purchaser inquiry in Texas

2015BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 23 exhausted and a complete knowledge of all matters referred to and affecting the estate is obtained." Id.

2004Any description, recital of fact, or reference to other documents in the chain of title puts the purchaser on inquiry notice, and “he is bound to follow up this inquiry, step by step, from one discovery to another and from one instrument to another, until the whole series of title deeds is exhausted and a complete knowledge of all matters referred to and affecting the estate is obtained.” Id.

1936In Bounds v. Little, 75 Texas, 316 , 12 S. W., 1109 , the trial court in charging the jury as to the defense of innocent purchaser made by Bounds, instructed them in substance that if by the making of inquiry among persons living near the land Bounds could have learned from them of the existence of the deed through which plaintiffs claimed, then he would be deemed to have notice.

1936In Bounds v. Little, 75 Texas, 316 , 12 S. W., 1109 , the trial court in charging the jury as to the defense of innocent purchaser made by Bounds, instructed them in substance that if by the making of inquiry among persons living near the land Bounds could have learned from them of the existence of the deed through which plaintiffs claimed, then he would be deemed to have notice.

1877(Preston v. Breedlove, 45 Tex., 47 ; Lockhart v. Ward, 45 Tex., 227 ; Johnson v. Byler, 45 Tex., 509 , and authorities cited in those cases.) It is evident that the recovery of appellees was on their title derived by purchase at the foreclosure sale, and that the case, as tried, was upon that issue, and not upon any legal or equitable title in plaintiffs, by virtue of the mortgage claimed to have been taken from Daily at the time he received a deed.

1876(Preston v. Breedlove, 45 Tex., 47 ; Byler v. Johnson, 45 Tex., 509 .) Although it appears that Garrison was aware of the suit brought by Johnson, and was indeed a witness on the trial, it is not perceived that this should take the case out of the general rule just stated.

1877(Preston v. Breedlove, 45 Tex., 47 ; Lockhart v. Ward, 45 Tex., 227 ; Johnson v. Byler, 45 Tex., 509 , and authorities cited in those cases.) It is evident that the recovery of appellees was on their title derived by purchase at the foreclosure sale, and that the case, as tried, was upon that issue, and not upon any legal or equitable title in plaintiffs, by virtue of the mortgage claimed to have been taken from Daily at the time he received a deed.

1876(Preston v. Breedlove, 45 Tex., 47 ; Byler v. Johnson, 45 Tex., 509 .) Although it appears that Garrison was aware of the suit brought by Johnson, and was indeed a witness on the trial, it is not perceived that this should take the case out of the general rule just stated.

1981Citizens State Bank v. Del-Tex Investment Co., 123 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1938, writ dism’d judgment correct).

1976An exception to the rule was noted in Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1932), aff’d, 126 Tex. 182 , 86 S.W.2d 41 (1935), where the Court noted that continued possession for a period of six years, after having executed a conveyance, along with other evidences of ownership, was a circumstance sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry of the rights of the possessor, and that such inquiry should go beyond the prior deed and that alone.

1976But its office is merely to put a purchaser on inquiry; it does not necessarily determine the nature of the inquiry or of whom it should be made.” The nature of the' inquiry was discussed at length in Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315 (1883).

1976An exception to the rule was noted in Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1932), aff’d, 126 Tex. 182 , 86 S.W.2d 41 (1935), where the Court noted that continued possession for a period of six years, after having executed a conveyance, along with other evidences of ownership, was a circumstance sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry of the rights of the possessor, and that such inquiry should go beyond the prior deed and that alone.

1976An exception to the rule was noted in Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1932), aff’d, 126 Tex. 182 , 86 S.W.2d 41 (1935), where the Court noted that continued possession for a period of six years, after having executed a conveyance, along with other evidences of ownership, was a circumstance sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry of the rights of the possessor, and that such inquiry should go beyond the prior deed and that alone.

1944This rule is stated in the case of Buchanan v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 492 , 119 S.W. 1141, 1142 , 132 Am.St.Rep. 900 as follows : “The fact that Buchanan believed that he had a good title to the land when he sold it and when he made the deed to Burnett was unimportant, if in fact Burnett believed the representations to be true and relied upon them, making the purchase upon the faith of the statements made by Buchanan.

1944This rule is stated in the case of Buchanan v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 492 , 119 S.W. 1141, 1142 , 132 Am.St.Rep. 900 as follows : “The fact that Buchanan believed that he had a good title to the land when he sold it and when he made the deed to Burnett was unimportant, if in fact Burnett believed the representations to be true and relied upon them, making the purchase upon the faith of the statements made by Buchanan.

1938Jones v. Robb [ 35 Tex.Civ.App. 263 ] 80 S.W. 395 ; Tinsley v. Rice [ 105 Ga. 285 ] 31 S.E. 174 .” We may yet safely, go farther and say that even if GMAC had plead waiver and abandonment by plaintiff of his controverting plea, and if we could assume there was sufficient testimony to authorize the submission of an issue of that fact to the jury, still the contention would have to be overruled because no special issue on the point was presented and requested by it, but was waived.

1938Jones v. Robb [ 35 Tex.Civ.App. 263 ] 80 S.W. 395 ; Tinsley v. Rice [ 105 Ga. 285 ] 31 S.E. 174 .” We may yet safely, go farther and say that even if GMAC had plead waiver and abandonment by plaintiff of his controverting plea, and if we could assume there was sufficient testimony to authorize the submission of an issue of that fact to the jury, still the contention would have to be overruled because no special issue on the point was presented and requested by it, but was waived.

1938Jones v. Robb [ 35 Tex.Civ.App. 263 ] 80 S.W. 395 ; Tinsley v. Rice [ 105 Ga. 285 ] 31 S.E. 174 .” We may yet safely, go farther and say that even if GMAC had plead waiver and abandonment by plaintiff of his controverting plea, and if we could assume there was sufficient testimony to authorize the submission of an issue of that fact to the jury, still the contention would have to be overruled because no special issue on the point was presented and requested by it, but was waived.

1938Jones v. Robb [ 35 Tex.Civ.App. 263 ] 80 S.W. 395 ; Tinsley v. Rice [ 105 Ga. 285 ] 31 S.E. 174 .” We may yet safely, go farther and say that even if GMAC had plead waiver and abandonment by plaintiff of his controverting plea, and if we could assume there was sufficient testimony to authorize the submission of an issue of that fact to the jury, still the contention would have to be overruled because no special issue on the point was presented and requested by it, but was waived.

1935Whether such fact is sufficient is not decided by Thomas v. Bank, supra. The case was tried upon an agreed statement.

1919A purchaser under a power purchases at his peril, and if there is no subsisting power or authority to sell, no title is acquired by the purchaser.” In the case of Daniel v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240 , 38 S. W. 161 , 59 Am.

1919A purchaser under a power purchases at his peril, and if there is no subsisting power or authority to sell, no title is acquired by the purchaser.” In the case of Daniel v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240 , 38 S. W. 161 , 59 Am.

1879The court, in the case of Carter v. Attoway, 46 Tex., 108 , held that, “ In a suit to enforce the vendor’s lien, a subsequent vendee, in possession and claiming under a recorded deed, is a necessary party.” In the same case it was held, as against a purchaser of whose claim there was notice, a sale made under a decree of foreclosure against the original vendee, and to which suit such purchaser was not a party, is not sufficient to pass title to the land; and that this rule is not in any way affected by the fact that such purchaser had notice of the lien at the time of his purchase.

1877(Preston v. Breedlove, 45 Tex., 47 ; Lockhart v. Ward, 45 Tex., 227 ; Johnson v. Byler, 45 Tex., 509 , and authorities cited in those cases.) It is evident that the recovery of appellees was on their title derived by purchase at the foreclosure sale, and that the case, as tried, was upon that issue, and not upon any legal or equitable title in plaintiffs, by virtue of the mortgage claimed to have been taken from Daily at the time he received a deed.

1859(Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts, 382 .) “ Possession by the vendee,” said Chief Justice Shabkie, “ is evidence to creditors and purchasers, of the conveyance; or, at least, it is so strong a circumstance, that it is now uniformly regarded as sufficient evidence of notice.” (1 Sm. & Marsh. 107.) In the language of the court, in Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N. Hamp. 307, “ It is not to be presumed, that any man, who wishes to purchase land honestly, will buy without knowing what are the claims of a person who is in the open possession of it.” f The possession of the plaintiffs’ tenants was certainly suffici

1859(Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts, 382 .) “ Possession by the vendee,” said Chief Justice Shabkie, “ is evidence to creditors and purchasers, of the conveyance; or, at least, it is so strong a circumstance, that it is now uniformly regarded as sufficient evidence of notice.” (1 Sm. & Marsh. 107.) In the language of the court, in Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N. Hamp. 307, “ It is not to be presumed, that any man, who wishes to purchase land honestly, will buy without knowing what are the claims of a person who is in the open possession of it.” f The possession of the plaintiffs’ tenants was certainly suffici

1859It is, therefore, in judgment of law, notice to the purchaser of that title.) (Wethered v. Boon, 17 Texas Rep. 143 .) He ought to be deemed to have “ reasonable information” of a fact, who has the means of information afforded him, and whose situation makes it his duty to inquire of those from whom the information may be obtained.^ Such was the case of the defendant, Duren, and his vendor, Dailey.