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9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ross v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2019For this proposition, we relied in part on pre-harmless error caselaw finding that violation of the peremptory challenge statute alone amounted to harm requiring reversal, see, e.g., Macrander, 828 P.2d at 243 (relying on Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911)), and in part on now-rejected Supreme Court caselaw implicitly finding federal constitutional underpinnings of peremptory challenges, see, e.g., Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 306 (understanding Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to hold that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendan 2000See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (stating that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendant what state law guarantees him). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lefebrered2 sentences2019In our most recent consideration of this proposition, and the only instance in which we actually relied on language from the statute and rule themselves, we announced that “[t]he function of peremptory 12 challenges in a criminal proceeding is to allow both the prosecution and the defense to secure a more fair and impartial jury by enabling them to remove jurors whom they perceive as biased, even if the jurors are not subject to a challenge for cause,” Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 303 , and we inferred that the allowance by statute and rule of the same number of peremptory challenges, in the absence of 2019For this proposition, we relied in part on pre-harmless error caselaw finding that violation of the peremptory challenge statute alone amounted to harm requiring reversal, see, e.g., Macrander, 828 P.2d at 243 (relying on Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911)), and in part on now-rejected Supreme Court caselaw implicitly finding federal constitutional underpinnings of peremptory challenges, see, e.g., Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 306 (understanding Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to hold that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendan | 1 | 1 |
People v. MacRanderred1 sentence2019For this proposition, we relied in part on pre-harmless error caselaw finding that violation of the peremptory challenge statute alone amounted to harm requiring reversal, see, e.g., Macrander, 828 P.2d at 243 (relying on Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911)), and in part on now-rejected Supreme Court caselaw implicitly finding federal constitutional underpinnings of peremptory challenges, see, e.g., Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 306 (understanding Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to hold that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendan | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Board of County Commissionersgreen1 sentence1995See Holland v. Board of County Commissioners, 883 P.2d 500 (Colo.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Daileygreen2 sentences1988In Dailey , the trial court held that the "erroneous averments [in the affidavit] raised questions as to the credibility of both the informant and the affiant." 639 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis added). 1988In Dailey , the trial court held that the "erroneous averments [in the affidavit] raised questions as to the credibility of both the informant and the affiant. " 639 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence2019For this proposition, we relied in part on pre-harmless error caselaw finding that violation of the peremptory challenge statute alone amounted to harm requiring reversal, see, e.g., Macrander, 828 P.2d at 243 (relying on Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911)), and in part on now-rejected Supreme Court caselaw implicitly finding federal constitutional underpinnings of peremptory challenges, see, e.g., Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 306 (understanding Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to hold that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendan | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rivera v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2019For this proposition, we relied in part on pre-harmless error caselaw finding that violation of the peremptory challenge statute alone amounted to harm requiring reversal, see, e.g., Macrander, 828 P.2d at 243 (relying on Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911)), and in part on now-rejected Supreme Court caselaw implicitly finding federal constitutional underpinnings of peremptory challenges, see, e.g., Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 306 (understanding Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), to hold that a federal due process violation results if a trial court fails to provide a defendan | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. District Court for County of Jefferson
green
2 sentences2017Court, 165 Colo. 253 , 439 P.2d 741 (1968) (deviating from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal due process clause in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), with regard to proof of insanity, and interpreting our own due process clause to require the prosecution to disprove insanity). 2017Court, 165 Colo. 253 , 439 P.2d 741 (1968) (deviating from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal due process clause in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), with regard to proof of insanity, and interpreting our own due process clause to require the prosecution to disprove insanity). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Leland v. Oregon
green
2 sentences2017Court, 165 Colo. 253 , 439 P.2d 741 (1968) (deviating from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal due process clause in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), with regard to proof of insanity, and interpreting our own due process clause to require the prosecution to disprove insanity). 2017Court, 165 Colo. 253 , 439 P.2d 741 (1968) (deviating from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal due process clause in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), with regard to proof of insanity, and interpreting our own due process clause to require the prosecution to disprove insanity). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2017In Jackson v. Virginia, although the Supreme Court broadly upheld a criminal defendant’s right to challenge the sufficiency of a state conviction by motion for writ of habeas corpus, it there determined only the standard of sufficiency required by the federal due process clause. 443 U.S. at 318-20 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 2017In Jackson v. Virginia, although the Supreme Court broadly upheld a criminal defendant’s right to challenge the sufficiency of a state conviction by motion for writ of habeas corpus, it there determined only the standard of sufficiency required by the federal due process clause. 443 U.S. at 318-20 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Chesterfield Development Corp. v. City of Chesterfield
green
1 sentence2002Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102 , 1104-05 (8th Cir.1992): It is not enough simply to give these state law claims constitutional labels such as “due process” or “equal protection” in order to raise a substantial federal question under section 1983 .... we have unequivocally held that a state-law error, no matter how fundamental, cannot in and of itself create a federal due-process violation. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
green
2 sentences1996Duong v. County of Arapahoe, supra. In addition, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), the court ruled that a municipality’s failure to train or warn its employees about known work hazards, which allegedly caused the death of an employee, did not violate the due process clause. 1996Duong v. County of Arapahoe, supra. In addition, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), the court ruled that a municipality’s failure to train or warn its employees about known work hazards, which allegedly caused the death of an employee, did not violate the due process clause. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Duong v. County of Arapahoe
green
2 sentences1996Duong v. County of Arapahoe, supra . 1996Duong v. County of Arapahoe, supra. In addition, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), the court ruled that a municipality’s failure to train or warn its employees about known work hazards, which allegedly caused the death of an employee, did not violate the due process clause. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences1988The United States Supreme Court addressed the state’s failure to preserve non-incidental evidence under the federal due process clause in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). 1988The United States Supreme Court addressed the state’s failure to preserve non-incidental evidence under the federal due process clause in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McCray v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1988The Court did note that it previously held in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), that the federal due process clause does "not require the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.” 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2683 . 1988The Court did note that it previously held in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), that the federal due process clause does "not require the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.” 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2683 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences1988The Court did note that it previously held in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), that the federal due process clause does "not require the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.” 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2683 . 1988The Court did note that it previously held in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), that the federal due process clause does "not require the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.” 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2683 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1986It is now well settled that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. at 1196 . 1986It is now well settled that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. at 1196 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.