7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Linson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 885 (4) (700 SE2d 394) (2010) (“If the same conduct established the commission of both offenses, it is necessary to take the next step in the analysis by applying the required evidence test for determining when one offense is included in another.”) (cleaned up). 2024See Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 885 (4) (700 SE2d 394) (2010) (“If the same conduct established the commission of both offenses, it is necessary to take the next step in the analysis by applying the required evidence test for determining when one offense is included in another.”) (cleaned up). | 3 | 3 |
Johnston v. Warendhgreen1 sentence2023See North Fulton Community Charities v. Goodstein, 367 Ga. App. 576 , 581 (1) ( 556 SE2d 867 ) (2023) (the basis of the proprietor’s liability in a static condition case is its superior knowledge of the hazard). | 1 | 1 |
Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Limited Partnershipgreen2 sentences2022Partnership, 126 F3d 178, 181 (II) (3d Cir. 1997). 2022Partnership, 126 F3d 178, 181 (II) (3d Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Deal v. Colemangreen2 sentences2016In this Court’s consideration of the meaning of the text of a statute, we are to presume that the General Assembly “meant what it said and said what it meant”; consequently, the statutory text is to be given its “plain and ordinary meaning,” viewed in the “context in which it appears.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 2016In this Court’s consideration of the meaning of the text of a statute, we are to presume that the General Assembly “meant what it said and said what it meant”; consequently, the statutory text is to be given its “plain and ordinary meaning,” viewed in the “context in which it appears.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Parr v. TRIPLE L & J CORP.green1 sentence2006In order to make this determination, we first must look to the contract between the parties, and “[i]f the tort claims are based on duties that are imposed by contract, then contract law provides the remedies for [the] economic losses.” (Citation omitted.) Parr v. Triple L & J Corp., 107 P3d 1104, 1107 (II) (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drinkard v. Walker
green
2 sentences2011Walker, 281 Ga. 211 ( 636 SE2d 530 ) (2006),] pursuant to OCGA §§ 16-1-6 (1), 16-1-7 (a) (1)) for determining when one offense is included in another: “(A) single act may constitute an offense which violates more than one statute, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other. . . .” Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 885 (4) ( 700 SE2d 394 ) (2010). 2011Walker, 281 Ga. 211 ( 636 SE2d 530 ) (2006),] pursuant to OCGA §§ 16-1-6 (1), 16-1-7 (a) (1)) for determining when one offense is included in another: “(A) single act may constitute an offense which violates more than one statute, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other. . . .” Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 885 (4) ( 700 SE2d 394 ) (2010). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.