relevance inquiry in Texas

2015Rule 702, by its terms, only provides for the admission of expert testimony that actually assists the finder of fact.″ (citation omitted)); Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002) (″The relevance requirement, which incorporates traditional relevancy analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, is met if the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.

2015When the evidence offered is the opinion testimony of an "expert" witness, the relevance requirement is met if the expert testimony is "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2015InJordan v. State, [ 928 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ] we specifically addressed the “fit” aspect of the relevance inquiry.

2015The relevance inquiry under Rule 702 is whether evidence “‘will assist the trier of fact’ and is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” Id. at 438 (citing Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Crim.

2019The relevance requirement, which incorporates traditional relevancy analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, is met if the expert testimony is “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1985)).

2018The relevance requirement, which incorporates traditional relevancy analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, is met if the expert testimony is “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1985)).

2020The relevance inquiry is whether evidence “will assist the trier of fact and is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 438 .

2015The relevance inquiry under Rule 702 is whether evidence “‘will assist the trier of fact’ and is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” Id. at 438 (citing Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Pollard, 283 F.Supp. at 257 claim for corporate donors” because “a corporation, being (“Even if it be conceded that defendant's investigation might a creature of State, has no ‘personal’ constitutional rights be advanced if he knew that certain individuals had made that can be asserted on its behalf.” To support their position, contributions ..., we do not think that that fact would make the taxpayers cite Super X Drugs of Texas, Inc. v. State, relevant the disclosure of all of the contributors....”).

1998See Pollard, 283 F.Supp. at 257 ("Even if it be conceded that defendant's investigation might be advanced if he knew that certain individuals had made contributions ..., we do not think that that fact would make relevant the disclosure of all of the contributors....").

2025We need not, and do not, decide such matters here. 23 In addition, in part IV.C, we conclude that Riders’ “control” argument lacks support in the evidentiary record before us. 20 have cited no more than a scintilla of evidence to support the affirmative-holding-out element of their ostensible agency claim. (2) Joint enterprise Uber maintains that Driver’s independent contractor status precludes the existence of a joint enterprise between Driver and Uber, citing Walker v. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmBH, 844 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1988) (“the principal/independent contractor relationship is fu

2025We need not, and do not, decide such matters here. 19 In addition, in part IV.D., we conclude that Riders’ “control” argument lacks support in the evidentiary record before us. 19 Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to Riders, we conclude that they have cited no more than a scintilla of evidence to support the affirmative-holding-out element of their ostensible agency claim. (2) Joint enterprise Uber maintains that Driver’s independent contractor status precludes the existence of a joint enterprise between Driver and Uber, citing Walker v. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmBH,

2015See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tex.2014) (interpreting a statutory testing requirement to include a relevance requirement not included in the statutory language in order to yield a non-arbitrary, non-absurd result); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex.2008) (“[C]hanging the meaning of the statute by adding words to it, we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function.”).

2015See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tex. 2014) (interpreting a statutory testing requirement to include a relevance requirement not included in the statutory language in order to yield a non-arbitrary, non-absurd result); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex. 2008) (“[C]hanging the meaning of the statute by adding words to it, we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function.”).

2015See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tex.2014) (interpreting a statutory testing requirement to include a relevance requirement not included in the statutory language in order to yield a non-arbitrary, non-absurd result); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex.2008) (“[C]hanging the meaning of the statute by adding words to it, we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function.”).

2015See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tex. 2014) (interpreting a statutory testing requirement to include a relevance requirement not included in the statutory language in order to yield a non-arbitrary, non-absurd result); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex. 2008) (“[C]hanging the meaning of the statute by adding words to it, we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function.”).

2010Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002)(holding that the relevance requirement for the admission of expert testimony incorporates traditional relevancy analysis under 1 See e.g., Reyes v. State, 274 S.W .3d 724, 729 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d). -8- Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, and is met if the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.).

2010Morales v. State , 32 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr , 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002)(holding that the relevance requirement for the admission of expert testimony incorporates traditional relevancy analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, and is met if the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.).

2022See id.

2021Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Cotton Valley Compression, L.L.C., 336 S.W.3d 764, 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

2019Relevance Rule 702 incorporates a relevance inquiry through its requirement that the evidence “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 702).

2015“A defendant has a fundamental right to present evidence of a defense as long as the evidence is relevant and is not excluded by an established evidentiary rule.” Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim.

2015Evidence that has no relationship to any issue in the case does not satisfy rule 702 and is thus inadmissible under rule 702, as well as rules 401 and 402.″ (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex. 1998) (″Unreliable evidence is of no assistance to the trier of fact and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 702.″); Lincoln v. Clark Freight Lines, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (″Unreliable scientific or technical evidence is of no assistance to the jury … .″); U.S. Rest.

2015App. 1996))); Dallas Cnty. v. Crestview Corners Car Wash, 370 S.W.3d 25, 35 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (″To be relevant, the expert’s opinion must be based on the facts … .″); Praytor v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (″To be relevant, the proposed testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.″); cf. Dickerson v. State Farm Lloyd’s Inc., No. 10-11-00071-CV, 2011 WL 3334964 , at 4 (Tex. App. - Waco Aug. 3, 2011, pet. denied) (stating that in automobile-accide

2015Evidence that has no relationship to any issue in the case does not satisfy rule 702 and is thus inadmissible under rule 702, as well as rules 401 and 402.″ (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex. 1998) (″Unreliable evidence is of no assistance to the trier of fact and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 702.″); Lincoln v. Clark Freight Lines, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (″Unreliable scientific or technical evidence is of no assistance to the jury … .″); U.S. Rest.

2015App. 1996))); Dallas Cnty. v. Crestview Corners Car Wash, 370 S.W.3d 25, 35 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (″To be relevant, the expert’s opinion must be based on the facts … .″); Praytor v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (″To be relevant, the proposed testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.″); cf. Dickerson v. State Farm Lloyd’s Inc., No. 10-11-00071-CV, 2011 WL 3334964 , at 4 (Tex. App. - Waco Aug. 3, 2011, pet. denied) (stating that in automobile-accide

2014See, e.g., SA-OMAX 2007, L.P. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 374 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (courts must prefer interpretations of contracts that give meaning to all of their terms).

2013See Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim.

2011See, e.g., Williams, 895 S.W.2d 363 ; Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Pierce v. State, 777 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). 13 To illustrate, in Rousseau , the expert testimony failed to satisfy the relevance inquiry.

2004Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).