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8 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Joseph John Melick v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2026On appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, “the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59 , 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450 , 460 (2018)). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light - 13 - most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 144 (2018) (quoting Kel | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026On appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, “the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59 , 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450 , 460 (2018)). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light - 13 - most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 144 (2018) (quoting Kel | 1 | 1 |
Townes v. Com.green2 sentences2010See Townes, 269 Va. at 241 , 609 S.E.2d at 4 (holding that a trial court "erred" in finding that a prisoner was subject to the Act). 2010See Townes, 269 Va. at 241 , 609 S.E.2d at 4 (holding that a trial court "erred" in finding that a prisoner was subject to the Act). | 1 | 1 |
Bloom v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010See Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 969 , 234 S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (1977) (“[C]ounsel’s avowal, the truth of which was unchallenged by *214 the Commonwealth, constituted a proper proffer — ”) 4 ; see also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 , 554 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2001) (holding the trial court did not err in relying on the unchallenged pretrial proffer of facts by the Commonwealth). 2010See Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 969 , 234 S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (1977) (“[C]ounsel’s avowal, the truth of which was unchallenged by *214 the Commonwealth, constituted a proper proffer — ”) 4 ; see also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 , 554 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2001) (holding the trial court did not err in relying on the unchallenged pretrial proffer of facts by the Commonwealth). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010Harmless Error The Commonwealth argues that if the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, it was harmless error because Harris failed to present evidence that would have justified a modification or suspension of his sentence as is required under Code § 19.2-303. “[A]n error is harmless if ‘it plainly appears from the record that appellant’s motion for sentence modification would have been denied had the court entertained it.’ ” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 631, 641 , 681 S.E.2d 74, 79 (2009) (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 608 , 513 S.E.2d 2010Harmless Error The Commonwealth argues that if the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, it was harmless error because Harris failed to present evidence that would have justified a modification or suspension of his sentence as is required under Code § 19.2-303. “[A]n error is harmless if ‘it plainly appears from the record that appellant’s motion for sentence modification would have been denied had the court entertained it.’ ” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 631, 641 , 681 S.E.2d 74, 79 (2009) (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 608 , 513 S.E.2d | 1 | 1 |
Esparza v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010Harmless Error The Commonwealth argues that if the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, it was harmless error because Harris failed to present evidence that would have justified a modification or suspension of his sentence as is required under Code § 19.2-303. “[A]n error is harmless if ‘it plainly appears from the record that appellant’s motion for sentence modification would have been denied had the court entertained it.’ ” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 631, 641 , 681 S.E.2d 74, 79 (2009) (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 608 , 513 S.E.2d 2010Harmless Error The Commonwealth argues that if the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, it was harmless error because Harris failed to present evidence that would have justified a modification or suspension of his sentence as is required under Code § 19.2-303. “[A]n error is harmless if ‘it plainly appears from the record that appellant’s motion for sentence modification would have been denied had the court entertained it.’ ” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 631, 641 , 681 S.E.2d 74, 79 (2009) (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 600, 608 , 513 S.E.2d | 1 | 1 |
Whittaker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010See Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 969 , 234 S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (1977) (“[C]ounsel’s avowal, the truth of which was unchallenged by *214 the Commonwealth, constituted a proper proffer — ”) 4 ; see also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 , 554 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2001) (holding the trial court did not err in relying on the unchallenged pretrial proffer of facts by the Commonwealth). 2010See Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 969 , 234 S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (1977) (“[C]ounsel’s avowal, the truth of which was unchallenged by *214 the Commonwealth, constituted a proper proffer — ”) 4 ; see also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 , 554 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2001) (holding the trial court did not err in relying on the unchallenged pretrial proffer of facts by the Commonwealth). | 1 | 1 |
R & R Construction Corp. v. Hillgreen2 sentences2001See Hill, 25 Va.App. at 379-80, 488 S.E.2d at 665 (where employee felt soreness in his back while lifting numerous five-gallon buckets, “[t]he fact that the claimant did not or could not identify precisely which bucket or buckets he was lifting when the disc or discs herniated does not constitute failure to prove that an immediate or sudden event or events caused the discs to herniate”). 2001See Hill, 25 Va.App. at 379-80, 488 S.E.2d at 665 (where employee felt soreness in his back while lifting numerous five-gallon buckets, “[t]he fact that the claimant did not or could not identify precisely which bucket or buckets he was lifting when the disc or discs herniated does not constitute failure to prove that an immediate or sudden event or events caused the discs to herniate”). | 1 | 1 |
Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroadgreen2 sentences2000See Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223 , 55 S.E. 551 (1906) (stating that Virginia adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine). 2000See Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223 , 55 S.E. 551 (1906) (stating that Virginia adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawlor v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2026“A motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the case to the jury.” Linnon v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 92 , 98 (2014) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 223 (2013)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Linnon v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2026“A motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the case to the jury.” Linnon v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 92 , 98 (2014) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 223 (2013)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Chelsey Danielle Ingram, s/k/a chelsea Danielle Ingram v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2026On appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, “the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59 , 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450 , 460 (2018)). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light - 13 - most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 144 (2018) (quoting Kel | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Smallwood v. Com.
green
1 sentence2024And Harris’s fingerprint was on one of the suboxone strips that was also found in the center console. - 10 - As for the heroin and cocaine that Hughes was hiding in her pants, we disagree with Harris’s claim that those drugs “were in the exclusive, actual possession of Hughes.” (Emphasis added.) As already noted, “criminal drug possession” can be “either sole or joint.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1 , 27 (2021) (citing Smallwood, 278 Va. at 629-30 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Moseley
green
1 sentence2024And Harris’s fingerprint was on one of the suboxone strips that was also found in the center console. - 10 - As for the heroin and cocaine that Hughes was hiding in her pants, we disagree with Harris’s claim that those drugs “were in the exclusive, actual possession of Hughes.” (Emphasis added.) As already noted, “criminal drug possession” can be “either sole or joint.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1 , 27 (2021) (citing Smallwood, 278 Va. at 629-30 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Harris v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2012In Harris, a case similar to this one, the Supreme Court reversed this Court and held that Harris’s motion to suppress should have been granted. 266 Va. at 34 , 581 S.E.2d at 210-11 . 2012In Harris, a case similar to this one, the Supreme Court reversed this Court and held that Harris’s motion to suppress should have been granted. 266 Va. at 34 , 581 S.E.2d at 210-11 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Stamper v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2010Thus, we reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction when this matter was originally heard, and remand for consideration of Harris’s motion for reconsideration of his sentence “in light of the circumstances found to exist when the matter is heard.” Stamper, 228 Va. at 720 , 324 S.E.2d at 690 . 5 C. 2010Thus, we reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction when this matter was originally heard, and remand for consideration of Harris’s motion for reconsideration of his sentence “in light of the circumstances found to exist when the matter is heard.” Stamper, 228 Va. at 720 , 324 S.E.2d at 690 . 5 C. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville
green
2 sentences2000On appeal, we will address two issues; (1) whether Harris’ claim against the individual defendants is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because of prior proceedings in federal court, and (2) *224 whether Code § 18.2-460 and former § 15.1-138 1 embody sufficient public policies to support Harris’ cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine articulated in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534 , 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). 2000On appeal, we will address two issues; (1) whether Harris’ claim against the individual defendants is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because of prior proceedings in federal court, and (2) *224 whether Code § 18.2-460 and former § 15.1-138 1 embody sufficient public policies to support Harris’ cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine articulated in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534 , 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Arnold v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1999Citing Arnold, 18 Va. App. at 222 , 443 S.E.2d at 185 , the trial court held that the nolle prosequi of the original indictment “laid to rest that indictment, .... as though it never had existed.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Harris’ statutory *581 speedy trial right was to be calculated from the date of his arraignment on the charges in the second indictment. 3 The trial court continued in its opinion letter to consider Harris’ claim that the delay in prosecuting him constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 1999Citing Arnold, 18 Va. App. at 222 , 443 S.E.2d at 185 , the trial court held that the nolle prosequi of the original indictment “laid to rest that indictment, .... as though it never had existed.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Harris’ statutory *581 speedy trial right was to be calculated from the date of his arraignment on the charges in the second indictment. 3 The trial court continued in its opinion letter to consider Harris’ claim that the delay in prosecuting him constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.