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15 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1929–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2018In receding from the reasoning of Houck on these points, “we are mindful of the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis.” State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1995). 2018In receding from the reasoning of Houck on these points, "we are mindful of the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis ." State v. Gray , 654 So.2d 552 , 554 (Fla. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Prost v. Andersongreen1 sentence2026See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2026See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, 2026See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, | 1 | 1 |
Calderon v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2026See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, | 1 | 1 |
Witt v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, | 1 | 1 |
MacKey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const. And as noted by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, “No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Lawhorn v. Allengreen2 sentences2023Given that “one of the most important functions of the capital sentencing process is the opportunity to humanize the defendant, the importance of the defense’s closing argument cannot . . . be overstated.” Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008). 2023Closing argument by the defense “can remind the factfinder of favorable facts that it may have forgotten or mistakenly downplayed or prematurely misjudged.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
PENSACOLA BEACH PIER, INC. v. Kinggreen1 sentence2018Pensacola Beach Pier, Inc. v. King, 66 So. 3d 321, 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). | 1 | 1 |
American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Fla. v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2017Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). | 1 | 1 |
Atkins v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes 2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schoppgreen1 sentence2000See State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1023 (Fla.1995) (Harding, J., dissenting) (" [S]tare decisis provides stability to the law and to the society governed by that law."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court discussed the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination. 2013In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court discussed the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination. | 2 | 2004–2013 |
State v. Grandstaff
green
2 sentences2010The importance of rule 3.800(c) in ensuring fairness in the sentencing process is illustrated by Grandstaff, 927 So.2d at 1036 . 2010The importance of rule 3.800(c) in ensuring fairness in the sentencing process is illustrated by Grandstaff, 927 So.2d at 1036 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes 2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hudson v. McMillian
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes 2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Harbison v. Little
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Taylor v. Crawford
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 , 264 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 2909 , 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). [9] See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 , 1079 (8th Cir.2007) ("While we do not imply that the Court [in Hill ] thereby adopted a new constitutional standard, we do observe that the Court expressed no dissatisfaction with that statement of the issue [whether the protocol allegedly causes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Giordenello v. United States
green
2 sentences2005The importance of the requirement that the arrest affidavit or complaint be sworn to before the magistrate judge was explained by the court in Brown : The interpretation to be given Criminal Rules 3 and 4 was set out by the Supreme Court in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-486 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). 2005The importance of the requirement that the arrest affidavit or complaint be sworn to before the magistrate judge was explained by the court in Brown : The interpretation to be given Criminal Rules 3 and 4 was set out by the Supreme Court in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-486 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Schmerber v. California
green
1 sentence2004In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , the United States Supreme Court was concerned with the inherent pressures of in-custody interrogation and the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
McMillon v. State
green
1 sentence2002"Giving both instructions preserves the State's obligation to prove every element of its case without diminishing the importance of the presumption that logically flows from a defendant's actual possession of a controlled substance." McMillon, 813 So.2d at 58 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Swann v. Adams
green
2 sentences1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc 1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Swann v. Adams
green
2 sentences1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc 1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Swann v. Adams
green
2 sentences1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc 1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Swann v. Adams
green
1 sentence1982The exception embodied in our constitution which allows shortened terms only when necessary to maintain staggered terms, serves more to illustrate the importance of the principle of continuity to the framers, than it does to separate our constitution from those of the rest of the nation. [2] Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 210 , 86 S.Ct. 767 , 15 L.Ed.2d 707 (1966); 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965) (supp.op.), rev'd, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.Fla. 1967). [3] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the exc | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sobel v. Adams
green
1 sentence1982The provision was added by the legislature after originating in a legislative committee. [4] The holdovers in Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.Fla. 1965), were elected in 1964 under a 1963 plan which had originally been approved by the district court, Sobel v. Adams, 214 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.Fla. 1963). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sutton v. Zewadski
neutral
1 sentence1929While the court agrees with counsel upon the proposition that the rule prescribed by the court - acting within its authority have the force of law and must be complied with, Sutton v. Zewadski, 70 Fla. 379 , 70 So. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.