Harris rule in Michigan

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

2024The trial court denied Harris’s motion without conducting a Ginther hearing. 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -4- After filing a claim of appeal in this Court, Harris filed a motion for a Ginther hearing, which was denied “for failure to persuade the Court of the necessity of a remand at this time,” but “without prejudice to a case call panel of this Court determining that remand is necessary once the case is submitted on a session calendar.”2 Thereafter, this Court granted Harris’s motion to expand the record to include Dr. Sawyer’s supplemental affidavit, which was sub

2024The trial court denied Harris’s motion without conducting a Ginther hearing. 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -4- After filing a claim of appeal in this Court, Harris filed a motion for a Ginther hearing, which was denied “for failure to persuade the Court of the necessity of a remand at this time,” but “without prejudice to a case call panel of this Court determining that remand is necessary once the case is submitted on a session calendar.”2 Thereafter, this Court granted Harris’s motion to expand the record to include Dr. Sawyer’s supplemental affidavit, which was sub

2016See People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 63 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999) (“[A] jury is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.”) Viewing the complainants’ identification testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Harverson, 291 Mich App at 175-176 , and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prosecution, Unger, 278 Mich App at 222 , a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant was the gunman.

2016The prosecutor’s use of the terms “coward” and “weaseling” does not elevate the prosecutor’s argument to plain error because a prosecutor is not required to confine argument to the blandest possible terms, Dobek, 274 Mich App at 66 , and because the references were brief and were made during an otherwise proper argument that focused on the evidence. 3.

2016See People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 63 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999) (“[A] jury is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.”) Viewing the complainants’ identification testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Harverson, 291 Mich App at 175-176 , and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prosecution, Unger, 278 Mich App at 222 , a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant was the gunman.

1993See the last clause of MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162. 2 Defendant removed his tools, two guns, two radios, a camera, a picture, part of his wife’s phone bill, and the keys to his motorcycle. 3 We need not discuss the first question in the Harris test — “If the sentence is to be within the guidelines, where in the guidelines range should the sentence fall?” — because the trial court had already chosen to depart from the guidelines. 4 During sentencing, defendant’s wife alleged other instances of drunken violence, but the trial court chose not to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve defendant’s o

1993See the last clause of MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162. 2 Defendant removed his tools, two guns, two radios, a camera, a picture, part of his wife’s phone bill, and the keys to his motorcycle. 3 We need not discuss the first question in the Harris test — “If the sentence is to be within the guidelines, where in the guidelines range should the sentence fall?” — because the trial court had already chosen to depart from the guidelines. 4 During sentencing, defendant’s wife alleged other instances of drunken violence, but the trial court chose not to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve defendant’s o

1993Milbourn, supra. It is evident that under the Milbourn/Harris analysis, the trial court is required to make reasoned sentencing decisions.

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985My colleagues rely on New Jersey v Portash, 440 US 450 ; 99 S Ct 1292 ; 59 L Ed 2d 501 (1979), but that case is clearly distinguishable because it involved an involuntary statement.

1985My colleagues rely on New Jersey v Portash, 440 US 450 ; 99 S Ct 1292 ; 59 L Ed 2d 501 (1979), but that case is clearly distinguishable because it involved an involuntary statement.

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1985Similarly, in People v Esters, 417 Mich 34 ; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a majority of this Court agreed that the defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), were admissible, as a matter of federal constitutional law, for impeachment purposes. [2] However, in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 355 ; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044 , we held that "[i]nvoluntary confessions ... may never be used, both because the police broke the law but more importantly because an involuntary confession is always of questionable

1983In his opinion for reversal in Esters, supra, p 64 , Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish Harris from Edwards on the baiss of the following language in Edwards, supra, 451 US 484 : "Schneckloth [v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 226 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.

1983In his opinion for reversal in Esters, supra, p 64 , Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish Harris from Edwards on the baiss of the following language in Edwards, supra, 451 US 484 : "Schneckloth [v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 226 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.