67 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griffin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. 2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. | 2 | 7 |
State v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. 2006See State v. Battista, 31 Conn. App. 497, 506 , 626 A.2d 769 , cert. denied, 227 Conn. 907 , 632 A.2d 696 (1993). “[A] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. 2006See State v. Battista, 31 Conn. App. 497, 506 , 626 A.2d 769 , cert. denied, 227 Conn. 907 , 632 A.2d 696 (1993). “[A] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sankogreen2 sentences2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. 2007See State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 40 , 771 A.2d 149 (“[a] factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905 , 772 A.2d 599 (2001), quoting State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1944); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 , 112 S. Ct. 466 , 116 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court noted that "a factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation." Id., at 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 . 2019Our Supreme Court noted that "a factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation." Id., at 539 , 643 A.2d 1213 . | 1 | 10 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2002"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Thomason v. Chemical Bank , 234 Conn. 281 , 287 661 A.2d 595 (1995), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945). 2002"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Thomason v. Chemical Bank , 234 Conn. 281 , 287 661 A.2d 595 (1995), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945). | 1 | 6 |
Thomason v. Chemical Bankgreen2 sentences2002"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Thomason v. Chemical Bank , 234 Conn. 281 , 287 661 A.2d 595 (1995), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945). 2002"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Thomason v. Chemical Bank , 234 Conn. 281 , 287 661 A.2d 595 (1995), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945). | 1 | 5 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2022Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant cannot demonstrate a federal due process violation, based upon the failure of the police to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the police; see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S. Ct. 333 , 102 L. 2022Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant cannot demonstrate a federal due process violation, based upon the failure of the police to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the police; see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S. Ct. 333 , 102 L. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Burtongreen2 sentences2021In Chapman, we noted that ‘‘the United States Supreme Court has held that a factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation.’’ State v. Chapman, supra, 229 Conn. 539 ; see also, e.g., State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153 , 162–65, 778 A.2d 955 (2001). 2021In Chapman, we noted that ‘‘the United States Supreme Court has held that a factual insufficiency regarding one statutory basis, which is accompanied by a general verdict of guilty that also covers another, factually supported basis, is not a federal due process violation.’’ State v. Chapman, supra, 229 Conn. 539 ; see also, e.g., State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153 , 162–65, 778 A.2d 955 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2000Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to determine whether bifurcation is necessary to satisfy the procedural safeguards required by the federal due process clause. 8 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L. 2000Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to determine whether bifurcation is necessary to satisfy the procedural safeguards required by the federal due process clause. 8 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Geislergreen2 sentences2025After conducting a thor- ough Geisler analysis, however; see State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); the trial court concluded that the state constitution confers broader protections in this regard and that Connecticut courts would apply a balancing test to claims brought under the due process clauses of the state constitution. 2025After conducting a thor- ough Geisler analysis, however; see State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); the trial court concluded that the state constitution confers broader protections in this regard and that Connecticut courts would apply a balancing test to claims brought under the due process clauses of the state constitution. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Catorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Newsomegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rothgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Carpentergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fariagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Petro v. Petrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clemonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Battistagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Alexander Eugenio Moskovitsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Richard Lowell Stratton, A/K/A \Richard Lowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Stephen Riveragreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Alexander V.green | 1 | 1 |
| Daoust v. McWilliamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Lewis v. Stateyellow | 1 | 1 |
| Bellino v. Commissioner of Correctionred | 1 | 1 |
Bellino v. Commissionergreen1 sentence2020But see State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 720–27 (applying balancing test under constitution of Con- necticut). 13 On appeal, the respondent notes that a determination of a habeas claim that required ‘‘the court to perform its legitimate and essential role of weighing and evaluating the credibility of conflicting testimony does not, by itself, render a court’s conclusion debatable among jurists of reason for the purpose of appellate review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellino v. Commissioner of Correction, 75 Conn. App. 743, 748 , 817 A.2d 704 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 915 , 826 A.2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2025Recognizing that the federal constitution establishes a minimum national standard and that states are permit- ted to afford greater protections, in State v. Harris, supra, 330 Conn. 91 , we considered whether the due process provision of article first, § 8, of the state consti- tution ‘‘affords greater protection than the federal due process clause with respect to the admissibility of an eyewitness identification following an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure.’’ Id., 114. 2019In State v. Harris, supra, 330 Conn. 91 , our Supreme Court held that this provision affords greater protection than the federal due process clause with respect to the admissibility of an eyewitness identification following an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure.33 It concluded that it was ‘‘appropriate to modify the Biggers framework to conform to recent developments in social science and the law.’’ Id., 115 . | 2 | 2019–2025 |
Neil v. Biggers
green
2 sentences2018II We next address the defendant's contention that he was entitled to suppression of Rivera's out-of-court and in-court identifications under the due process provision of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. 15 In support of his claim, he contends that that provision affords greater protection than the federal due process clause with respect to the admissibility of an eyewitness identification following an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. 16 The defendant urges us to **115 reject the federal constitutional framework set forth in Neil v. Biggers , supra, 409 U. 2018II We next address the defendant's contention that he was entitled to suppression of Rivera's out-of-court and in-court identifications under the due process provision of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. 15 In support of his claim, he contends that that provision affords greater protection than the federal due process clause with respect to the admissibility of an eyewitness identification following an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. 16 The defendant urges us to **115 reject the federal constitutional framework set forth in Neil v. Biggers , supra, 409 U. | 2 | 2014–2018 |
Connecticut v. Revelo
green
2 sentences2010In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right *290 in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. 2006In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. | 2 | 2006–2010 |
Beasley v. United States
green
2 sentences2010In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right *290 in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. 2006In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. | 2 | 2006–2010 |
Corpus-Hooker v. United States
green
2 sentences2010In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right *290 in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. 2006In doing so, the trial court unfairly punished the defendant for exercising that right in violation of the federal due process clause.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052 , 122 S. Ct. 639 , 151 L. | 2 | 2006–2010 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1992In determining what procedural safeguards are required by the federal due process clause when the state seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, the United States Supreme Court has utilized the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. 1992In determining what procedural safeguards are required by the federal due process clause when the state seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, the United States Supreme Court has utilized the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. | 2 | 1992–2006 |
United States Trust Co. v. Bohart
green
2 sentences1997"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomason v. Chemical Bank , supra, 234 Conn. 287 , quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). "[T]he twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness 1997"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomason v. Chemical Bank , supra, 234 Conn. 287 , quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 , 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). "[T]he twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness | 2 | 1997–2002 |
Milliken v. Meyer
green
2 sentences1999International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 463 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ] (1940).'. . . 1999International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 316 [ 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ] (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 463 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ] (1940).'. . . | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hall
green
2 sentences1997"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id., 287 , quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 414 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). 1997"The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id., 287 , quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 414 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1994In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S. Ct. 515 , 93 L. 1994In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S. Ct. 515 , 93 L. | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. McFarland
neutral
1 sentence2026Specifically, in arguing that his state constitutional due process rights were violated, he points to the nearly twenty year delay between the date of the alleged commission of the crime and his arrest, as well as the more than three year delay between the time that the victim contacted the police and his arrest.9 The defendant argues that, under the standard recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. McFarland, 353 Conn. 169, 178 , 341 A.3d 859 (2025), he established actual and substantial prejudice, and, after balancing the prejudice to him against the state’s reasons for the delay, h | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Marion
green
2 sentences2026Specifically, in arguing that his state constitutional due process rights were violated, he points to the nearly twenty year delay between the date of the alleged commission of the crime and his arrest, as well as the more than three year delay between the time that the victim contacted the police and his arrest.9 The defendant argues that, under the standard recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. McFarland, 353 Conn. 169, 178 , 341 A.3d 859 (2025), he established actual and substantial prejudice, and, after balancing the prejudice to him against the state’s reasons for the delay, h 2026Specifically, in arguing that his state constitutional due process rights were violated, he points to the nearly twenty year delay between the date of the alleged commission of the crime and his arrest, as well as the more than three year delay between the time that the victim contacted the police and his arrest.9 The defendant argues that, under the standard recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. McFarland, 353 Conn. 169, 178 , 341 A.3d 859 (2025), he established actual and substantial prejudice, and, after balancing the prejudice to him against the state’s reasons for the delay, h | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Lovasco
green
2 sentences2026Ed. 2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S. Ct. 2044 , 52 L. 2026Ed. 2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S. Ct. 2044 , 52 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Morrill
green
2 sentences2025The trial court concluded that Connecticut has adopted the majority interpretation of the federal due process clause in State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 522 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985), and that the defendant in the present case was unable to prevail under the two-pronged test because, regardless of any prejudice, he conceded that there was no evidence that the state had delayed in Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 4 ,0 0 Conn. 0 State v. McFarland arresting him to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or for other improper purposes. 2025The trial court concluded that Connecticut has adopted the majority interpretation of the federal due process clause in State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 522 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985), and that the defendant in the present case was unable to prevail under the two-pronged test because, regardless of any prejudice, he conceded that there was no evidence that the state had delayed in Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 4 ,0 0 Conn. 0 State v. McFarland arresting him to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or for other improper purposes. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Rizzo
green
2 sentences2021Because he does not claim that the state constitution provides greater protection in this regard than does the federal constitution, and because he has not presented a separate and ade- quate analysis under the state constitution . . . we regard his claim as being presented under the federal due process clause as applied to the state through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 243 n.40, 833 A.2d 363 (2003). 6 During closing arguments at the habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the information in the proffer sho 2021Because he does not claim that the state constitution provides greater protection in this regard than does the federal constitution, and because he has not presented a separate and ade- quate analysis under the state constitution . . . we regard his claim as being presented under the federal due process clause as applied to the state through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 243 n.40, 833 A.2d 363 (2003). 6 During closing arguments at the habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the information in the proffer sho | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi 2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Kelsey
green
2 sentences2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi 2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Kelsey
green
2 sentences2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi 2020To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the government suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material [either to guilt or to punishment].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelsey, 93 Conn. App. 408, 418 , 889 A.2d 855 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 800 (2006). 12 ‘‘The United States Supreme Court, employing a federal due process clause analysis, explained that when confronted with a claim that the state failed to preserve evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of whi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Henderson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Roth v. Weston green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Asherman v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Manson v. Brathwaite green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Cummings green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Fermaint green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Cummings green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Anderson green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Howard green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Krack v. Action Motors Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Daniels green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Revelo green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Joseph C. Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. Rice green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Clarke v. Loma Linda Foods, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Lopes green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. McKiernan green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Lopes green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.