25 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. O'CONNORgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 2003); see also McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind. 2000). 2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce | 4 | 4 |
McIntosh v. Melroe Co.green2 sentences2020See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 2003); see also McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind. 2000). 2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce | 4 | 4 |
Reilly v. Dalygreen2 sentences2013See Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 443-444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 2013See Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 443-444 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. | 2 | 3 |
LinkAmerica Corp. v. Albertgreen2 sentences2020GmbH’s suggestion in that regard is based on the fact that our Supreme Court in LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006), stated that personal jurisdiction must comport with the federal due process clause. 2015“However, personal jurisdiction turns on facts, typically related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and findings of fact by the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1411-CT-515 | May 8, 2015 Page 5 of 12 trial court are reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citing LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 965 ). [11] In Attaway, we explained that [u]ntil fairly recently, determining personal jurisdiction in Indiana required an analysis under both Indiana Trial Rule 4.4 (Indiana’s long arm provision) and the federal due process clause. | 1 | 3 |
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 289 U.S. 36 , 40, 53 S.Ct. 431 , 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933) ("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. 2019See, e.g. , Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 289 U.S. 36 , 40, 53 S.Ct. 431 , 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933) ("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. | 1 | 1 |
Drake v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 5 Article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, cited by Newman, requires the same due process analysis as a federal due process claim. | 1 | 1 |
Paul Henry Gingerich v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2018Gingerich v. State, 979 N.E.2d 694, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce 2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Indiana State Board of Nursinggreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.2003); see also McIntosh v. McIroe Co., 729 N.E.2d, 972, 976 (Ind.2000). [14] “A due process claim requires the consideration of two factors: first, there must be the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and second, a determination of what procedural safeguards are then required.” Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 790 N.E.2d 110, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“Once it is determined that the Due Proce | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Kauffmangreen1 sentence2005Wilson v. Kauffman, 563 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 968 , 112 S.Ct. 439 , 116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Haimbaugh Landscaping, Inc. v. Jegengreen1 sentence1996Haimbaugh Landscaping, Inc. v. Jegen, 653 N.E.2d 95, 104 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) trans. denied; Wilhoite v. Melvin Simon & Associates, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Wilhoite v. Melvin Simon & Associates, Inc.green1 sentence1996Haimbaugh Landscaping, Inc. v. Jegen, 653 N.E.2d 95, 104 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) trans. denied; Wilhoite v. Melvin Simon & Associates, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Scalf v. Berkel, Inc.green1 sentence1994See Scalf v. Berkel, Inc. (1983) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 1201 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court established that a nonresident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2015In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court established that a nonresident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2009–2015 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1998This analysis is not to be confused with the current federal due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which does weigh the burden of providing the additional services. 1998This analysis is not to be confused with the current federal due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which does weigh the burden of providing the additional services. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1994Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). 1994Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Molly A. Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Board, David Craig, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Larry Leverenz, A.T., in his official and individual capacity
green
1 sentence2020Melton, 53 N.E.3d at 1215 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015“However, personal jurisdiction turns on facts, typically related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and findings of fact by the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1411-CT-515 | May 8, 2015 Page 5 of 12 trial court are reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citing LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 965 ). [11] In Attaway, we explained that [u]ntil fairly recently, determining personal jurisdiction in Indiana required an analysis under both Indiana Trial Rule 4.4 (Indiana’s long arm provision) and the federal due process clause. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lake Central School Corp. v. Scartozzi
green
1 sentence2013Gorp. v. Scartozzi, 759 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. Ct.App.2001) for the proposition “that the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been construed by the courts as analogous to the federal due process clause.” Appellant’s Brief at 33. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
City of Gary v. Redmond
green
1 sentence2007As explained by the Third District of this court in City of Gary v. Redmond, 489 N.E.2d 543 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), the United States Supreme Court has concluded that an award of attorney fees under Section 1988 does not necessarily require a plaintiffs success under one of the enumerated sections or titles found in Section 1988. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hagans v. Lavine
green
2 sentences2007Instead, all we need determine is whether the Parents’ federal due process claim was “obviously without merit,” “obviously frivolous,” or “no longer open to discussion.” See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 . 2007Instead, all we need determine is whether the Parents’ federal due process claim was “obviously without merit,” “obviously frivolous,” or “no longer open to discussion.” See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
green
2 sentences2007Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ). 5 . 2007Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ). 5 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Staley v. Harris County TX
green
2 sentences2007Indeed, quite recently stated in Staley v. Harris County, Tex., 485 F.3d 305 , 485 F.3d 305 , 314 (5th. 2007Indeed, quite recently stated in Staley v. Harris County, Tex., 485 F.3d 305 , 485 F.3d 305 , 314 (5th. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hensley v. Eckerhart
green
2 sentences2007Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ). 5 . 2007Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ). 5 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.
green
2 sentences2006Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). 2006Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mattei v. Laborers Combined Funds of Western Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence2005Wilson v. Kauffman, 563 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 968 , 112 S.Ct. 439 , 116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Northcutt v. Farm Credit Bank
green
1 sentence2005Wilson v. Kauffman, 563 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 968 , 112 S.Ct. 439 , 116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Forrest v. Washington State Electrical Contractors Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence2005Wilson v. Kauffman, 563 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 968 , 112 S.Ct. 439 , 116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Vincent (1980), 273 Ind. 374 , 404 N.E.2d 585 , wherein it considered and rejected a challenge to the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the general statute of limitations for persons under legal disabilities based upon Article I, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution and the federal due process clause. 1995Vincent (1980), 278 Ind. 374 , 404 N.E.2d 585 , wherein it considered and rejected a challenge to the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the general statute of limitations for persons under legal disabilities based upon Article I, $ 12 of the Indiana Constitution and the federal due process clause. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Saylor v. Hall
green
1 sentence1983They cite Saylor v. Hall, (1973) Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 ; Overland Construction Company, Inc. v. Sirmons, (1979) Fla., 369 So.2d 572 ; and Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., (1980) Wyo., 611 P.2d 821 , which have held such statutes as Ind.Code 34-4-20-2 violative of the federal Due Process clause or of open court clauses similar to Indiana's. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.