importance requirement in Pennsylvania

2020Indeed, one can detect aspects of the same open-ended analysis in, e.g., our 1922 decision in In re Fish’s Election, 117 A. 85, 87 (Pa. 1922) (quoting Knight v. Borough of Coudersport, 92 A. 299, 300 (Pa. 1914)) (“If the law declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the court will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement.

2020Indeed, one can detect aspects of the same open-ended analysis in, e.g., our 1922 decision in In re Fish’s Election, 117 A. 85, 87 (Pa. 1922) (quoting Knight v. Borough of Coudersport, 92 A. 299, 300 (Pa. 1914)) (“If the law declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the court will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement.

2020Indeed, one can detect aspects of the same open-ended analysis in, e.g., our 1922 decision in In re Fish’s Election, 117 A. 85, 87 (Pa. 1922) (quoting Knight v. Borough of Coudersport, 92 A. 299, 300 (Pa. 1914)) (“If the law declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the court will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement.

2020Indeed, one can detect aspects of the same open-ended analysis in, e.g., our 1922 decision in In re Fish’s Election, 117 A. 85, 87 (Pa. 1922) (quoting Knight v. Borough of Coudersport, 92 A. 299, 300 (Pa. 1914)) (“If the law declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the court will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement.

1973In Truesdale , we set forth three factors which generally underlie the right to bail: "(a) the importance of the presumption of innocence; (b) the distaste for imposition of sanctions prior to trial and conviction; and (c) the desire to give the accused the maximum opportunity to prepare his defense." 449 Pa. at 335-336 ; 296 A. 2d at 834-835 .

1973In Truesdale , we set forth three factors which generally underlie the right to bail: "(a) the importance of the presumption of innocence; (b) the distaste for imposition of sanctions prior to trial and conviction; and (c) the desire to give the accused the maximum opportunity to prepare his defense." 449 Pa. at 335-336 ; 296 A. 2d at 834-835 .

2004Rather, “[bjecause of the importance of the privilege to the administration of justice, the burden of proof is upon the party asserting that the disclosure of information would not violate the attorney-client privilege.” Gould v. City of Aliquippa, 750 A.2d 934, 937 (Pa. Commw. 2000); McAndrew, supra. .

2002“Because of the importance of the privilege to the administration of justice, the burden of proof is upon the party asserting that the disclosure of information would not violate the attorney-client privilege.” Gould v. City of Aliquippa, 750 A.2d 934, 937 (Pa. Commw. 2000) (citing In re Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 527 Pa. 432, 440 , 593 A.2d 402 , 406 (1991)).

2004Passing over the importance requirement for the moment, we have held that “[t]here is no effective means of reviewing after a final judgment an order requiring the production of putatively protected material.” Ben, 729 A.2d at 552 (internal quotation omitted).

2004Passing over the importance requirement for the moment, we have held that "[t]here is no effective means of reviewing after a final judgment an order requiring the production of putatively protected material." Ben, 729 A.2d at 552 (internal quotation omitted).

2006The importance of this rule is apparent; for it requires but a glance over the cases of this class to discover how sad has been the experience of the courts in family disputes, growing out of the exceptions which have been allowed to this statute [Statute of Frauds]; and how many and how distressing must have been the ruptures of the closest ties of kindred that have been produced and perpetrated by the encouragement thus given to try the experiment of extracting legal obligations out of parental [or filial] kindness. ’ Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. 365, 372 (1855).

1976The importance of this rule is apparent; for it requires but a glance over the cases of this class to discover how sad has been the experience of the courts in family disputes, growing out of the exceptions which have been allowed to this statute [Statute of Frauds]; and how many and how distressing must have been the ruptures of the closest ties of kindred that have been produced and perpetrated by the encouragement thus given to try the experiment of extracting legal obligations out of parental [or filial] kindness.” Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. 365, 372 (1855).

2006See also, Brotman v. Brotman, 353 Pa. 570 , 46 A. 2d 175 (1946); Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928); Sorber v. Masters, 264 Pa. 582 , 107 A. 892 (1919); Erie & W.V.

2006See also, Brotman v. Brotman, 353 Pa. 570 , 46 A. 2d 175 (1946); Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928); Sorber v. Masters, 264 Pa. 582 , 107 A. 892 (1919); Erie & W.V.

1987A court of equity has the limited duty of *150 “guaranteeing that [the beneficiary] not be allowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and run off with plaintiffs money on a pro forma declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact." Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 356 F.Supp. 991, 999 (N.D.Ga.1973) (emphasis supplied).

1975A court of equity has the limited duty of “guaranteeing that [the beneficiary] not be allowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and run off with plaintiff’s money on a pro forma, declarar tion which has absolutely no basis in fact.” Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 356 F.Supp. 991, 999 (N.D.Ga.1973) (emphasis supplied).

2024See, e.g., Luther, 463 A.2d at 1078-79 (“A trial counsel cannot fault his client for failing to provide names of character witnesses, if witnesses were available, when the trial counsel has been derelict in not adequately discussing with his client the importance of such a defense.”). - 20 - J-S03044-24 Further, trial counsel did not claim, and the record does not indicate, that his reason for not investigating or calling character witnesses was to shield the jury from negative character testimony.

2024See, e.g., Luther, 463 A.2d at 1078-79 (“A trial counsel cannot fault his client for failing to provide names of character witnesses, if witnesses were available, when the trial counsel has been derelict in not adequately discussing with his client the importance of such a defense.”). - 20 - J-S03044-24 Further, trial counsel did not claim, and the record does not indicate, that his reason for not investigating or calling character witnesses was to shield the jury from negative character testimony.

2024See supra note 7; see also Oncken v. Ewing, 8 A.2d 402, 404 (Pa. 1939) (“If the law itself declares a specified [election] irregularity to be fatal the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1947In the absence of such declaration the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had or had not so vital an influence on the proceedings as probably prevented a full and free expression of the popular will’.” In Oncken v. Ewing, 336 Pa. 43, 47 , the court (Mr. Justice Horace Stern) says: “The invalidation of a public election is a judicial act of serious import, and is justified only by circumstances of the most compelling nature.

1998But see Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 49-51 , 669 A.2d 896, 899 (1995) (reaffirming the importance of the analysis articulated by the supreme court in Edmunds, supra, vis-a-vis state constitutional claims, but addressing such a claim where appellant simply raised the claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, cited eases in support of his claim, and related the cases to the claim), disapproved on other grounds, Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996).

1998But see Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 49-51 , 669 A.2d 896, 899 (1995) (reaffirming the importance of the analysis articulated by the supreme court in Edmunds, supra, vis-a-vis state constitutional claims, but addressing such a claim where appellant simply raised the claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, cited eases in support of his claim, and related the cases to the claim), disapproved on other grounds, Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996).

1979In Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Pa. 566, 571 , 276 A.2d 834, 836 (1971), quoted in Commonwealth v. Russell, 477 Pa. 147, 151 , 383 A.2d 866, 868 (1978), the court pointed out the importance of defense counsel and stated that a hearing or trial court should not accept an accused’s pro se motion when he has counsel of record.

1979In Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Pa. 566, 571 , 276 A.2d 834, 836 (1971), quoted in Commonwealth v. Russell, 477 Pa. 147, 151 , 383 A.2d 866, 868 (1978), the court pointed out the importance of defense counsel and stated that a hearing or trial court should not accept an accused’s pro se motion when he has counsel of record.

2023Id. at 7, citing Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 978 (Pa. 2018) and Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 825-26 (Pa. 2004).

2023Id. at 7, citing Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 978 (Pa. 2018) and Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 825-26 (Pa. 2004).

2022In this case, Appellant asserts that at least some of the information it seeks to shield from discovery is entitled to attorney-client privilege, which our Supreme Court has called “the most revered of our common-law privileges." Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa. 1986).

2022Our Supreme Court recognizes that the “confidentiality of mental health records is the sine qua non of effective treatment.” Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 33 (Pa. 2003).

2022Our Supreme Court recognizes that the “confidentiality of mental health records is the sine qua non of effective treatment.” Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25 , 33 (Pa. 2003).

2018See K.C., 128 A.3d at 778 . 8 .

2016Id. at 180; see also id. at 181 (“The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue[,] the propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.”).

2016Id. at 180; see also id. at 181 (“The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue[,] the propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.”).

2008See Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 911 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super.2006) (where sentencing court was “oddly deferential” to defendant and concern for defendant’s rehabilitative needs outweighed court’s consideration of section 9718 factors, sentence was unduly lenient and properly vacated on appeal), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 592 Pa. 7 , 922 A.2d 873 (2007). ¶ 42 We recognize that the definition of “reasonableness” is fluid and lacks precise boundaries.

2008See Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 911 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super.2006) (where sentencing court was “oddly deferential” to defendant and concern for defendant’s rehabilitative needs outweighed court’s consideration of section 9718 factors, sentence was unduly lenient and properly vacated on appeal), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 592 Pa. 7 , 922 A.2d 873 (2007). ¶ 42 We recognize that the definition of “reasonableness” is fluid and lacks precise boundaries.