) (finding a federal due process violation resulting from evidence that was lost before the defense had an opportunity to examine it, based in part on our observation that the missing evidence was “the primary evidence in the case.”) (abrogated by Snyder, 963 A.2d 396 ). 5 According to Appellant, the blood evidence was central to the Commonwealth’s case even though it was not introduced at trial because this Court recognized its importance in Chamberlain I when we explained that defense counsel reasonably argued that DNA testing mig

2011See Commonwealth v. Deans, 530 Pa. 514 , 610 A.2d 32, 34 (1992) (finding a federal due process violation resulting from evidence that was lost before the defense had an opportunity to examine it, based in part on our observation that the missing evidence was “the primary evidence in the case.”) (abrogated by Snyder, 963 A.2d 396 ). 5 According to Appellant, the blood evidence was central to the Commonwealth’s case even though it was not introduced at trial because this Court recognized its importance in Chamberlain I when we explained that defense counsel reasonably argued that DNA testing mig

2011See Commonwealth v. Deans, 530 Pa. 514 , 610 A.2d 32, 34 (1992) (finding a federal due process violation resulting from evidence that was lost before the defense had an opportunity to examine it, based in part on our observation that the missing evidence was “the primary evidence in the case.”) (abrogated by Snyder, 963 A.2d 396 ). 5 According to Appellant, the blood evidence was central to the Commonwealth’s case even though it was not introduced at trial because this Court recognized its importance in Chamberlain I when we explained that defense counsel reasonably argued that DNA testing mig

2009See 166 S.W.3d at 281 .

2009See 166 S.W.3d at 281 .

2002The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “the requirements of Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are not distinguishable from those of the [Due Process Clause of the] 14th Anendment ... [thus] we may apply the same- analysis to both claims.” Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v. Marich, 542 Pa. 226 , 229 n. 6, 666 A.2d 253 , 255 n. 6 (1995) (citing R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 535 Pa. 440, 461-62 , 636 A.2d 142, 152-53 (1994)).

2002The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “the requirements of Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are not distinguishable from those of the [Due Process Clause of the] 14th Anendment ... [thus] we may apply the same- analysis to both claims.” Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v. Marich, 542 Pa. 226 , 229 n. 6, 666 A.2d 253 , 255 n. 6 (1995) (citing R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 535 Pa. 440, 461-62 , 636 A.2d 142, 152-53 (1994)).

1991The Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted prior to the federal Constitution, and using the language of the Magna Charta ("Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut dissaisiatur, aut utlagetur . . . nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrae") which has been incorporated virtually word for word in Article I, Section 9, states that an accused cannot "be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." The phrase "law of the land" is equivalent to the due process language in the federal Constitution, and has been ref

1991The Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted prior to the federal Constitution, and using the language of the Magna Charta ("Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut dissaisiatur, aut utlagetur . . . nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrae") which has been incorporated virtually word for word in Article I, Section 9, states that an accused cannot "be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." The phrase "law of the land" is equivalent to the due process language in the federal Constitution, and has been ref

1983See Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 , 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142-43 , 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); Valladares v. Valladares, 80 App.Div.2d 244, 250-251, 438 N.Y.

1983See Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 , 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142-43 , 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); Valladares v. Valladares, 80 App.Div.2d 244, 250-251, 438 N.Y.

1983If the Legislature had intended the Code’s provisions for equitable distribution to govern the disposition of property conveyed before its effective date, we would be constrained to hold that retroactive application of the Code under such circumstances deprives appellant-son of his property without due process of law in violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 The latter provision is substantially equivalent to the federal due process clause, Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 357 Pa. 581,

1983If the Legislature had intended the Code’s provisions for equitable distribution to govern the disposition of property conveyed before its effective date, we would be constrained to hold that retroactive application of the Code under such circumstances deprives appellant-son of his property without due process of law in violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 The latter provision is substantially equivalent to the federal due process clause, Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 357 Pa. 581,