Harris factors in Texas

1999In determining the proper harmless error standard, the court stated, ‘Without deciding whether constitutional rights have been implicated in the case at hand, we conclude the Harris test [Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) 2 *142 ], established under the more rigorous standard, is appropriate here.” Mosley v. State, 960 S.W.2d at 204-05 .

1999In determining the proper harmless error standard, the court stated, ‘Without deciding whether constitutional rights have been implicated in the case at hand, we conclude the Harris test [Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) 2 *142 ], established under the more rigorous standard, is appropriate here.” Mosley v. State, 960 S.W.2d at 204-05 .

2017App. P. 44.2(a); Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825 ; Crayton, 463 S.W.3d at 536 ; Grant, 218 S.W.3d at 234 ; Wall v. State, 286 S.W.3d 372, 376 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding constitutional violation during closing argument of punishment phase harmless under Harris factors, which were revised in Snowden).

2015Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this Court grant its second ground for review, and after consideration on the merits, reverse the Court of Appeals.  118 Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 821 (emphasis original). 119 Compare id. at 822-25 (reanalyzing the remaining Harris factors in light of the extent of the error found) with Oliver, slip op. at 9-16 (utilizing the Snowden factors, but finding harm under a constitutional standard despite the minimal impact of the text on the cocaine case). 120 Id. 121 See Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825 . 20 PRAYER The State respectfully reque

2015See also Austin Neighborhoods Council, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment City of Austin, 644 S. W. 2d 560, 565-566 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) that properly construes a titled plea to the jurisdiction as a plea in abatement.

2014See also Austin Neighborhoods Council, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment City of Austin, 644 S. W. 2d 560, 565-566 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) that properly construes a titled plea to the jurisdiction as a plea in abatement.

2010See, e.g., Harris, 245 S.W.3d at 487 (because Harris established that Rotating Services was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy as a matter of law, Harris’ motion for summary judgment was sufficient to defeat Rotating Services’ claims that were added in an amended petition, filed after Harris’ motion for summary judgment); Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436-37 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding summary judgment was proper even as to claims in an amended petition because the “amended petition merely reiterates the same essential elements in another

2010See, e.g., Harris, 245 S.W.3d at 487 (because Harris established that Rotating Services was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy as a matter of law, Harris’ motion for summary judgment was sufficient to defeat Rotating Services’ claims that were added in an amended petition, filed after Harris’ motion for summary judgment); Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding summary judgment was proper even as to claims in an amended petition because the “amended petition merely reiterates the same essential elements in another fas

2010See, e.g., Harris, 245 S.W.3d at 487 (because Harris established that Rotating Services was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy as a matter of law, Harris’ motion for summary judgment was sufficient to defeat Rotating Services’ claims that were added in an amended petition, filed after Harris’ motion for summary judgment); Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436-37 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding summary judgment was proper even as to claims in an amended petition because the “amended petition merely reiterates the same essential elements in another

2010See, e.g., Harris, 245 S.W.3d at 487 (because Harris established that Rotating Services was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy as a matter of law, Harris’ motion for summary judgment was sufficient to defeat Rotating Services’ claims that were added in an amended petition, filed after Harris’ motion for summary judgment); Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding summary judgment was proper even as to claims in an amended petition because the “amended petition merely reiterates the same essential elements in another fas

2003Thompson, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2002, pet. refd) (holding that prosecutor’s closing remarks amounted to constitutional error and required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) analysis applying Harris standard); see also Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

2003Thompson, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that prosecutor's closing remarks amounted to constitutional error and required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) analysis applying Harris standard); see also Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim.App.1990).

2015And, the Court modified the Harris factors to include “the nature of the error, whether it was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have assigned to it in its deliberations.” See Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim.

2015And, the Court modified the Harris factors to include “the nature of the error, whether it was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have assigned to it in its deliberations.” See Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim.

2011The remaining Harris factors—the nature of the error (e.g., erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, objectionable jury argument, etc.), whether it was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have 30 807 S.W.2d 732, 739-40 (Tex. Crim.

2011The remaining Harris factors—the nature of the error (e.g., erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, objectionable jury argument, etc.), whether it was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have 30 807 S.W.2d 732, 739-40 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Alford Chevroleir-Geo, 997 S.W.2d at 181 (holding that although trial court has broad discretion to define scope of discovery, it can abuse its discretion by acting unreasonably).

2010See Alford Chevrolet-Geo , 997 S.W.2d at 181 (holding that although trial court has broad discretion to define scope of discovery, it can abuse its discretion by acting unreasonably).

2005See Mayhew , 964 S.W.2d at 939 (finding no equal protection violation where denial of development application was clearly rationally related to Town’s concerns regarding urbanization effects of development).

2005See Mayhew , 964 S.W.2d at 939 (finding no equal protection violation where denial of development application was clearly rationally related to Town’s concerns regarding urbanization effects of development).

2003Thompson, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2002, pet. refd) (holding that prosecutor’s closing remarks amounted to constitutional error and required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) analysis applying Harris standard); see also Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

2003Thompson, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that prosecutor's closing remarks amounted to constitutional error and required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) analysis applying Harris standard); see also Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim.App.1990).

2013The court has recently held that the Harris factors are not helpful in Rule 44.2(b) analyses, and particularly the factor of “whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity.” Mason v. State, 322 S.W.3d 251 , 257 n.10 (Tex. Crim.

2013The court has recently held that the Harris factors are not helpful in Rule 44.2(b) analyses, and particularly the factor of “whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity.” Mason v. State, 322 S.W.3d 251 , 257 n.10 (Tex. Crim.

2024Cf. Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1986) (“The absence of any reference to pleaded alternative grounds of recovery does not render an order intrinsically interlocutory.

2023See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.”). –7– harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

2022See Rogers, 550 S.W.3d at 193 ; Barrios, 389 S.W.3d at 393 .

2020See Threadgill v. State, 120 S.W.3d 871, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that agreement to cap on punishment is plea bargain for purposes of Rule 25.2).

2020Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in disallowing late response where movant failed to offer any explanation demonstrating mistake or accident); Stierwalt, 499 S.W.3d at 191 (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance of summary judgment hearing where plaintiff waited until three days before hearing to seek continuance to obtain discovery it knew, a month before filing 8 its motion, was necessary to defend the summary judgment motion).

2020Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in disallowing late response where movant failed to offer any explanation demonstrating mistake or accident); Stierwalt, 499 S.W.3d at 191 (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance of summary judgment hearing where plaintiff waited until three days before hearing to seek continuance to obtain discovery it knew, a month before filing 8 its motion, was necessary to defend the summary judgment motion).

2020See Huston, 434 S.W.3d at 636 (appellant bears burden to bring forward on appeal sufficient record to show error committee by trial court).

2017App. P. 44.2(a); Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825 ; Crayton, 463 S.W.3d at 536 ; Grant, 218 S.W.3d at 234 ; Wall v. State, 286 S.W.3d 372, 376 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding constitutional violation during closing argument of punishment phase harmless under Harris factors, which were revised in Snowden).

2015See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (noting that failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim).

2015McCool’s affidavit was not properly before the trial court on the motions for summary judgment.”); INA of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex. 1985) (“Bryant’s response to INA’s motion for summary judgment was not timely filed, and nothing appears of record to indicate that the late filing was 2 Although Harris’s motion represents that her response was filed by agreement, her motion is not signed by the defendants.

2015These failure further hamstrung Harris's defense by limiting the effectiveness of counsel's arguments against the introduction of the unduly prejudicial photographs of Carlos Gallardo, which photographs were admitted into evidence during Dr. Quinton'S direct examination. (59 RR at 292.) At a pretrial 25 See Part C-l, ante. 93 hearing, the trial court itself recognized these depictions to be "gruesome," yet it rationalized their admission upon musing, "that's what happens when you have a murder trial." (55 RR at 14.) To be sure, "a trial court does not err merely because it admits into evidence

2015See Wilson v. State, State ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6601218 at *5 (Tex.App.– Houston [1st Dist.] November 20, 2014, pet. filed)..