importance rule in California

2022No. 107- 296, 1st Sess., p. 53 (2001).) As the Air Wisconsin court stated, “The ATSA shifted from airlines to the TSA the responsibility ‘for assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security.’ ” (Air Wisconsin, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 248 .) Under section 44941, airline employees are relieved of the responsibility of confirming whether an actual threat exists in order to “encourage air carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential threats.” (Air Wiscons

2022No. 107- 296, 1st Sess., p. 53 (2001).) As the Air Wisconsin court stated, “The ATSA shifted from airlines to the TSA the responsibility ‘for assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security.’ ” (Air Wisconsin, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 248 .) Under section 44941, airline employees are relieved of the responsibility of confirming whether an actual threat exists in order to “encourage air carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential threats.” (Air Wiscons

2013(Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 289–290 [reminding and encouraging the trial court to use its inherent power to exercise control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it].) We see no evidence the jury got the impression that the trial court minimized the importance of defense counsel’s argument.

2013(Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 289–290 [reminding and encouraging the trial court to use its inherent power to exercise control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it].) We see no evidence the jury got the impression that the trial court minimized the importance of defense counsel’s argument.

2025(See People v. Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 220 ; Boyde v. Brown (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 1159, 1166 [rejecting claim that inmate’s paranoid delusions rendered him incompetent when the delusions did not limit his ability to interact with counsel or understand the proceedings].) If anything, his attempt to come up with a more plausible and legally sound defense of the murder and an explanation for his subsequent behavior demonstrates an understanding of the nature of the criminal proceedings and of the importance of a defense, as well as [REDACTED].

2023(In re Sokol, supra, 113 F.3d at p. 307 .) “Factors to be considered include, inter alia: 1) the nature of the forum and the importance of the claim in the prior litigation; 2) the incentive to litigate and the actual extent of litigation in the prior forum; and 3) the foreseeability of future litigation (because of its impact on the incentive to litigate in the first proceeding). [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Regarding the first factor, the court concluded that “[t]he nature and importance of the issues at trial and in bankruptcy court are . . . dissimilar.” (In re Sokol , supra, 113 F.3d at p. 307 .)

2023(In re Sokol, supra, 113 F.3d at p. 307 .) “Factors to be considered include, inter alia: 1) the nature of the forum and the importance of the claim in the prior litigation; 2) the incentive to litigate and the actual extent of litigation in the prior forum; and 3) the foreseeability of future litigation (because of its impact on the incentive to litigate in the first proceeding). [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Regarding the first factor, the court concluded that “[t]he nature and importance of the issues at trial and in bankruptcy court are . . . dissimilar.” (In re Sokol , supra, 113 F.3d at p. 307 .)

2022To decide if the Legislature wanted to create an exception to the hearsay rule in this case, we would normally begin by examining the words of the statute as the “ ‘the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.’ ” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 83, quoting Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487 .) We would construe those words in context, resolving uncertainties or ambiguities by reference to extrinsic aids such as legislative history and taking into consideration the Legislature’s purposes in enacting the legislation.

2022(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 28 .) To overcome the presumption, a court must make two specific findings.

2018In support of this discussion, we cited a federal decision stressing "the importance of a rule" that "encourage[s] early police intervention where a suspect is clearly bent on the commission of crime " ( U.S. v. Stallworth (2d Cir. 1976) 543 F.2d 1038 , 1041, italics added), and "that enables society to punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled" ( id. at p. 1040, italics added). ( *672 Dillon , at p. 453, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) In light of these considerations

2018The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether counsel necessarily consented to a continuance of the remaining matter, with a new 10-day grace period to run following the date to which the trial in the remaining matter was continued. ( Id. at p. 966, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 189 P.3d 271 .) In holding that "counsel necessarily consents to postponement [and therefore a new grace period] when he or she is not unconditionally ready for immediate trial due to conflicting commitments to other clients," the court addressed the importance of defense counsel's readiness for trial: "At the outset, we

2018The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether counsel necessarily consented to a continuance of the remaining matter, with a new 10-day grace period to run following the date to which the trial in the remaining matter was continued. ( Id. at p. 966, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 189 P.3d 271 .) In holding that "counsel necessarily consents to postponement [and therefore a new grace period] when he or she is not unconditionally ready for immediate trial due to conflicting commitments to other clients," the court addressed the importance of defense counsel's readiness for trial: "At the outset, we

2017Pointing to “firmly rooted” constitutional history, Grafton concluded that, “ ‘unless the Legislature prescribes a jury waiver method, we cannot enforce it.’ ” ( Grafton, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 953, 956.) Other portions of the Grafton court’s analysis underscore the importance of the rule that the Legislature retains sole authority to determine permissible methods of jury waiver.

2017The court rejected a claim that it was “anomalous” to prohibit a “knowing, voluntary, written” predispute waiver of the right to jury trial, given that section 631 permits parties to forfeit the right through their own negligence, such as by failing to file a timely demand for jury trial (§ 631, subd. (f)(4)), or by failing to deposit required fees in a timely manner (§631, subd. (f)(5), (6)). ( Grafton, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 963-964.) This result is not anomalous, the court pointed out, because the forfeiture provisions at issue “were created by the Legislature.

2008(Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1247-1248; see also Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1202-1203.) That legislative intent does not exist here.

2007In this way, the Convention gives children the possibility of interpreting their own interests.” (Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Rep., ¶ 30, p. 433, italics added.) “In applying the ‘age and maturity’ exception, a court must not focus solely on the general goal of the Convention—to protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal—but must also carefully determine that the particular child ‘ “has obtained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” ’ ” (de Silva v. Pitts (10th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 1279, 1286 .) The couple’s older child is 13 year

2007But in those cases in which the plaintiff claims adjusters did produce their employers' product, that fact should have been dispositive in application of the dichotomy as long as the employer's product was not itself an administrative service. [10] Because plaintiffs are not primarily engaged in work that falls on the administrative side of the dichotomy, it is unnecessary for us to analyze the other elements of the administrative exemption, including the substantial importance requirement and the requirement that the employee exercise discretion and independent judgment. [11] For similar reas

2005Although the eyewitness testimony can have no bearing on our assessment of the propriety of the Governor’s decision, and does not, the belated emergence of this evidence demonstrates not just the erroneousness of the Governor’s assumptions regarding the nature of Scott’s offense, but the importance of the requirement that evidence underlying the parole authority’s decision “ ‘have some indicia of reliability.’ ” (Biggs v. Terhune, supra, 334 F.3d at p. 915 , quoting Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, supra, 833 F.2d at p. 1390 .) A parole hearing does not ordinarily provide a prisoner a very goo

2005Although the eyewitness testimony can have no bearing on our assessment of the propriety of the Governor’s decision, and does not, the belated emergence of this evidence demonstrates not just the erroneousness of the Governor’s assumptions regarding the nature of Scott’s offense, but the importance of the requirement that evidence underlying the parole authority’s decision “ ‘have some indicia of reliability.’ ” (Biggs v. Terhune, supra, 334 F.3d at p. 915 , quoting Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, supra, 833 F.2d at p. 1390 .) A parole hearing does not ordinarily provide a prisoner a very goo

2002(Id. at pp. 122-123.) As the People concede, the trial court abused its discretion under Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, by ruling defendant’s prior murder and rape convictions could be admitted to impeach him should he choose to testify.

2001However, when we consider the actions of the Legislature in implementing the constitutional right to an interpreter after adoption of that right in 1974, the judicial articulation of the scope of the constitutional right in the decade before promulgation of rule 984.2, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of analogous procedural failings in In re Richard S., supra, 54 Cal.3d 857 , we must conclude that the procedural requirements of rule 984.2 are not an integral part of the constitutional right established in article I, section 14.

1997We have observed that, if given no opportunity to convict of the lesser offense, the jury wrongly may convict the defendant of the greater offense, even though it believes an element of that offense is missing, rather than acquit the defendant entirely. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 444, fn. 17 [ 285 Cal. Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 ]; People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 352 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 455 , 702 P.2d 613 ]; People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324-325 .) (42c) It appears that, in deciding to instruct as to second degree murder, the trial court properly heeded that

1997Moreover, it appears that defense counsel's objection was motivated by a deliberate decision to "`utilize an all-or-nothing tactical strategy,'" in the hope that the jury might decide against guilt if it had any doubts regarding whether a particular murder was the result of impulse or instead of deliberation or premeditation. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 ; People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234-1236 .) (44) In discussing the importance of instruction as to lesser included offenses, we previously have admonished that the jury should not be confronted with an "all or not

1997(People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 ; People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234-1236 .) In discussing the importance of instruction as to lesser included offenses, we previously have admonished that the jury should not be confronted with an “all or nothing” choice when it may believe that the accused is guilty only of a lesser included offense.

1997Moreover, it appears that defense counsel's objection was motivated by a deliberate decision to "`utilize an all-or-nothing tactical strategy,'" in the hope that the jury might decide against guilt if it had any doubts regarding whether a particular murder was the result of impulse or instead of deliberation or premeditation. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 ; People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234-1236 .) (44) In discussing the importance of instruction as to lesser included offenses, we previously have admonished that the jury should not be confronted with an "all or not

1997(People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 ; People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234-1236 .) In discussing the importance of instruction as to lesser included offenses, we previously have admonished that the jury should not be confronted with an “all or nothing” choice when it may believe that the accused is guilty only of a lesser included offense.