relevance test in Massachusetts

2018This "sets forth a relevance test to define the documents the Attorney General may examine." Yankee Milk , 372 Mass. at 357 , 362 N.E.2d 207 .

2018This "sets forth a relevance test to define the documents the Attorney General may examine." Yankee Milk , 372 Mass. at 357 , 362 N.E.2d 207 .

2002The statement in Bishop that “[i]f the judge rules that the undisclosed clinic records are not privileged, then the judge shall release the records to the parties,” Bishop, 416 Mass. at 184 , was not intended to do away with the threshold relevance inquiry which precedes application of the Bishop protocol itself.

2002Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216 (1996), which Poitras has conceded was the governing standard, made the relevance test originally announced in Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 181 (1993), more stringent.

2018See Bodimetric Profiles , 404 Mass. at 156 , 533 N.E.2d 1364 .

2018See Bodimetric Profiles , 404 Mass. at 156 , 533 N.E.2d 1364 .

2013See also CUNA, supra at 542 , quoting from Yankee Milk, 372 Mass. at 357 (c. 93A, § 6[1], sets forth “a relevance test to define the documents the Attorney General may examine”).

2005Thus, were it clear that the prosecutor in this case had actual knowledge of an alternative source for the age-inappropriate sexual knowledge contained in the victim’s testimony, it is likely that her argument vis-a-vis the inculpatory value of the victim’s knowledge would amount to professional misconduct. 6 Further, where prosecutorial misconduct “is egregious, deliberate, and intentional ... the ‘drastic remedy’ of dismissal of charges may become an appropriate remedy.” See Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 579 (1989), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 198-199 (1985).

2005Thus, were it clear that the prosecutor in this case had actual knowledge of an alternative source for the age-inappropriate sexual knowledge contained in the victim’s testimony, it is likely that her argument vis-a-vis the inculpatory value of the victim’s knowledge would amount to professional misconduct. 6 Further, where prosecutorial misconduct “is egregious, deliberate, and intentional ... the ‘drastic remedy’ of dismissal of charges may become an appropriate remedy.” See Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 579 (1989), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 198-199 (1985).

1981“The right of subrogation is purely derivative as the insurer succeeds only to the rights of the insured, and no new cause of action is created.” DeLucia v. Pires, 52 Mass. App. Dec. 1, 7 (1973).