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5 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
A.B. v. S.U.green1 sentence2024See A.B. v. S.U., 17 2023 VT 32, ¶ 10 , __ Vt. __, 298 A.3d 573 (explaining that “we have employed the federal standards to evaluate Article 4 claims” and while parties are free to argue that Vermont Constitution provides greater protection, argument must be adequately supported). | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered1 sentence2009See State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 482 , 595 A.2d 248, 256 (1990) (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Percygreen2 sentences2009See State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 482 , 595 A.2d 248, 256 (1990) (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”). 2009See State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 482 , 595 A.2d 248, 256 (1990) (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wasman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2009See State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 482 , 595 A.2d 248, 256 (1990) (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
Texas v. McCulloughgreen1 sentence2009See State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 482 , 595 A.2d 248, 256 (1990) (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences1999In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965), the issue was whether the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extending the exclusionary rule 6 to the states through the federal due process clause applied to all state court convictions that had become final before Mapp . 1999In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the issue was whether the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), extending the exclusionary rule [6] to the states through the federal due process clause applied to all state court convictions that had become final before Mapp . | 1 | 1 |
Levinsky v. Diamondgreen2 sentences1991See Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 197 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1086 (1989) (Article 4 has been treated as the Vermont equivalent of the federal due process clause), overruled on other grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280 , 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990). 1991See Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 197 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1086 (1989) (Article 4 has been treated as the Vermont equivalent of the federal due process clause), overruled on other grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280 , 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Muzzy v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 197 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1086 (1989) (Article 4 has been treated as the Vermont equivalent of the federal due process clause), overruled on other grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280 , 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990). 1991See Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 197 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1086 (1989) (Article 4 has been treated as the Vermont equivalent of the federal due process clause), overruled on other grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280 , 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Board
green
2 sentences2011Plaintiff does not argue a lack of due process under a federal due process analysis, but rather contends that the instant case is controlled by Vincent n Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531 , 536 A.2d 925 (1987), and not Mason v. Thetford School Board, 142 Vt. 495 , 457 A.2d 647 (1983). ¶ 8. 2011Plaintiff does not argue a lack of due process under a federal due process analysis, but rather contends that the instant case is controlled by Vincent n Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531 , 536 A.2d 925 (1987), and not Mason v. Thetford School Board, 142 Vt. 495 , 457 A.2d 647 (1983). ¶ 8. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mason v. Thetford School Board
green
2 sentences2011Plaintiff does not argue a lack of due process under a federal due process analysis, but rather contends that the instant case is controlled by Vincent n Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531 , 536 A.2d 925 (1987), and not Mason v. Thetford School Board, 142 Vt. 495 , 457 A.2d 647 (1983). ¶ 8. 2011Plaintiff does not argue a lack of due process under a federal due process analysis, but rather contends that the instant case is controlled by Vincent n Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531 , 536 A.2d 925 (1987), and not Mason v. Thetford School Board, 142 Vt. 495 , 457 A.2d 647 (1983). ¶ 8. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1999In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965), the issue was whether the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extending the exclusionary rule 6 to the states through the federal due process clause applied to all state court convictions that had become final before Mapp . 1999In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the issue was whether the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), extending the exclusionary rule [6] to the states through the federal due process clause applied to all state court convictions that had become final before Mapp . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.