importance rule in Maryland

2009Nonetheless, the Court enumerated several factors to be considered in deciding whether a statute is a "special law." The Court reiterated the importance of these factors in State v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 299 Md. 310 , 473 A.2d 892 (1984).

2009Nonetheless, the Court enumerated several factors to be considered in deciding whether a statute is a "special law." The Court reiterated the importance of these factors in State v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 299 Md. 310 , 473 A.2d 892 (1984).

1946In effect, this Court has frequently held regarding election laws, that: “ Tf the law itself declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement. * * * In the absence of such declaration, the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had, or had not so vital an influence * * * as probably prevented a free and full expression of the popular will’.” Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 648 , 187 A. 833, 835 , quoting Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 6

1946In effect, this Court has frequently held regarding election laws, that: “ Tf the law itself declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement. * * * In the absence of such declaration, the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had, or had not so vital an influence * * * as probably prevented a free and full expression of the popular will’.” Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 648 , 187 A. 833, 835 , quoting Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 6

1939Williams’ Excrs. v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 376, 379 .

1938Williams’ Excrs. v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 376, 379 .

2009Maryland Rule 4-325(e) states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving [of] ... an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” We explained the importance of this rule in McMillan v. State, 181 Md.App. 298, 359 , 956 A.2d 716 , cert. granted 406 Md. 744 , 962 A.2d 370 (2008): The policy behind the preservation rule is clear.

2009Maryland Rule 4-325(e) states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving [of] ... an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” We explained the importance of this rule in McMillan v. State, 181 Md.App. 298, 359 , 956 A.2d 716 , cert. granted 406 Md. 744 , 962 A.2d 370 (2008): The policy behind the preservation rule is clear.

2009Maryland Rule 4-325(e) states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving [of] ... an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” We explained the importance of this rule in McMillan v. State, 181 Md.App. 298, 359 , 956 A.2d 716 , cert. granted 406 Md. 744 , 962 A.2d 370 (2008): The policy behind the preservation rule is clear.

2005See Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 732 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991) (Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the presumption, noting that “the Worker’s Compensation Commission is an administrative agency and was created specifically to develop an expertise in its field”); and Kelly Catering, Inc. v. Holman, 96 Md.App. 256, 271-72 , 624 A.2d 1300 (1993), (Court of Special Appeals stated: “It is, of course, beyond dispute — and therefore rarely stated — that the [Commission] possesses considerable expertise in interpreting and applying the Workers’ Compensation statutes.... ”), aff'd, 334 Md.

2005See Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 732 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991) (Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the presumption, noting that “the Worker’s Compensation Commission is an administrative agency and was created specifically to develop an expertise in its field”); and Kelly Catering, Inc. v. Holman, 96 Md.App. 256, 271-72 , 624 A.2d 1300 (1993), (Court of Special Appeals stated: “It is, of course, beyond dispute — and therefore rarely stated — that the [Commission] possesses considerable expertise in interpreting and applying the Workers’ Compensation statutes.... ”), aff'd, 334 Md.

2005See Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 732 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991) (Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the presumption, noting that “the Worker’s Compensation Commission is an administrative agency and was created specifically to develop an expertise in its field”); and Kelly Catering, Inc. v. Holman, 96 Md.App. 256, 271-72 , 624 A.2d 1300 (1993), (Court of Special Appeals stated: “It is, of course, beyond dispute — and therefore rarely stated — that the [Commission] possesses considerable expertise in interpreting and applying the Workers’ Compensation statutes.... ”), aff'd, 334 Md.

2005See Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 732 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991) (Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the presumption, noting that “the Worker’s Compensation Commission is an administrative agency and was created specifically to develop an expertise in its field”); and Kelly Catering, Inc. v. Holman, 96 Md.App. 256, 271-72 , 624 A.2d 1300 (1993), (Court of Special Appeals stated: “It is, of course, beyond dispute — and therefore rarely stated — that the [Commission] possesses considerable expertise in interpreting and applying the Workers’ Compensation statutes.... ”), aff'd, 334 Md.

2001In 1952 we held in Wilson v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 200 Md. 652 , 89 A. 2d 227 , that a trial court has no power to strike out or reduce a sentence *434 imposed upon a convicted defendant after it has become enrolled.

2001In 1952 we held in Wilson v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 200 Md. 652 , 89 A. 2d 227 , that a trial court has no power to strike out or reduce a sentence *434 imposed upon a convicted defendant after it has become enrolled.

2001Nevertheless, the majority seems to have adopted the intermediate appellate court's formulation of the issue: whether a "reasonable trier of fact could find that appellee did not seek compensation for her surgery from the Charles County jury." Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md.App. at 581 , 758 A.2d at 1025 . [6] I am also concerned about the majority's suggestion, and the more explicit one by the Court of Special Appeals, [7] with regard to the importance of a defense argument, of which the plaintiff is put on notice, in determining the scope of the issues decided or the effect of a satisfied judgment

2001Nevertheless, the majority seems to have adopted the intermediate appellate court's formulation of the issue: whether a "reasonable trier of fact could find that appellee did not seek compensation for her surgery from the Charles County jury." Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md.App. at 581 , 758 A.2d at 1025 . [6] I am also concerned about the majority's suggestion, and the more explicit one by the Court of Special Appeals, [7] with regard to the importance of a defense argument, of which the plaintiff is put on notice, in determining the scope of the issues decided or the effect of a satisfied judgment

2001In emphasizing the importance of the doctrine in that case, Judge Seabury forcefully stated: “Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a low and degraded character and that after they have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper administration of justice.” We held in 1950 in Czaplinski v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 196 Md.

2001In emphasizing the importance of the doctrine in that case, Judge Seabury forcefully stated: “Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a low and degraded character and that after they have given their testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper administration of justice.” We held in 1950 in Czaplinski v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 196 Md.

1982But "[notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement, it is not of universal application.” Id.

1982The rule does not apply if the purchase is made to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, or if the beneficiaries validly consent, or if they are guilty of laches, "or if the fiduciary be authorized by statute, by the instrument creating the trust, or by the court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, provided the sale be fairly made.” Id. at 593 , 199 A. at 869 .

1963In the recent case of Aleshire v. State, 225 Md. 355 , 170 A. 2d 758 (1961), Judge Prescott for the Court reviewed exhaustively the importance of the rule of foreseeability in the law of negligence, and concluded (at p. 366 of 225 Md.), that “* * * injuries which could by no reasonable possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonably prudent person would have apprehended, cannot form the basis for actionable negligence.” He also pointed out (at p. 367) that “* * * the test of foreseeability, or reasonable anticipation as it is sometimes called, must be judged by foresight, not in retros

1963In the recent case of Aleshire v. State, 225 Md. 355 , 170 A. 2d 758 (1961), Judge Prescott for the Court reviewed exhaustively the importance of the rule of foreseeability in the law of negligence, and concluded (at p. 366 of 225 Md.), that “* * * injuries which could by no reasonable possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonably prudent person would have apprehended, cannot form the basis for actionable negligence.” He also pointed out (at p. 367) that “* * * the test of foreseeability, or reasonable anticipation as it is sometimes called, must be judged by foresight, not in retros

1946In effect, this Court has frequently held regarding election laws, that: “ Tf the law itself declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement. * * * In the absence of such declaration, the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had, or had not so vital an influence * * * as probably prevented a free and full expression of the popular will’.” Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 648 , 187 A. 833, 835 , quoting Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 6

1946In effect, this Court has frequently held regarding election laws, that: “ Tf the law itself declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views of the importance of the requirement. * * * In the absence of such declaration, the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had, or had not so vital an influence * * * as probably prevented a free and full expression of the popular will’.” Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 648 , 187 A. 833, 835 , quoting Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 6

1939Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. *666 420, 423; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368 ; Pedro v: Vickery, 37 Md. 467, 485 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33 , 80 A. 603 ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 313, 315 , 118 A. 759 ; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 592 ; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 484. ■ “Notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement it is not of universal application.

1939Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. *666 420, 423; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368 ; Pedro v: Vickery, 37 Md. 467, 485 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33 , 80 A. 603 ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 313, 315 , 118 A. 759 ; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 592 ; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 484. ■ “Notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement it is not of universal application.

1939Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. *666 420, 423; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368 ; Pedro v: Vickery, 37 Md. 467, 485 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33 , 80 A. 603 ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 313, 315 , 118 A. 759 ; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 592 ; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 484. ■ “Notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement it is not of universal application.

1939Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. *666 420, 423; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368 ; Pedro v: Vickery, 37 Md. 467, 485 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33 , 80 A. 603 ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 313, 315 , 118 A. 759 ; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 592 ; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 484. ■ “Notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement it is not of universal application.

1939Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. *666 420, 423; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368 ; Pedro v: Vickery, 37 Md. 467, 485 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33 , 80 A. 603 ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 313, 315 , 118 A. 759 ; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 592 ; 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 484. ■ “Notwithstanding the importance of the rule and the salutary effect of its rigid enforcement it is not of universal application.