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21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kunkel v. Waltongreen2 sentences2020In addition, the relevance requirement safeguards against “improper and abusive” discovery and acts as an “independent constraint on discovery.” Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 533 . 2020“Although relevant (discoverable) information is defined broadly to encompass not only admissible information but also information calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information [citation], this definition is not intended as an invitation to invent attenuated chains of possible relevancy.” Carlson, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 37 . ¶ 69 Moreover, “[t]he corollary to the relevance requirement is that the compelled disclosure of highly personal information ‘having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit’ is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” Id. (quoting Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d a | 2 | 5 |
The PEOPLE v. Luriegreen2 sentences2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy). ¶ 2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is 24 unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy) | 2 | 2 |
People v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy). ¶ 2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is 24 unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy) | 2 | 2 |
Manns v. Briellgreen2 sentences2007See Manns, 349 Ill.App.3d at 361 , 285 Ill.Dec. 108 , 811 N.E.2d at 352 (court does not have discretion to order discovery of information not meeting threshold requirement of relevance to matter actually at issue in the case). 2007See Manns, 349 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
United States Testing Company, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2019The relevance standard for information requests is “a liberal discovery-type standard, under which the requested information need only be relevant to the union in its negotiations.” United States Testing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 160 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. 2018The relevance standard for information requests is "a liberal discovery-type standard, under which the requested information need only be relevant to the union in its negotiations." United States Testing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 160 F.3d 14 , 19 (D.C. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ruizgreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maxwellgreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Peeplesgreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Townsgreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Adkinsgreen2 sentences2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend 2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mayberrygreen1 sentence2023People v. Mayberry, 2020 IL App (1st) 181806, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 539 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2023Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34 (“critical inquiry is simply whether there is sufficient similarity between the misconduct at issue in the present case and the misconduct showing in other cases”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kirchnergreen1 sentence2023People v. Mayberry, 2020 IL App (1st) 181806, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 539 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Middlecoff v. Leofantigreen1 sentence1975(Middlecoff v. Leofanti, 133 Ill.App.2d 822, 826 (1971).) Although these cases specifically concern rights of natural parents, the instant distinction of petitioner being an adoptive parent does not negate the relevance of the rule of law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carlson v. Jerousek
green
2 sentences2020“Although relevant (discoverable) information is defined broadly to encompass not only admissible information but also information calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information [citation], this definition is not intended as an invitation to invent attenuated chains of possible relevancy.” Carlson, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 37 . ¶ 69 Moreover, “[t]he corollary to the relevance requirement is that the compelled disclosure of highly personal information ‘having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit’ is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” Id. (quoting Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d a 2020“Although relevant (discoverable) information is defined broadly to encompass not only admissible information but also information calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information [citation], this definition is not intended as an invitation to invent attenuated chains of possible relevancy.” Carlson, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 37 . ¶ 69 Moreover, “[t]he corollary to the relevance requirement is that the compelled disclosure of highly personal information ‘having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit’ is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” Id. (quoting Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d a | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Regency Commercial Associates, LLC v. Lopax, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Id. 2014Id. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Holman
red
1 sentence2024The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 44 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (“We have long held that age is not just a chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional significance.”); People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 341-42 (2002) (recognizing youth as mitigating because of juvenile defend | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Holmes v. State
green
2 sentences2024The relevance inquiry then shifts to a balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. “[W]hen such a nexus exists, the probative value of defendant-authored rap lyrics is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because the usefulness of the lyrics to the jury is not substantially overcome by their inflammatory character as propensity evidence.” Id. at 566 (citing Holmes, 306 P.3d at 420 ). ¶ 95 When it considered these principles alongside the defendant’s rap lyrics, the reviewing court concluded that while the defendant’s rap lyrics include “some thematic elements native to 3 2024The relevance inquiry then shifts to a balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. “[W]hen such a nexus exists, the probative value of defendant-authored rap lyrics is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because the usefulness of the lyrics to the jury is not substantially overcome by their inflammatory character as propensity evidence.” Id. at 566 (citing Holmes, 306 P.3d at 420 ). ¶ 95 When it considered these principles alongside the defendant’s rap lyrics, the reviewing court concluded that while the defendant’s rap lyrics include “some thematic elements native to 3 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. De La Paz
green
1 sentence2021He disputes that Carpenter created a “new rule.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Luedemann
green
2 sentences2005While the dissent professes that "[t]he majority's geometrical analysis of this encounter is lost on me" (op. 293 Ill.Dec. at 403 , 828 N.E.2d at 373 ), it explains the relevance of these factors a short time later. 2005While the dissent professes that "[t]he majority's geometrical analysis of this encounter is lost on me" (op. 293 Ill.Dec. at 403 , 828 N.E.2d at 373 ), it explains the relevance of these factors a short time later. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Best v. Taylor MacHine Works
green
2 sentences2001Specifically, we held that the mandatory consent procedures set forth in section 2-1003(a) circumvented the relevance requirement found in Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) (166 Ill.2d R. 201(b)(1)), which provides that during discovery a party must fully disclose "any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." We held that the disclosure mandated by section 2-1003(a) was "described in the broadest possible terms" ( Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 532 , 228 Ill.Dec. 626 , 689 N.E.2d 1047 ), requiring "maximum disclosure" ( Best, 179 Ill.2d at 444-45 , 228 Ill. 2001Specifically, we held that the mandatory consent procedures set forth in section 2-1003(a) circumvented the relevance requirement found in Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) (166 Ill.2d R. 201(b)(1)), which provides that during discovery a party must fully disclose "any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." We held that the disclosure mandated by section 2-1003(a) was "described in the broadest possible terms" ( Kunkel, 179 Ill.2d at 532 , 228 Ill.Dec. 626 , 689 N.E.2d 1047 ), requiring "maximum disclosure" ( Best, 179 Ill.2d at 444-45 , 228 Ill. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Richardson
green
1 sentence1994(Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 361-62 .) Maples’ testimony meets the relevance requirement because it reflected upon defendant’s violent character. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Tate
green
2 sentences1994(Tate, 87 Ill. 2d at 143 .) This standard is a relevance standard defined in terms of the strength of the connection between the crimes, of which similarity is but one factor. 1994This court found that the other-crimes evidence was inadmissible because there was no "substantial and meaningful link" between the other-crimes evidence and the charged crime. ( Tate, 87 Ill.2d at 143 , 57 Ill.Dec. 572 , 429 N.E.2d 470 .) This standard is a relevance standard defined in terms of the strength of the connection between the crimes, of which similarity is but one factor. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Quilico v. Union Oil Co. of California
green
1 sentence1981App. 3d 87 , 374 N.E.2d 219 .) We note, however, that the defendants have not shown the relevance of this principle of law to their case. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.