8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sind v. Pollingreen1 sentence2001The presence of duress is a matter of fact, see Sind v. Pollin, 356 A.2d 653, 656 (D.C.1976), and the Board must accept factual findings supported by substantial evidence, such as these. | 1 | 1 |
Remin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commissiongreen1 sentence1987D.C.Code § 1-1510(a)(3)(E) (1981); see Remin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 471 A.2d 275, 277 (D.C.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Barry v. Wilsongreen1 sentence1986Thus, we must “examine the administrative record to determine whether there has been procedural error, whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the [Board’s] findings, or whether the [Board’s] action was in some manner arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Stokes v. District of Columbia, supra, 502 A.2d at 1010 ; Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C.1982); Kegley v. District of Columbia, supra, 440 A.2d at 1019 . 5 *506 Substantial evidence supports the findings of the hearing examiner and the Board. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Peter Estes
green
1 sentence2021Cf. Brown-Carson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 159 A.3d 303 , 312 (D.C. 2017) (finding error in the CRB’s unexplained, and therefore arbitrary and capricious, departure from its previously articulated approach). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
cluster 748877
green
2 sentences2005Smalls was recalled and briefly testified the same afternoon after Sadler and two other pro forma government witnesses had testified. [17] If the marshal in executing the order overstated its duration in speaking to the affected family members and associates, appellant could fairly be expected to monitor and learn of the marshal's overstatement. [18] "Of course," the Second Circuit was careful to add, "if some further alternative is suggested by the defendant or the prosecution, the trial judge should give it consideration." Ayala, 131 F.3d at 72 . [19] "[T]he Waller Court prescribed no partic 2005"Of course/' the Second Circuit was careful to add, "if some further alternative is suggested by the defendant or the prosecution,, the trial judge should give it consideration.” Ayala, 131 F.3d at 72 . . "[T]he Waller Court prescribed no particular format to which a trial judge must adhere to satisfy the findings requirement, and we read nothing in Waller that would require a reviewing court to evaluate the trial judge’s closure order solely on the basis of the explicit factual findings and, thereby, ignore facts of record which fully support the decision and belie a claim that [the defendant | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ernest Sutton Bell v. Mack Jarvis Robert Smith
green
1 sentence2005Smalls was recalled and briefly testified the same afternoon after Sadler and two other pro forma government witnesses had testified. [17] If the marshal in executing the order overstated its duration in speaking to the affected family members and associates, appellant could fairly be expected to monitor and learn of the marshal's overstatement. [18] "Of course," the Second Circuit was careful to add, "if some further alternative is suggested by the defendant or the prosecution, the trial judge should give it consideration." Ayala, 131 F.3d at 72 . [19] "[T]he Waller Court prescribed no partic | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald
green
1 sentence1993This court invalidated the guideline adopted by the Board of Judges of the Superior Court in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719 (D.C.1989). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dell v. Department of Employment Services
green
1 sentence1989Ms. Harris relies principally on our decision in Dell v. Dep’t of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 102 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stokes v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence1986Thus, we must “examine the administrative record to determine whether there has been procedural error, whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the [Board’s] findings, or whether the [Board’s] action was in some manner arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Stokes v. District of Columbia, supra, 502 A.2d at 1010 ; Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C.1982); Kegley v. District of Columbia, supra, 440 A.2d at 1019 . 5 *506 Substantial evidence supports the findings of the hearing examiner and the Board. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Kegley v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence1986Thus, we must “examine the administrative record to determine whether there has been procedural error, whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the [Board’s] findings, or whether the [Board’s] action was in some manner arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Stokes v. District of Columbia, supra, 502 A.2d at 1010 ; Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C.1982); Kegley v. District of Columbia, supra, 440 A.2d at 1019 . 5 *506 Substantial evidence supports the findings of the hearing examiner and the Board. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cia Anon Venezolana De Navegacion v. Frank L. Harris and Pate Stevedoring Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence1969Gerstenfeld v. Jett, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 119 , 374 F.2d 33 (1967), relied on by the Board to except it from the findings requirement, is distinguishable from Andree & Seedman, supra, because, unlike this case, a procedure was there available to seek an exception to the administrative classification and that was deemed by that court to protect the right to a hearing and, inferably, the right of judicial review. 25 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
S. Jon Gerstenfeld v. T. Sutton Jett
green
1 sentence1969Gerstenfeld v. Jett, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 119 , 374 F.2d 33 (1967), relied on by the Board to except it from the findings requirement, is distinguishable from Andree & Seedman, supra, because, unlike this case, a procedure was there available to seek an exception to the administrative classification and that was deemed by that court to protect the right to a hearing and, inferably, the right of judicial review. 25 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.