Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Depass v. Chittygreen2 sentences1999"The general rule is that lis pendens is notice of all facts apparent on the face of the pleadings and such other facts as the pleadings would necessarily put the purchaser on inquiry and of the contents of exhibits filed and proved if they are pertinent to the matter in issue or the relief sought." DePass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77 , 105 So. 148, 150 (1925). 1999"The general rule is that lis pendens is notice of all facts apparent on the face of the pleadings and such other facts as the pleadings would necessarily put the purchaser on inquiry and of the contents of exhibits filed and proved if they are pertinent to the matter in issue or the relief sought." DePass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77 , 105 So. 148, 150 (1925). | 3 | 3 |
3709 N. Flagler Drive Prodigy Land Trust v. Bank of America, N.A.green1 sentence2019On their face, they do not represent a determination that a subsequent purchaser lacks standing to contest practically anything a plaintiff might assert in a foreclosure case or that a subsequent purchaser must tie each and every matter it asserts by way of defense to some interest that gives it standing to assert that specific matter.3 See Wilmington Tr., N.A. v. Alvarez, 239 So. 3d 1265 , 1266 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (rejecting the argument that a subsequent purchaser "lack[ed] standing" to assert the statute of limitations as a defense to a foreclosure case); 3709 N. Flagler Drive Prodigy La | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dobarganes v. State
green
1 sentence2019On their face, they do not represent a determination that a subsequent purchaser lacks standing to contest practically anything a plaintiff might assert in a foreclosure case or that a subsequent purchaser must tie each and every matter it asserts by way of defense to some interest that gives it standing to assert that specific matter.3 See Wilmington Tr., N.A. v. Alvarez, 239 So. 3d 1265 , 1266 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (rejecting the argument that a subsequent purchaser "lack[ed] standing" to assert the statute of limitations as a defense to a foreclosure case); 3709 N. Flagler Drive Prodigy La | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Crescent Miami Center, LLC v. DEPT. OF REVENUE, STATE
green
1 sentence2005Id. [1] The Second District Court of Appeal came to a different conclusion under similar facts in Kuro, where a father and son transferred condominiums which they solely owned to Kuro, Inc., a corporation *916 which they had formed and in which they were the sole shareholders. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Losee v. . Clute
green
1 sentence1997This is consistent with Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873), which found no manufacturer liability on the following facts: It appears by the case that the defendants Clute manufactured the boiler in question for the Saratoga Paper Company, in which they were stockholders, for the purposes and uses to which it was subsequently applied by it; and the testimony tended to show that it was constructed improperly and of poor iron; that said defendants knew at the time that it was to be used in the immediate vicinity of and adjacent to dwelling houses and stores in a village, so that in case of an exp | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Marchand v. De Soto Mortgage Company
green
1 sentence1981Lis pendens "is notice of all facts apparent on the face of the pleadings and such other facts as the pleadings would necessarily put the purchaser on inquiry." De Pass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77 , 105 So. 148, 150 (1925); Marchand v. De Soto Mortgage Co., 149 So.2d 357 (Fla.2d DCA 1963). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Massey v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence1939Massey v. Hubbard, 18 Fla. 688 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
McGill v. Chappelle
green
2 sentences1926McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479 , 71 South. 1926McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479 , 71 South. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.