6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012“Proof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt is thus ‘more powerful’ than proof that the fact is ‘more likely true than not,’ more powerful, even, than proof ‘that its truth is highly probable.’ ” Id. (quoting (Darius) Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1998) (en banc)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Smallgreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., In re Small, 760 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2000) (identifying respondent’s “lack of candor with respect to his application for admission” as one factor justifying the imposition of a fitness requirement); In re Delate, 579 A.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C.1990) (“given respondent’s behavior revealed in this record — virtual abandonment of her conservatorship responsibilities in two cases — she should not be permitted to resume practice automatically upon expiration of her suspension”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Delategreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., In re Small, 760 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2000) (identifying respondent’s “lack of candor with respect to his application for admission” as one factor justifying the imposition of a fitness requirement); In re Delate, 579 A.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C.1990) (“given respondent’s behavior revealed in this record — virtual abandonment of her conservatorship responsibilities in two cases — she should not be permitted to resume practice automatically upon expiration of her suspension”). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997We have stressed the importance of this rule because § 23-110 "is virtually a remedy of last resort" and "the record on direct appeal is ordinarily barren of the evidentiary facts which would either confirm or refute [the] allegation [of ineffective assistance of trial counsel]." Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869-70 (D.C.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1997We have stressed the importance of this rule because § 23-110 “is virtually a remedy of last resort” and “the record on direct appeal is ordinarily barren of the evidentiary facts which would either confirm or refute [the] allegation [of ineffective assistance of trial counsel].” Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869-70 (D.C.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Newsome v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2005Although, there is an "outrageous conduct" exception to this general rule, Newsome, id. at 631 , and although we recognize the importance in principle of the parental rights being asserted by the mother, we conclude that on the record before us, counsel's failure to prepare a statement of proceedings and evidence must be imputed to his client. 2005Although, there is an “outrageous conduct” exception to this general rule, Newsome, id. at 631 , and although we recognize the importance in principle of the parental rights being asserted by the mother, we conclude that on the record before us, counsel’s failure to prepare a statement of proceedings and evidence must be imputed to his client. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2012We emphasized the importance of that standard in Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C.2001) (en banc): “The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 133 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 2012We emphasized the importance of that standard in Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C.2001) (en banc): “The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 133 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rivas v. United States
green
2 sentences2012We emphasized the importance of that standard in Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C.2001) (en banc): “The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 133 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 2012We emphasized the importance of that standard in Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C.2001) (en banc): “The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Id. at 133 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Tillery v. United States
green
2 sentences1982In Tillery, supra, we echoed the importance of defense counsel not only preparing but presenting highly credible impeachment material where the critical issue was that of credibility. 1982In Tillery, supra, we echoed the importance of defense counsel not only preparing but presenting highly credible impeachment material where the critical issue was that of credibility. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.