relevance claim in California

2026“There can be no doubt that evidence of safety- history is relevant.” (Benson, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345 .) In Benson — on which the trial court relied in denying Cesena’s initial motion in limine — the court explained that safety history evidence satisfies the relevance test 14 because the evidence makes the determination of whether a product is unsafe “ ‘ “more probable or less probable than [it] would be without the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1344.) Although Benson was a product liability case, Beauchamp, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 20 , reached the same conclusion in a traditional premises

2026“There can be no doubt that evidence of safety- history is relevant.” (Benson, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345 .) In Benson — on which the trial court relied in denying Cesena’s initial motion in limine — the court explained that safety history evidence satisfies the relevance test 14 because the evidence makes the determination of whether a product is unsafe “ ‘ “more probable or less probable than [it] would be without the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1344.) Although Benson was a product liability case, Beauchamp, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 20 , reached the same conclusion in a traditional premises

2026“There can be no doubt that evidence of safety- history is relevant.” (Benson, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345 .) In Benson — on which the trial court relied in denying Cesena’s initial motion in limine — the court explained that safety history evidence satisfies the relevance test 14 because the evidence makes the determination of whether a product is unsafe “ ‘ “more probable or less probable than [it] would be without the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1344.) Although Benson was a product liability case, Beauchamp, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 20 , reached the same conclusion in a traditional premises

2026“There can be no doubt that evidence of safety- history is relevant.” (Benson, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345 .) In Benson — on which the trial court relied in denying Cesena’s initial motion in limine — the court explained that safety history evidence satisfies the relevance test 14 because the evidence makes the determination of whether a product is unsafe “ ‘ “more probable or less probable than [it] would be without the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1344.) Although Benson was a product liability case, Beauchamp, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 20 , reached the same conclusion in a traditional premises

2024Code, § 210.)3 The relevance standard is “very broad.” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16 .) “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in determining the relevance of evidence.’ ” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 609 .) “The court, however, has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 .) Even if evidence is relevant, section 352 provides a “court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 6 outweighed by the probability that its ad

2023Code, § 351.) The relevance standard is “very broad.” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16 .) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or 5. disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid.

2022(People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296 , fn. omitted.) Our Supreme Court has held that the mere presence of an undocumented immigrant in the United States without lawful authorization “does not itself involve moral turpitude.” (In re Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440, 460 .) And in this case, the evidence before the trial court was that E.C.’s last entry into the United States was 13 years before the trial in this case.

2014(People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 888 .) Appellant relies on People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 to argue pursuant to Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution, statutory prohibitions on impeachment Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code. [¶] (c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4 , . . . [¶] (d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the witness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to

2022(Ibid.; Fielder v. Berkeley Properties Co. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 30, 40 .) We broadly construe the relevance standard.

2022(Ibid.; Fielder v. Berkeley Properties Co. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 30, 40 .) We broadly construe the relevance standard.

2017Under Brady , evidence is 'material' only if it is reasonably probable a prosecution's outcome would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. [Citation.] By contrast, '[u]nder Pitchess , a defendant need only show that the information sought is material "to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation." [Citation.] Because Brady 's constitutional materiality standard is narrower than the Pitchess requirements, any [information] that meets Brady 's test of materiality necessarily meets the relevance standard for disclosure under Pitchess . [Citation.]' [Citation.] [¶] 'This

2017Under Brady, evidence is ‘material’ only if it is reasonably probable a prosecution’s outcome would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. [Citation.] By contrast, ‘[u]nder Pitchess, a defendant need only show that the information sought is material “to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” [Citation.] Because Brady’s constitutional materiality standard is narrower than the Pitchess requirements, any [information] that meets Brady’s test of materiality necessarily meets the relevance standard for disclosure under Pitchess. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘This proc

2016“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931 , fn. omitted (Clark).) Beyond the relevance requirement of moral turpitude, the “ ‘ “trial courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude prior convictions for impeachment purposes . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘When determining whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, the court should consider, among other factors, whether

2015(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 722 .) Beyond this, trial courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude prior convictions for impeachment purposes.

2015(People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 387 .) However, the admissibility of any past misconduct for impeachment is limited by the relevance requirement of moral turpitude.

2014(See People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1496 [holding that felony vandalism involves moral turpitude].) Beyond “the relevance requirement of moral turpitude . . . the latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 856, 931 .) Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude impeachment evidence “is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the issue arises” (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 389 ), a reviewing court ordinarily will

1988If the People succeed in camera, the adversary process should be utilized, “probing the information’s relevance to the defense, exploring with counsel the availability of other alternatives, and, if necessary, hearing testimony voir dire.” (Biggs, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 531 .) The hearing should conclude with the trial court making findings sufficient to enable the appellate court to review its decision.

1980The magistrate agreed to continue his inquiry concerning the issue of privilege as suggested by the procedure adopted in People v. Superior Court (Biggs) (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 522 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 118 ], “.. .in an adversary setting, probing the information’s relevance to the defense, exploring with counsel the availability of other alternatives .. .. ” (Id., at p. 531.) Kilgo was examined at great length by defense counsel, coincidentally with the preliminary hearing by agreement of the parties.

1977Physical domination of the defendant need not take the form of display of weapons: apparent consent to search has been held involuntary when it has followed, for example, a protracted period of incarceration (People v. Leib (1976) supra, 16 Cal.3d 869, 877 ), detention (see People v. Superior Court (Casebeer) (1969) 71 Cal.2d 265,270 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]), or custodial interrogation (United States v. Rothman (9th Cir. 1973) 492 F.2d 1260, 1264-1265 ; Judd v. United States (D.C.

1977Of course, the fact that Officer Ferraro was in uniform also diminishes the relevance of the claim that he did not specifically inform defendant he was a policeman: we may likewise reasonably infer that defendant could tell from Ferraro's uniform that he was dealing with an officer of the law. [10] Physical domination of the defendant need not take the form of display of weapons: apparent consent to search has been held involuntary when it has followed, for example, a protracted period of incarceration ( People v. Leib (1976) supra, 16 Cal.3d 869, 877 ), detention (see People v. Superior Court

1977Physical domination of the defendant need not take the form of display of weapons: apparent consent to search has been held involuntary when it has followed, for example, a protracted period of incarceration (People v. Leib (1976) supra, 16 Cal.3d 869, 877 ), detention (see People v. Superior Court (Casebeer) (1969) 71 Cal.2d 265,270 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]), or custodial interrogation (United States v. Rothman (9th Cir. 1973) 492 F.2d 1260, 1264-1265 ; Judd v. United States (D.C.

1977Of course, the fact that Officer Ferraro was in uniform also diminishes the relevance of the claim that he did not specifically inform defendant he was a policeman: we may likewise reasonably infer that defendant could tell from Ferraro's uniform that he was dealing with an officer of the law. [10] Physical domination of the defendant need not take the form of display of weapons: apparent consent to search has been held involuntary when it has followed, for example, a protracted period of incarceration ( People v. Leib (1976) supra, 16 Cal.3d 869, 877 ), detention (see People v. Superior Court

2026First, there must be sufficient evidence in the particular case to support a 16 contention that [intimate partner battering] applies to the woman involved. [Citation.] Second, there must be a contested issue as to which [intimate partner battering] testimony is probative.” (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 592 .) Expert testimony on intimate partner battering may “play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.” (People v. Bledsoe (198

2026First, there must be sufficient evidence in the particular case to support a 16 contention that [intimate partner battering] applies to the woman involved. [Citation.] Second, there must be a contested issue as to which [intimate partner battering] testimony is probative.” (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 592 .) Expert testimony on intimate partner battering may “play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.” (People v. Bledsoe (198

2026First, there must be sufficient evidence in the particular case to support a 16 contention that [intimate partner battering] applies to the woman involved. [Citation.] Second, there must be a contested issue as to which [intimate partner battering] testimony is probative.” (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 592 .) Expert testimony on intimate partner battering may “play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.” (People v. Bledsoe (198

2025With the latter going to the subjective knowledge and conscious disregard elements of implied malice murder (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143 ), both of which Bieser heavily contested, the proffered evidence met the minimal relevance bar.

2025If the People succeed in camera, the adversary process should be utilized, ‘probing the information’s relevance to the defense, exploring with counsel the availability of other alternatives, and, if necessary, hearing testimony voir dire.’ [Citation.] The hearing should conclude with the trial court making findings sufficient to enable the appellate court to review its decision. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1021, fns. omitted.) “A trial court has discretion to deny disclosure not only when the necessity for confidentiality outweighs the necessity for disclosure, but also ‘when there is an “ ‘absenc

2025If the People succeed in camera, the adversary process should be utilized, ‘probing the information’s relevance to the defense, exploring with counsel the availability of other alternatives, and, if necessary, hearing testimony voir dire.’ [Citation.] The hearing should conclude with the trial court making findings sufficient to enable the appellate court to review its decision. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1021, fns. omitted.) “A trial court has discretion to deny disclosure not only when the necessity for confidentiality outweighs the necessity for disclosure, but also ‘when there is an “ ‘absenc

2024(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201 .) We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown “ ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 .) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absenc

2024(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201 .) We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown “ ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 .) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absenc

2024(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201 .) We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown “ ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 .) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absenc

2024Code, § 210.)3 The relevance standard is “very broad.” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16 .) “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in determining the relevance of evidence.’ ” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 609 .) “The court, however, has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 .) Even if evidence is relevant, section 352 provides a “court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 6 outweighed by the probability that its ad

2024(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201 .) We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown “ ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 .) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absenc

2024(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201 .) We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters unless it is shown “ ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 .) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absenc

2024Code, § 210.)3 The relevance standard is “very broad.” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16 .) “ ‘A trial court has “considerable discretion” in determining the relevance of evidence.’ ” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 609 .) “The court, however, has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 .) Even if evidence is relevant, section 352 provides a “court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 6 outweighed by the probability that its ad

2022If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 ; see also People v. Turner (2010) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807 .) Admissibility of any past misconduct for impeachment is limited by the relevance requirement of moral turpitude.