Harris motion in Alabama

2024See Christianson v. State, 601 So. 2d 512, 520 (Ala. Crim.

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007“However, ‘[t]he ore tenus presumption of correctness applies to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law.’ City of Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 842 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.2002). ‘[T]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness.’ Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999). ‘ “ ‘[W]hen the trial *893 court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court’s judgment.’ ” ’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d at 159 , qu

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007“However, ‘[t]he ore tenus presumption of correctness applies to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law.’ City of Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 842 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.2002). ‘[T]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness.’ Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999). ‘ “ ‘[W]hen the trial *893 court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court’s judgment.’ ” ’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d at 159 , qu

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007Upon Harris’s motion to suppress his statement’s to law-enforcement officials, the trial court held a suppression hearing to determine whether law-enforcement officials advised Harris of his Miranda rights and to determine whether Harris’s statements had been made knowingly and voluntarily. “ ‘The trial court held the suppression hearing outside the hearing of the jury; therefore, we review the evidentiary findings of the trial court at that hearing under the ore tenus standard.’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2004). ‘When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the cour

2007“However, ‘[t]he ore tenus presumption of correctness applies to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law.’ City of Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 842 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.2002). ‘[T]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness.’ Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999). ‘ “ ‘[W]hen the trial *893 court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court’s judgment.’ ” ’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d at 159 , qu

2007“However, ‘[t]he ore tenus presumption of correctness applies to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law.’ City of Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 842 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.2002). ‘[T]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness.’ Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999). ‘ “ ‘[W]hen the trial *893 court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court’s judgment.’ ” ’ Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d at 159 , qu

2006While in custody, "'[s]he was accused time and time again of child abuse and finally after a direct threat to the well-being of her child, she made a statement which included inculpatory matters.'" 435 So.2d at 1215 (Maddox, J., dissenting, and quoting Harris's brief).

2006The police officers promised Harris that "`the incident would be listed as an accident, so it would not be reported to the Department of Pensions and Security.'" Id. "`Upon leaving the interrogation room[, Harris] . . . recanted'" her confession.

2006See, e.g., Ex parte Price , 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998). 2 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 In his brief, Harris makes the following statement: "When Harris returned to his home [after the traffic stop of the Hyundai Sonata], the officers intruded without probable cause upon Harris's premises. [The] officers intruded not with knowledge of a crime in progress, but upon a suspicion, to simply determine if a resident engaged in a crime." (Harris's brief at p. 15.) To the extent that Harris intended this single sentence to be a challenge to the officers' entry o

2006See, e.g., Ex parte Price , 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998). 2 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 In his brief, Harris makes the following statement: "When Harris returned to his home [after the traffic stop of the Hyundai Sonata], the officers intruded without probable cause upon Harris's premises. [The] officers intruded not with knowledge of a crime in progress, but upon a suspicion, to simply determine if a resident engaged in a crime." (Harris's brief at p. 15.) To the extent that Harris intended this single sentence to be a challenge to the officers' entry o

2006See, e.g., Ex parte Price , 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998). 2 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 In his brief, Harris makes the following statement: "When Harris returned to his home [after the traffic stop of the Hyundai Sonata], the officers intruded without probable cause upon Harris's premises. [The] officers intruded not with knowledge of a crime in progress, but upon a suspicion, to simply determine if a resident engaged in a crime." (Harris's brief at p. 15.) To the extent that Harris intended this single sentence to be a challenge to the officers' entry o

2005See Whitehead v. State, 593 So.2d 126 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).

2005Harris contends that in Parts IV and V of the opinion on original submission we "erroneously invoke[d] the case of Whitehead v. State, 593 So.2d 126 (Ala. Crim.App.1991), to hold that Mrs. Harris has `waived' two claims from appellate review—the circuit court's refusal to consider the testimony of expert witness Stephen Glassroth and the evidence presented in her Motion to Supplement the Record— because the claims were not raised before the circuit court after that court made its ruling." (Harris's brief on application for rehearing at p. 23.) Assuming without determining that our reliance on

2005Ex parte Frazier, 758 So.2d 611, 616 (Ala.1999).

2002The ruling was based on caselaw stating that “[t]he grounds urged on a motion for a new trial must ordinarily be preserved at trial by timely and specific objections.” Trawick v. State, 431 So.2d 574, 578-79 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), citing Smith v. State, 393 So.2d 529 (Ala.Crim.App.1981).