6 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Winstead v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2018An "error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the • I ' judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009) (citing Kotteakos v. United · States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). | 1 | 1 |
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.green1 sentence2006The Renton Court found the ordinance at issue did not necessarily “fit neatly” into either category, but nonetheless concluded that the Renton ordinance was aimed “not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community,” id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 929 (emphasis in original), and as such it was consistent with the Court’s definition of “content-neutral” speech regulations. | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Blairgreen2 sentences1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that "a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment." Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). 1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that “a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment.” Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.green2 sentences1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that "a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment." Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). 1999Initially, it should be observed that it is well settled that “a party may be estopped to plead limitation where he has induced inaction on the part of the plaintiff by his false representation or fraudulent concealment.” Burke v. Blair, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1961) (quoted with approval in Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Moore & Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Moving on to the next step of our analysis, we focus on whether the alleged damage resulted from an “occurrence.” Like most modern, form-CGL 5 To the extent that Young alleged damage in the form of purchasing more PermaCrete than QSI estimated, we find that such excess cost does not fall within the definition of “property damage” or “physical injury.” -14- policies, “occurrence” is defined as an “accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” While the Policies do not define the term “accident,” the Tennessee Supreme Court in Moore pr 2025Moving on to the next step of our analysis, we focus on whether the alleged damage resulted from an “occurrence.” Like most modern, form-CGL 5 To the extent that Young alleged damage in the form of purchasing more PermaCrete than QSI estimated, we find that such excess cost does not fall within the definition of “property damage” or “physical injury.” -14- policies, “occurrence” is defined as an “accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” While the Policies do not define the term “accident,” the Tennessee Supreme Court in Moore pr | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Taylor Stumbo v. City of Ashland
green
1 sentence2022The next step mandated in Stumbo is a finding that “the claimant is unable to perform any type of work.” 461 S.W.3d at 396 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kotteakos v. United States
green
1 sentence2018An "error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the • I ' judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009) (citing Kotteakos v. United · States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.