Harris motion in Ohio

2025See State Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 30 , citing State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 20 . {¶10} Accordingly, we hold that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harris’s motion to correct the record.

2012See, also State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 . “[T]he fact that a defendant may be entitled to a revised order setting forth an inadvertently omitted term that is required by Crim.R. 32(C) as a matter of form does not prevent an original order that conforms to the substantive requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) from being final.” Lester at ¶ 16 . {¶ 10} Thus, the trial court properly denied Harris’s motion because the nunc pro tunc entry was in compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) and Baker and was the proper means to 6 correct the clerical error in the Termination Entr

2026Bd. of Commrs., 2010-Ohio-5073, ¶ 8 , quoting Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 416 (1937) (explaining that Civ.R. 11 sanctions are appropriate when the conduct “‘imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity,’” “‘implies conscious doing of wrong,’” or is done “‘with actual intent to mislead or deceive another’”). {¶ 35} In keeping with the theme of his motion for judicial notice, Harris suggests that, in light of Tillison, 2018-Ohio-3217 , and Parker, 2019-Ohio-4420 , Judge Rothgery’s counsel may have lied by arguing that the judge had authority to issue the nunc pr

2026Regarding Harris’s claim that the original sentencing entry was void, the Ninth District relied on our decision in State v. Harper, 2020- Ohio-2913, to conclude that any error in Judge Rothgery’s exercise of jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control in the rape case rendered the original judgment of sentence in that case “‘voidable, not void.’” 2025-Ohio-1299, ¶ 15-16 (9th Dist.), quoting Harper at ¶ 5.

2026See Sartini, 2002-Ohio-3317, at ¶ 33 ; Elder, 2015-Ohio-3628, at ¶ 13 . a.

2025See State v. Ralls, 2022-Ohio-2110, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).

2025(Emphasis added.) See App.R. 12(D); State v. Glick, 2007-Ohio- 4104, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.) (Because appellant had not asserted that he suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court’s order, the court did not reverse the judgment.); State v. Sinclair, 2020-Ohio-4860, ¶ 48 (5th Dist.) (for a reviewing court to reverse a judgment, the appellant must show prejudicial error).

2025Second, the trial court determined that Mr. Harris moved for default under Civ.R. 55(D)(Judgment against the state) 9 which did not apply to Harris’s motion for relief from judgment because it was not a pleading as prescribed by Civ.R. 55. {¶17} “[A] trial court possesses the ‘inherent authority to control its own docket and manage the cases before it.’” King v. Divoky, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting Holsopple v. Holsopple, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).

2025Second, the trial court determined that Mr. Harris moved for default under Civ.R. 55(D)(Judgment against the state) 9 which did not apply to Harris’s motion for relief from judgment because it was not a pleading as prescribed by Civ.R. 55. {¶17} “[A] trial court possesses the ‘inherent authority to control its own docket and manage the cases before it.’” King v. Divoky, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting Holsopple v. Holsopple, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).

2025State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 82 (1990) (appellate court reviews denial of a motion to correct the record for an abuse of discretion).

2025See State Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 30 , citing State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 20 . {¶10} Accordingly, we hold that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harris’s motion to correct the record.

2025Second, the trial court determined that Mr. Harris moved for default under Civ.R. 55(D)(Judgment against the state) 9 which did not apply to Harris’s motion for relief from judgment because it was not a pleading as prescribed by Civ.R. 55. {¶17} “[A] trial court possesses the ‘inherent authority to control its own docket and manage the cases before it.’” King v. Divoky, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting Holsopple v. Holsopple, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).

2025Second, the trial court determined that Mr. Harris moved for default under Civ.R. 55(D)(Judgment against the state) 9 which did not apply to Harris’s motion for relief from judgment because it was not a pleading as prescribed by Civ.R. 55. {¶17} “[A] trial court possesses the ‘inherent authority to control its own docket and manage the cases before it.’” King v. Divoky, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting Holsopple v. Holsopple, 2020-Ohio-1210, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).

2024Co., 127 Ohio St. 351, 356 (1933). {¶14} The state has failed to present any arguments supporting its position that the trial court properly denied Harris’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2024“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best -9- position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992).

2024It points to evidence that Harris made veiled threats in a social media exchange with someone associated with Moody Manor or Body Up Bloods, recorded songs and videos actively supporting Ro Gang’s rivalry with Body Up, made incriminating social media posts, and was depicted making hand signals disparaging Body Up just before the shooting in this case. {¶ 49} This court has held that “active participation” requires the state to show that the defendant “actually–not just nominally–took part in the gang.” State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-776, ¶ 38 (6th Dist.).

2024Corday v Marshall, 2009-Ohio- 4986, ¶33; State v. Baldwin, 2011-Ohio-495, ¶15 (5th Dist.). {¶23} Subsequently, in State v. Davis, the Ohio Supreme Court modified the holding in Special Prosecutors as follows, [W]e hold that a trial court retains jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided upon direct appeal. 2011-Ohio-5028, ¶37 (emphasis added). {¶24} Thus, to prevail, Harris’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea must be based upon newly discovered evidence.

2024Corday v Marshall, 2009-Ohio- 4986, ¶33; State v. Baldwin, 2011-Ohio-495, ¶15 (5th Dist.). {¶23} Subsequently, in State v. Davis, the Ohio Supreme Court modified the holding in Special Prosecutors as follows, [W]e hold that a trial court retains jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided upon direct appeal. 2011-Ohio-5028, ¶37 (emphasis added). {¶24} Thus, to prevail, Harris’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea must be based upon newly discovered evidence.

2024Specifically, he complains that the identification was unduly suggestive because House only presented one picture of Harris to Je’an to confirm that Harris was the person Je’an knew as Blakk. {¶ 20} “To justify suppressing a pretrial identification, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the identification procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification, and (2) that the identification in fact was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Green, 2003-Ohio-5744, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.).