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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Curtisgreen2 sentences2017Compare Curtis, 755 A.2d at 1014-15 (holding that what is required to establish materiality under the rule currently codified as Rule 16 (a)(1)(E) is "some preliminary showing of a reason to doubt the chemical analysis provided by the government”), with Cole, 835 A.2d at 608 (explaining that "to show a given document or item of information is discoverable, a defendant must show ... that the information or document is relevant to the subject matter of the case”). 16 . 2017Compare Curtis, 755 A.2d at 1014–15 (holding that what is required to establish materiality under the rule currently codified as Rule 16 (a)(1)(E) is ―some preliminary showing of a reason to doubt the chemical analysis provided by the government‖), with Cole, 835 A.2d at 608 (explaining that ―to show a given document or item of information is discoverable, a defendant must show . . . that the information or document is relevant to the subject matter of the case‖). 25 revealed as a result of any audits‖). | 2 | 2 |
Cole v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Compare Curtis, 755 A.2d at 1014-15 (holding that what is required to establish materiality under the rule currently codified as Rule 16 (a)(1)(E) is "some preliminary showing of a reason to doubt the chemical analysis provided by the government”), with Cole, 835 A.2d at 608 (explaining that "to show a given document or item of information is discoverable, a defendant must show ... that the information or document is relevant to the subject matter of the case”). 16 . 2017Compare Curtis, 755 A.2d at 1014–15 (holding that what is required to establish materiality under the rule currently codified as Rule 16 (a)(1)(E) is ―some preliminary showing of a reason to doubt the chemical analysis provided by the government‖), with Cole, 835 A.2d at 608 (explaining that ―to show a given document or item of information is discoverable, a defendant must show . . . that the information or document is relevant to the subject matter of the case‖). 25 revealed as a result of any audits‖). | 2 | 2 |
Winfield v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997This court has held that "evidence of motivation of a third party to commit the crime charged risks distracting the jury from the issue of this defendant's guilt or innocence, and in applying the relevance standard the judge may properly take account of the danger." Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1996) (en banc). 1997This court has held that “evidence of motivation of a third party to commit the crime charged risks distracting the jury from the issue of this defendant’s guilt or innocence, and in applying the relevance standard the judge may properly take account of the danger.” Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1996) (en banc). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021“Ordinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible and if the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in controversy, it should go to the jury.” 40 38 Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1095 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
In re L.C.green1 sentence2021To be relevant “[a]n item of evidence” must be material and probative, and to make the latter showing, “it need only tend to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence.” In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 (D.C. 2014); accord Coates, 113 A.3d at 573 . | 1 | 1 |
CHARLES M. COATES v. UNITED STATESgreen2 sentences2021Extrinsic evidence of bias introduced during questioning must meet the ordinary relevance standard for “admissibility[,] [which] is low.” Coates v. United States, 113 A.3d 564, 573 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2021To be relevant “[a]n item of evidence” must be material and probative, and to make the latter showing, “it need only tend to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence.” In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 (D.C. 2014); accord Coates, 113 A.3d at 573 . | 1 | 1 |
Gethers v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003In Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266 (D.C.1996), we concluded that a proffer that a shooting victim was an alleged drug dealer and had *545 many enemies who could have committed the murder was insufficient for a third-party perpetrator defense under Winfield because the defendant made “no showing or proffer that such a person, if he or she actually existed, was connected in any way to the shooting.” Id. at 1272; see also Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 460 (D.C.2002) (quoting Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.1994) (Winfield I )) (“ ‘[A] defendant’s proffer of evid 2003In Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266 (D.C.1996), we concluded that a proffer that a shooting victim was an alleged drug dealer and had *545 many enemies who could have committed the murder was insufficient for a third-party perpetrator defense under Winfield because the defendant made “no showing or proffer that such a person, if he or she actually existed, was connected in any way to the shooting.” Id. at 1272; see also Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 460 (D.C.2002) (quoting Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.1994) (Winfield I )) (“ ‘[A] defendant’s proffer of evid | 1 | 1 |
Winfield v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003In Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266 (D.C.1996), we concluded that a proffer that a shooting victim was an alleged drug dealer and had *545 many enemies who could have committed the murder was insufficient for a third-party perpetrator defense under Winfield because the defendant made “no showing or proffer that such a person, if he or she actually existed, was connected in any way to the shooting.” Id. at 1272; see also Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 460 (D.C.2002) (quoting Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.1994) (Winfield I )) (“ ‘[A] defendant’s proffer of evid | 1 | 1 |
Resper v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003In Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266 (D.C.1996), we concluded that a proffer that a shooting victim was an alleged drug dealer and had *545 many enemies who could have committed the murder was insufficient for a third-party perpetrator defense under Winfield because the defendant made “no showing or proffer that such a person, if he or she actually existed, was connected in any way to the shooting.” Id. at 1272; see also Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 460 (D.C.2002) (quoting Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.1994) (Winfield I )) (“ ‘[A] defendant’s proffer of evid | 1 | 1 |
Punch v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996See Punch, 377 A.2d at 1358 (relevant evidence is “that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable” (emphasis added)); Fed.R.Evid. 401 (relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). 1996See Punch, 377 A.2d at 1358 (relevant evidence is "that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable" (emphasis added)); FED.R.EVID. 401 (relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nathan L. Drew v. United States
green
1 sentence2021Winfield did not do this. 3 Instead, by rejecting a heightened relevance standard for evidence _______________ 3 It is immaterial that Winfield prefaced its observation about “preliminary” pretrial admissibility assessments in footnote 6 with a reference to assessments of “other crimes” evidence under Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Test v. United States
green
2 sentences2010Specifically, while D.C.Code § 11-1914(b) announces a general rule of non-disclosure of records related to the jury selection process, it also contains a key exception to permit disclosure "in connection with the preparation or presentation of a motion under § 11-1910." Importantly, this exception is unqualified, save for the relevance requirement implicit in the words "in connection with." On its face, therefore, the DCJSA reveals no intent to further condition the right of inspection upon a litigant's possession and proffer of facts independently tending to show improper jury selection—facts 2010Specifically, while D.C.Code § 11-1914(b) announces a general rule of non-disclosure of records related to the jury selection process, it also contains a key exception to permit disclosure "in connection with the preparation or presentation of a motion under § 11-1910." Importantly, this exception is unqualified, save for the relevance requirement implicit in the words "in connection with." On its face, therefore, the DCJSA reveals no intent to further condition the right of inspection upon a litigant's possession and proffer of facts independently tending to show improper jury selection—facts | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Comford v. United States
green
2 sentences2009The relevance inquiry asks whether the evidence had "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Comford, supra, 947 A.2d at 1187 . . 2009The relevance inquiry asks whether the evidence had "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Comford, supra, 947 A.2d at 1187 . . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gordon v. United States
green
2 sentences2009For example, Blackson correctly notes that Gordon, supra, held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have allowed the government to ”pressure[] [the witness] to testify that it was her fear of the appellants that was causing her to testify inconsistently” and recant her earlier grand jury testimony. 2009The relevance inquiry asks whether the evidence had "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Comford, supra, 947 A.2d at 1187 . [11] For example, Blackson correctly notes that Gordon, supra, held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have allowed the government to "pressure[] [the witness] to testify that it was her fear of the appellants that was causing her to testify inconsistently" and recant her earlier grand jury testimony. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Second, in spite of the en banc majority’s view that this formulation insures the exclusion of irrelevant and speculative evidence, this court has recognized previously the exact opposite view in Johnson , as reflected in the following passage from the opinion, which followed the court’s “reasonable possibility” explanation: What we mean by “clearly link,” as used first by this court in Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097 , is proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. 1996Second, in spite of the en banc majority’s view that this formulation insures the exclusion of irrelevant and speculative evidence, this court has recognized previously the exact opposite view in Johnson , as reflected in the following passage from the opinion, which followed the court’s “reasonable possibility” explanation: What we mean by “clearly link,” as used first by this court in Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097 , is proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.