purchaser inquiry in Alabama

1983See generally , 79 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1961); Holly v. Dinkins , 202 Ala. 477 , 80 So. 861 (1919).

1983See generally , 79 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1961); Holly v. Dinkins , 202 Ala. 477 , 80 So. 861 (1919).

1926Kelly v. Eyster, 14 So. 657 , 102 Ala. 326 , headnote 6; Sloan v. Hudson, 24 So. 458 , 119 Ala. 27 , headnote 5.

1888Such offspring not being mentioned in any recorded mortgage, and there being nothing visible to put the purchaser on inquiry, it was ruled that it would be a fraud on him to take from him the property he had bought and paid for in good faith, and without notice.— Winter v. Landphere, 42 Iowa, 471 ; Kellogg v. Lovely, 46 Mich. 131 .

1888Such offspring not being mentioned in any recorded mortgage, and there being nothing visible to put the purchaser on inquiry, it was ruled that it would be a fraud on him to take from him the property he had bought and paid for in good faith, and without notice.— Winter v. Landphere, 42 Iowa, 471 ; Kellogg v. Lovely, 46 Mich. 131 .

1886In all cases, reasonable promptness, diligence, and good faith will be exacted, to be determined on the particular circumstances of each case — ■“ whether they are such as to have induced inaction, or ought to have quickened vigilance and action” — whether from the circumstances, a waiver of the right and acquiescence in the title by the party complaining, or of an intention of the purchaser not to claim under the title, may be inferred.— Cowan & Co. v. Sapp, 74 Ala. 44 ; Sayre v. Elyton Land Co., 73 Ala. 85 .

1886In all cases, reasonable promptness, diligence, and good faith will be exacted, to be determined on the particular circumstances of each case — ■“ whether they are such as to have induced inaction, or ought to have quickened vigilance and action” — whether from the circumstances, a waiver of the right and acquiescence in the title by the party complaining, or of an intention of the purchaser not to claim under the title, may be inferred.— Cowan & Co. v. Sapp, 74 Ala. 44 ; Sayre v. Elyton Land Co., 73 Ala. 85 .

1886On the former appeal, which was taken from a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, it was held, that the delay of complainant, was satisfactorily explained. — Cowan & Co. v. Sapp, supra. The conclusion is based on the allegations, that the complainant was in the undisturbed possession of the lands, and the purchasers were inactive until about six months previous to the filing of the bill, and that the payment was made, in another State, on the day of sale, the purchasers accepting it, most probably, in ignorance of the intended ■ sale; from which facts the complainant may have inferred, th

1880It puts the purchaser on inquiry as to any outstanding deed or imcum-brance, in favor of such possessor, or those he represents, and charges him with notice. —Herbert v. Hanrick, 16 Ala. 581 ; Fenno v. Sayre, 3 Ala. 458 ; Wade on Notice, § 276.

1880It puts the purchaser on inquiry as to any outstanding deed or imcum-brance, in favor of such possessor, or those he represents, and charges him with notice. —Herbert v. Hanrick, 16 Ala. 581 ; Fenno v. Sayre, 3 Ala. 458 ; Wade on Notice, § 276.

1847When he has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed to know such fact. [Atkinson on Marketable Titles, 573; Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. 383; Scroggin v. McDougald, 8 Ala. Rep. 381 .] If inquiry had been made of the person in possession, it is highly improbable it would have resulted in any thing but complete information; and, although the rule just referred to is usually stated in connection with tenancies and equitable titles, we do not doubt its application to all cases where there is an actual possession held by any other person than his whose title is purchased, even