relevance standard in Oregon

2016Id. at 474 .12 The Tax Court concluded that the department’s appraiser had not offered a good reason for failing to use an income approach analysis, and his failure to do so was a departure from fundamental appraisal prin- ciples.

2016Id. at 474 . 12 The Tax Court concluded that the department’s appraiser had not offered a good reason for failing to use an income approach analysis, and his failure to do so was a departure from fundamental appraisal principles.

2015The relevance standard set out in OEC 401 20 applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial, State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 580 , 879 P2d 162 (1994), and that standard provides a “very low threshold for the admission of evidence.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 569 , 113 P3d 423 (2005).

2015The relevance standard set out in OEC 401 20 applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial, State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 580 , 879 P2d 162 (1994), and that standard provides a “very low threshold for the admission of evidence.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 569 , 113 P3d 423 (2005).

2015The relevance standard set out in OEC 401 20 applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial, State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 580 , 879 P2d 162 (1994), and that standard provides a “very low threshold for the admission of evidence.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 569 , 113 P3d 423 (2005).

2015The relevance standard set out in OEC 401 20 applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial, State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 580 , 879 P2d 162 (1994), and that standard provides a “very low threshold for the admission of evidence.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 569 , 113 P3d 423 (2005).

2021In Morrow, we acknowledged that the other miscon- duct evidence at issue there involved the same victim and that the conduct was similar, but we concluded that those Cite as 310 Or App 116 (2021) 131 factors were insufficient to satisfy the relevance standard for motive with respect to the offenses charged in that case.

2016State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457 , 462 n 5, 8 P3d 212 , cert den, 531 US 1055 (2000). 6 We mention that wrinkle here, because defendant proffered Callum’s testimony about his adjustment disorder to provide an inference that defendant did not touch M with a culpable mental state.

2016State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457 , 462 n 5, 8 P3d 212 , cert den, 531 US 1055 (2000). 6 We mention that wrinkle here, because defendant proffered Callum’s testimony about his adjustment disorder to provide an inference that defendant did not touch M with a culpable mental state.

2016State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457 , 462 n 5, 8 P3d 212 , cert den, 531 US 1055 (2000). 6 We mention that wrinkle here, because defendant proffered Callum’s testimony about his adjustment disorder to provide an inference that defendant did not touch M with a culpable mental state.

2012Because the trial court did properly engage in the OEC 403 analysis and reached a permissible result, this court may not disturb it and must affirm the trial court.” Notwithstanding its own essential contention that the videos are “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts” for purposes of OEC 404(3), the state, relying on our decision in State v. Wilhelm, 168 Or App 489 , 3 P3d 715 (2000), asserts that the relevance analysis established in Johns is inapplicable.

2012Because the trial court did properly engage in the OEC 403 analysis and reached a permissible result, this court may not disturb it and must affirm the trial court.” Notwithstanding its own essential contention that the videos are “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts” for purposes of OEC 404(3), the state, relying on our decision in State v. Wilhelm, 168 Or App 489 , 3 P3d 715 (2000), asserts that the relevance analysis established in Johns is inapplicable.

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2001Under OEC 401, “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” As this court stated in State v. Titus, “[t]he rule establishes a *442 ‘very low threshold’ for the admission of evidence.” 328 Or 475, 481 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (quoting State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251 , 255 n 8, 855 P2d 621 (1993)).

2001Under OEC 401, “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” As this court stated in State v. Titus, “[t]he rule establishes a *442 ‘very low threshold’ for the admission of evidence.” 328 Or 475, 481 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (quoting State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251 , 255 n 8, 855 P2d 621 (1993)).

2001Under OEC 401, “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” As this court stated in State v. Titus, “[t]he rule establishes a *442 ‘very low threshold’ for the admission of evidence.” 328 Or 475, 481 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (quoting State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251 , 255 n 8, 855 P2d 621 (1993)).

2001Under OEC 401, “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” As this court stated in State v. Titus, “[t]he rule establishes a *442 ‘very low threshold’ for the admission of evidence.” 328 Or 475, 481 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (quoting State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251 , 255 n 8, 855 P2d 621 (1993)).

1999Shahtout, 298 Or at 606 . 5 In this case, the parties agreed at trial on the applicable standard of care and that 49 CFR section 393.86 is relevant to the jury’s determination of whether defendant met that standard.

1992See State Highway Com. v. Stumbo, 222 Or 62, 74-77 , 352 P2d 477 (1960); State ex rel Dept. of Trans. v. Glenn, 288 Or 17, 23 , 602 P2d 253 (1979); Highway Com. v. Assembly of God, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962). 7 The relevance standard in condemnation proceedings before the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code was similar.

1992See State Highway Com. v. Stumbo, 222 Or 62, 74-77 , 352 P2d 477 (1960); State ex rel Dept. of Trans. v. Glenn, 288 Or 17, 23 , 602 P2d 253 (1979); Highway Com. v. Assembly of God, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962). 7 The relevance standard in condemnation proceedings before the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code was similar.

1992As we did in Dodd v. Hood River County, 115 Or App 139 , 836 P2d 1373 (1992), and McKay Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 114 Or App 95 , 834 P2d 482 (1992), LUBA questioned the relevance of the analysis in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, supra, to cases like this one, which are based on regulations of land use rather than public acquisitions, owner dedications or other affirmative requirements or burdens that the government attaches as conditions of development. *458 We now conclude that the “exactions” versus “impacts” analysis and the related analyses have no relevance in cases

1992As we did in Dodd v. Hood River County, 115 Or App 139 , 836 P2d 1373 (1992), and McKay Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 114 Or App 95 , 834 P2d 482 (1992), LUBA questioned the relevance of the analysis in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, supra, to cases like this one, which are based on regulations of land use rather than public acquisitions, owner dedications or other affirmative requirements or burdens that the government attaches as conditions of development. *458 We now conclude that the “exactions” versus “impacts” analysis and the related analyses have no relevance in cases

1992See State Highway Com. v. Stumbo, 222 Or 62, 74-77 , 352 P2d 477 (1960); State ex rel Dept. of Trans. v. Glenn, 288 Or 17, 23 , 602 P2d 253 (1979); Highway Com. v. Assembly of God, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962). 7 The relevance standard in condemnation proceedings before the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code was similar.

1992See State Highway Com. v. Stumbo, 222 Or 62, 74-77 , 352 P2d 477 (1960); State ex rel Dept. of Trans. v. Glenn, 288 Or 17, 23 , 602 P2d 253 (1979); Highway Com. v. Assembly of God, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962). 7 The relevance standard in condemnation proceedings before the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code was similar.

1992As we did in Dodd v. Hood River County, 115 Or App 139 , 836 P2d 1373 (1992), and McKay Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 114 Or App 95 , 834 P2d 482 (1992), LUBA questioned the relevance of the analysis in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, supra, to cases like this one, which are based on regulations of land use rather than public acquisitions, owner dedications or other affirmative requirements or burdens that the government attaches as conditions of development. *458 We now conclude that the “exactions” versus “impacts” analysis and the related analyses have no relevance in cases

1992As we did in Dodd v. Hood River County, 115 Or App 139 , 836 P2d 1373 (1992), and McKay Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 114 Or App 95 , 834 P2d 482 (1992), LUBA questioned the relevance of the analysis in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, supra, to cases like this one, which are based on regulations of land use rather than public acquisitions, owner dedications or other affirmative requirements or burdens that the government attaches as conditions of development. *458 We now conclude that the “exactions” versus “impacts” analysis and the related analyses have no relevance in cases

1981Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Or 10 , 419 P2d 28 (1966); Glatt and Glatt, 41 Or App 615 , 598 P2d 1237 (1979); Stettler v. Stettler, supra. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to separate provisions for support and division of property and still effect a just and equitable settlement of the parties’ affairs.

1981Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Or 10 , 419 P2d 28 (1966); Glatt and Glatt, 41 Or App 615 , 598 P2d 1237 (1979); Stettler v. Stettler, supra. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to separate provisions for support and division of property and still effect a just and equitable settlement of the parties’ affairs.

1981Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Or 10 , 419 P2d 28 (1966); Glatt and Glatt, 41 Or App 615 , 598 P2d 1237 (1979); Stettler v. Stettler, supra. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to separate provisions for support and division of property and still effect a just and equitable settlement of the parties’ affairs.

1981Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Or 10 , 419 P2d 28 (1966); Glatt and Glatt, 41 Or App 615 , 598 P2d 1237 (1979); Stettler v. Stettler, supra. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to separate provisions for support and division of property and still effect a just and equitable settlement of the parties’ affairs.