Harris rule in California

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2021(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (Harris) [A statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes.]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [Pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes.]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1196 [The Harris rule applies “even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of 39 his or her r

2026In the prior small claims action, plaintiff alleged the defendant, a gay bar, had discriminated against him in violation of the Unruh Act because he was gay. ( Gayer, supra, at p. 518, fn. 2 .) The First District (1) concluded that membership in a protected class is a requirement for protection under the Unruh Act and (2) rejected plaintiff’s 33. argument that he was a member of a class of civil rights litigants. ( Gayer, supra, at pp. 522, 525 .) The court addressed the first prong of the Harris framework by stating the bar’s discrimination against the plaintiff “is neither based on status as

2026In the prior small claims action, plaintiff alleged the defendant, a gay bar, had discriminated against him in violation of the Unruh Act because he was gay. ( Gayer, supra, at p. 518, fn. 2 .) The First District (1) concluded that membership in a protected class is a requirement for protection under the Unruh Act and (2) rejected plaintiff’s 33. argument that he was a member of a class of civil rights litigants. ( Gayer, supra, at pp. 522, 525 .) The court addressed the first prong of the Harris framework by stating the bar’s discrimination against the plaintiff “is neither based on status as

2026(Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [an order challenged on appeal is presumed correct and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively show the trial court erred].) The third prong of the Harris analysis examines “the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation”—that is, from adding a characteristic to the types of discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Act.

2026(Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [an order challenged on appeal is presumed correct and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively show the trial court erred].) The third prong of the Harris analysis examines “the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation”—that is, from adding a characteristic to the types of discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Act.

2026(See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular statutory interpretation]; Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP v. Dhindsa (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 27 , 35 [same].) Therefore, we conclude the third prong of the Harris analysis applies generally and is not limited to characteristics that are economic or financial. 37.

2026(See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular statutory interpretation]; Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP v. Dhindsa (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 27 , 35 [same].) Therefore, we conclude the third prong of the Harris analysis applies generally and is not limited to characteristics that are economic or financial. 37.

2015(See City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395 [absent conflicting extrinsic evidence, interpretation of contract or written instrument is question of law]; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1126 . [same].) The security agreement required Stapke & Harris, “at its own expense, to keep 10 the Collateral in good standing” including “defend[ing] at its expense any proceeding which may affect title to or Creditor’s security interest in any Collateral.” The security agreement thus authorized Stapke & Harris’s defense of cl

2015(See City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395 [absent conflicting extrinsic evidence, interpretation of contract or written instrument is question of law]; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1126 . [same].) The security agreement required Stapke & Harris, “at its own expense, to keep 12 the Collateral in good standing” including “defend[ing] at its expense any proceeding which may affect title to or Creditor’s security interest in any Collateral.” The security agreement thus authorized Stapke & Harris’s defense of cl

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

1984The court stated that its decision in Taylor “did not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial, was necessarily unfair because it was not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.” (Daniel v. Louisiana, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 32 [42 L.Ed.2d at p. 793]; see also People v. Navarette (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1064, 1074-1076 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 55 ],) 3 Utilizing the first criteria of Stovall, supra, we find that the Harris rule is not predicated on the integrity of the fact-finding process.

1984The court stated that its decision in Taylor “did not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial, was necessarily unfair because it was not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.” (Daniel v. Louisiana, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 32 [42 L.Ed.2d at p. 793]; see also People v. Navarette (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1064, 1074-1076 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 55 ],) 3 Utilizing the first criteria of Stovall, supra, we find that the Harris rule is not predicated on the integrity of the fact-finding process.

2026The court stated the unspecified categories added by judicial construction—physical appearance and family status—“were based on personal characteristics of individuals that bore little or no relationship to their abilities to be responsible consumers of public accommodations.” ( Harris, supra, at p. 1148 , italics added.) In 2005, 14 years after Harris, the Supreme Court acknowledged it had not defined the term “personal characteristic” used in the first prong of the three-part Harris analysis.

2026The court stated the unspecified categories added by judicial construction—physical appearance and family status—“were based on personal characteristics of individuals that bore little or no relationship to their abilities to be responsible consumers of public accommodations.” ( Harris, supra, at p. 1148 , italics added.) In 2005, 14 years after Harris, the Supreme Court acknowledged it had not defined the term “personal characteristic” used in the first prong of the three-part Harris analysis.

2026(Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 842 .) The court explained the term by stating the categories enumerated in the Unruh Act or added by judicial construction “represent traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person’s identity, beliefs and self-definition.” (Koebke, at pp. 842–843.) For purposes of applying the first prong of the Harris framework to this case, we refer to this standard as the Koebke test.

2026(Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 842 .) The court explained the term by stating the categories enumerated in the Unruh Act or added by judicial construction “represent traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person’s identity, beliefs and self-definition.” (Koebke, at pp. 842–843.) For purposes of applying the first prong of the Harris framework to this case, we refer to this standard as the Koebke test.

2021(See Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 [trial court has discretion in certain circumstances to replace appointed counsel with counsel of defendant’s choice].) The motion was supported by defendant’s declaration stating that he was prepared to cooperate with Briggs.

2014This declaration may omit a full summary of the proceedings if part of the relief sought is an order to prepare a transcript for use by an indigent criminal defendant in support of the petition and if the declaration demonstrates the need for and entitlement to the transcript . . . . ” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.486.) 3 Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 . 3 process.

2020Floor Analyses, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), as amended Sept. 3, 2019, pp. 2–3; see also Hernandez, at pp. 957-958.) Hernandez rightly observed that “[t]he legislative intent for the enactment of Senate Bill 136 is very similar to the intents discussed in Stamps and Barton.” (Hernandez, at p. 958; see also Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702 ; Barton, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1158–1159.) Further, “[i]n contrast to Harris’s analysis of Proposition 47 and section 1170.18, Senate Bill 136 is silent regarding pleas and provides no express mechanism for relief, and thu

2020Floor Analyses, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), as amended Sept. 3, 2019, pp. 2–3; see also Hernandez, at pp. 957-958.) Hernandez rightly observed that “[t]he legislative intent for the enactment of Senate Bill 136 is very similar to the intents discussed in Stamps and Barton.” (Hernandez, at p. 958; see also Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702 ; Barton, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1158–1159.) Further, “[i]n contrast to Harris’s analysis of Proposition 47 and section 1170.18, Senate Bill 136 is silent regarding pleas and provides no express mechanism for relief, and thu

2022(See Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 840 [stating Harris test applies to new claims of discrimination based on category not listed in the statute or added by judicial construction]; Sisemore, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394, 1405-1407; Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (Long); but see Roth, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 539 .) We are not persuaded.

2022(See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1165-1168; Sisemore, supra, at p. 1407 [“Sisemore contends 9 that she was discriminated against [solely] because of her choice of [occupation], not that she was denied a mortgage loan because that choice resulted in her earning insufficient income to meet the lender’s underwriting criteria”]; Long, supra, at p. 1298 [police officers “may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apartment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occupation”], italics added.) Application of the Harris test is appropriate here because the facts pled b

2015(Id. at p. 1189.) Peevy observed that the high court had “struck a balance between the need to deter police misconduct and the need to expose defendants who perjure themselves at trial.” (Id. at p. 1194.) We said that “the Harris rule applies even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards [v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]] by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of his or her right to counsel,” noting that “the court’s concern that police misconduct not become a shield for perjury would seem to apply whether the misconduct i

2015(Id. at p. 1189.) Peevy observed that the high court had “struck a balance between the need to deter police misconduct and the need to expose defendants who perjure themselves at trial.” (Id. at p. 1194.) We said that “the Harris rule applies even if the individual police officer violates Miranda and Edwards [v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]] by purposefully failing to honor a suspect’s invocation of his or her right to counsel,” noting that “the court’s concern that police misconduct not become a shield for perjury would seem to apply whether the misconduct i

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

2000(People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ]; People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 580 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 475 ]; People v. Wyatt (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 255, 258 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 556 ]; People v. Duran, supra, 140 Cal.3d at p. 494; see People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208-209 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 524 P.2d 844 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], abrogated by Prop. 8; but see People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 621 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 ] [court has sua sponte duty].) In an

1985(See People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Mooring (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 453, 459 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Spears (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 397, 404 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 128-129 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ], cert, den., Smith v. California (1975) 420 U.S. 994 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 677 , 95 S.Ct. 1435 ].) The People apparently relied upon this pre-Harris rule and presented no rebuttal evidence.

1985(See People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Mooring (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 453, 459 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Spears (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 397, 404 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 128-129 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ], cert, den., Smith v. California (1975) 420 U.S. 994 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 677 , 95 S.Ct. 1435 ].) The People apparently relied upon this pre-Harris rule and presented no rebuttal evidence.

2025(See People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 251-252 [request for readback shows close case].) Deturk’s convictions would have supported Harris’s claim that he was in imminent danger of suffering great bodily injury and had to use deadly force to defend himself.

2023(See Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 [“Failure to provide an adequate record on 19 an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant. [Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in 14 favor of the validity of the judgment”].) And, as discussed, far from being irrational (or nonsensical), the court’s reasoning and resulting ruling denying Harris’s motion to set aside were entirely proper.

2022(See Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 840 [stating Harris test applies to new claims of discrimination based on category not listed in the statute or added by judicial construction]; Sisemore, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394, 1405-1407; Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (Long); but see Roth, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 539 .) We are not persuaded.

2022(See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1165-1168; Sisemore, supra, at p. 1407 [“Sisemore contends 9 that she was discriminated against [solely] because of her choice of [occupation], not that she was denied a mortgage loan because that choice resulted in her earning insufficient income to meet the lender’s underwriting criteria”]; Long, supra, at p. 1298 [police officers “may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apartment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occupation”], italics added.) Application of the Harris test is appropriate here because the facts pled b

2021(See People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [in absence of meaningful opportunity to object to trial court’s discretionary sentencing choices, failure to object does not forfeit appellate challenge]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1000 [general rule of forfeiture applies “‘“where an objection could have been, but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method”’” (italics added)].) We conclude neither the invited error doctrine nor the forfeiture rule bars Harris’s claim on appeal.

2021(See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 752 ; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1000 .) C.