Harris motion in Georgia

2018Accord Wallace v. State , 275 Ga. 879 , 881 (3) n. 11, 572 S.E.2d 579 (2002) (reiterating Harris rule and overruling later cases that ignored it).

2018Accord Wallace v. State , 275 Ga. 879 , 881 (3) n. 11, 572 S.E.2d 579 (2002) (reiterating Harris rule and overruling later cases that ignored it).

2018Based on his application, it appears that Harris’s motion to discharge an allegedly unconstitutional indictment was, in substance, a motion to vacate or set aside his convictions, and “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009); see also Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811 ( 596 SE2d 587 ) (2004).

2018Based on his application, it appears that Harris’s motion to discharge an allegedly unconstitutional indictment was, in substance, a motion to vacate or set aside his convictions, and “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009); see also Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811 ( 596 SE2d 587 ) (2004).

2025By contrast, encouraging the jury to find that Harris stabbed Gooch on purpose because he had committed an act of vio- lence against a girlfriend in the past invited the jury to use that ev- idence for an improper purpose: to find that Harris stabbed Gooch merely because he had “d[one] other bad things,” White, 319 Ga. at 398-399 (Peterson, PJ, concurring).

2025By contrast, encouraging the jury to find that Harris stabbed Gooch on purpose because he had committed an act of vio- lence against a girlfriend in the past invited the jury to use that ev- idence for an improper purpose: to find that Harris stabbed Gooch merely because he had “d[one] other bad things,” White, 319 Ga. at 398-399 (Peterson, P.J., concurring).

2022The admission of evidence “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Flannigan v. State, 305 Ga. 57, 62 ( 823 SE2d 743 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022The admission of evidence “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Flannigan v. State, 305 Ga. 57, 62 ( 823 SE2d 743 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2018Based on his application, it appears that Harris’s motion to discharge an allegedly unconstitutional indictment was, in substance, a motion to vacate or set aside his convictions, and “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009); see also Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811 ( 596 SE2d 587 ) (2004).

2018Based on his application, it appears that Harris’s motion to discharge an allegedly unconstitutional indictment was, in substance, a motion to vacate or set aside his convictions, and “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009); see also Wright v. State, 277 Ga. 810, 811 ( 596 SE2d 587 ) (2004).

2018See McClendon , 299 Ga. at 615 (3), 791 S.E.2d 69 . 4.

2018See McClendon , 299 Ga. at 615 (3), 791 S.E.2d 69 . 4.

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269-270 (2) ( 737 SE2d 98 ) (2013). “[A]n insufficient showing on either [Strickland] prong relieves the reviewing court of the need to address the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 687 SE2d 799 ) (2010). (a) As we have held in Division 1 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel’s cross-examination concerning the birth dates of those depicted in the lineup, Harris’ claim of ineffectiveness on this issue is without merit.

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269-270 (2) ( 737 SE2d 98 ) (2013). “[A]n insufficient showing on either [Strickland] prong relieves the reviewing court of the need to address the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 687 SE2d 799 ) (2010). (a) As we have held in Division 1 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel’s cross-examination concerning the birth dates of those depicted in the lineup, Harris’ claim of ineffectiveness on this issue is without merit.

2013He also specifically requested that the court make “factual findings regarding the evidence presented regarding the valuation of the proposed leasehold estate according to the Harris factors, as required under Sherman I.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 350 (4) (a).

2013He also specifically requested that the court make “factual findings regarding the evidence presented regarding the valuation of the proposed leasehold estate according to the Harris factors, as required under Sherman I.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 350 (4) (a).

2013See Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 585 (7) (c) ( 642 SE2d 8 ) (2007).

2013See Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 585 (7) (c) ( 642 SE2d 8 ) (2007).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269-270 (2) ( 737 SE2d 98 ) (2013). “[A]n insufficient showing on either [Strickland] prong relieves the reviewing court of the need to address the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 687 SE2d 799 ) (2010). (a) As we have held in Division 1 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel’s cross-examination concerning the birth dates of those depicted in the lineup, Harris’ claim of ineffectiveness on this issue is without merit.

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269-270 (2) ( 737 SE2d 98 ) (2013). “[A]n insufficient showing on either [Strickland] prong relieves the reviewing court of the need to address the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 687 SE2d 799 ) (2010). (a) As we have held in Division 1 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel’s cross-examination concerning the birth dates of those depicted in the lineup, Harris’ claim of ineffectiveness on this issue is without merit.

2012See Guoth v. Hamilton, 273 Ga. App. 435 (1) ( 615 SE2d 239 ) (2005) (noting that Harris rule has not been expressly applied to civil cases).

2012See Guoth v. Hamilton, 273 Ga. App. 435 (1) ( 615 SE2d 239 ) (2005) (noting that Harris rule has not been expressly applied to civil cases).

2005Johnson, P. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. 1 Morgan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 394, 395 (1) ( 442 SE2d 257 ) (1994). 2 Id. 3 Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga. App. 755, 759-760 (2) ( 577 SE2d 825 ) (2003) (footnote omitted). 4 See State v. Mack, 231 Ga. App. 499 ( 499 SE2d 355 ) (1998) (standard of review is abuse of discretion); see also Lush v. State, 168 Ga. App. 740, 742 (3) ( 310 SE2d 287 ) (1983) (language of an indictment interpreted liberally in favor of the state). 5 Bixby v. State, 254 Ga. App. 212 -213 (1) ( 561 SE2d 870 ) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Marshall v. State, 2

2005Johnson, P. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. 1 Morgan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 394, 395 (1) ( 442 SE2d 257 ) (1994). 2 Id. 3 Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga. App. 755, 759-760 (2) ( 577 SE2d 825 ) (2003) (footnote omitted). 4 See State v. Mack, 231 Ga. App. 499 ( 499 SE2d 355 ) (1998) (standard of review is abuse of discretion); see also Lush v. State, 168 Ga. App. 740, 742 (3) ( 310 SE2d 287 ) (1983) (language of an indictment interpreted liberally in favor of the state). 5 Bixby v. State, 254 Ga. App. 212 -213 (1) ( 561 SE2d 870 ) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Marshall v. State, 2

2013Evidence that a local taxing authority had applied the Harris factors was necessary, according to the Supreme Court, because “the fair market value of a leasehold interest must necessarily vary in accordance with the terms and conditions of each agreement as well as the nature and location of the property involved.” (Punctuation omitted.) 288 Ga. at 92 , citing Harris, supra. The Sherman 1 court further noted that on remand of that case, “a valuation of the fee simple estate is just the first step. [DAFC and the Board] will need to offer evidence as to how their [‘ramp-up’] method[,] [as] appl

2013Evidence that a local taxing authority had applied the Harris factors was necessary, according to the Supreme Court, because “the fair market value of a leasehold interest must necessarily vary in accordance with the terms and conditions of each agreement as well as the nature and location of the property involved.” (Punctuation omitted.) 288 Ga. at 92 , citing Harris, supra. The Sherman 1 court further noted that on remand of that case, “a valuation of the fee simple estate is just the first step. [DAFC and the Board] will need to offer evidence as to how their [‘ramp-up’] method[,] [as] appl

2024See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652, 655 (2) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that appellant was advised of his rights and understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty where appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty plea finding the plea was “freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made” (cleaned up)); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 875-878 (2) (a), (b) (750 SE2d 340) (2013) (concluding defendant’s completed waiver-of- rights “questionnaire” was “evidence which, in conjunction with the record of the plea hearing”

2024See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652, 655 (2) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that appellant was advised of his rights and understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty where appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty plea finding the plea was “freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made” (cleaned up)); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 875-878 (2) (a), (b) (750 SE2d 340) (2013) (concluding defendant’s completed waiver-of- rights “questionnaire” was “evidence which, in conjunction with the record of the plea hearing”

2024See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652, 655 (2) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that appellant was advised of his rights and understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty where appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty plea finding the plea was “freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made” (cleaned up)); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 875-878 (2) (a), (b) (750 SE2d 340) (2013) (concluding defendant’s completed waiver-of- rights “questionnaire” was “evidence which, in conjunction with the record of the plea hearing”

2024See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652, 655 (2) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that appellant was advised of his rights and understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty where appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty plea finding the plea was “freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made” (cleaned up)); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 875-878 (2) (a), (b) (750 SE2d 340) (2013) (concluding defendant’s completed waiver-of- rights “questionnaire” was “evidence which, in conjunction with the record of the plea hearing”

2024See Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 422 (467 SE2d 570) (1996) (dismissing direct appeal of guilty plea where claims about involuntariness of plea could not be resolved by facts appearing in the existing record).

2024See Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 422 (467 SE2d 570) (1996) (dismissing direct appeal of guilty plea where claims about involuntariness of plea could not be resolved by facts appearing in the existing record).

2024Based on this holding, we need not reach the Allens’ related argument that Harris has failed to identify any evidence that would enable him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their actions were sufficiently egregious. 26 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., 339 Ga. App. 843, 849 (1) (c) ( 795 SE2d 81 ) (2016). 27 See Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232 (1) ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003) (“Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . .

2024Based on this holding, we need not reach the Allens’ related argument that Harris has failed to identify any evidence that would enable him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their actions were sufficiently egregious. 26 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., 339 Ga. App. 843, 849 (1) (c) ( 795 SE2d 81 ) (2016). 27 See Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232 (1) ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003) (“Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . .

2024Based on this holding, we need not reach the Allens’ related argument that Harris has failed to identify any evidence that would enable him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their actions were sufficiently egregious. 26 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., 339 Ga. App. 843, 849 (1) (c) ( 795 SE2d 81 ) (2016). 27 See Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232 (1) ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003) (“Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . .

2024Based on this holding, we need not reach the Allens’ related argument that Harris has failed to identify any evidence that would enable him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their actions were sufficiently egregious. 26 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., 339 Ga. App. 843, 849 (1) (c) ( 795 SE2d 81 ) (2016). 27 See Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232 (1) ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003) (“Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . .

2024Based on the unambiguous language of the contract,10 Harris’s claim of breach of contract also fails as a matter of law.11 10 See Ainsworth, 254 Ga. App. at 476 (4) (“[W]here the language of a contract is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is necessary or even permissible by the trial court.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 11 The original complaint sought rescission, as well as damages for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence.

2024See generally Cabrel v. Lum, 289 Ga. 233, 240 (6) ( 710 SE2d 810 ) (2011) (“The expenses of litigation recoverable pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are ancillary and may only be recovered where other elements of damage are also recoverable.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024See generally Cabrel v. Lum, 289 Ga. 233, 240 (6) ( 710 SE2d 810 ) (2011) (“The expenses of litigation recoverable pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are ancillary and may only be recovered where other elements of damage are also recoverable.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023See Hattney, 279 Ga. at 90. 25

2023See Hattney, 279 Ga. at 90 . 26

2022See Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 897 (4) ( 827 SE2d 857 ) (2019) (claims of ineffective assistance of counsel not raised at the earliest practicable moment are waived).

2022See Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 897 (4) ( 827 SE2d 857 ) (2019) (claims of ineffective assistance of counsel not raised at the earliest practicable moment are waived).

2022See State v. Harris, 301 Ga. 234 (799 SE2d The trial court previously granted Harris’s motion for new trial on the ground that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress certain text messages, but we reversed.

2022We remanded the case “with direction that the trial court consider the remaining grounds in Harris’ motion for new trial.” Harris, 301 Ga. at 240 (2).

2022OCGA § 5-6-10 provides that, upon remittitur of an appellate court decision to the trial court, “[t]he decision and direction shall be respected and carried into full effect in good faith by the court below.” Given our direction in remanding the case, this principle limited the trial court to considering the already raised claims that remained undecided; “[f]or an appellate court to authorize further action by the trial court requires a clear direction, whether express or by necessary implication.” State v. Jackson, 295 Ga. 825, 828 (764 SE2d 395) (2014) (reversing the trial court’s grant of a

2022OCGA § 5-6-10 provides that, upon remittitur of an appellate court decision to the trial court, “[t]he decision and direction shall be respected and carried into full effect in good faith by the court below.” Given our direction in remanding the case, this principle limited the trial court to considering the already raised claims that remained undecided; “[f]or an appellate court to authorize further action by the trial court requires a clear direction, whether express or by necessary implication.” State v. Jackson, 295 Ga. 825, 828 (764 SE2d 395) (2014) (reversing the trial court’s grant of a

2022As an initial matter, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice, which this Court 2 Homicide by vehicle in the first degree as alleged in this case is in fact a felony, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), and second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor, see OCGA §§ 40-6-393 (c), 17-10-3. 3 had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, see, e.g., Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997), did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code and was therefore irrelevant in assessing prejudice under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b).

2022As an initial matter, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice, which this Court 2 Homicide by vehicle in the first degree as alleged in this case is in fact a felony, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), and second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor, see OCGA §§ 40-6-393 (c), 17-10-3. 3 had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, see, e.g., Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997), did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code and was therefore irrelevant in assessing prejudice under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b).