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39 California opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Doriesgreen2 sentences2023“The pleadings define the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” (Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 252 .) “Summary judgment cannot be granted on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] Conversely, summary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 , italics omitted.) “The next step in the analysis calls for an evaluation of the moving defendant’s effort to 4 meet the burden of showing that plaintiff's cause of action has no merit or 1997“The pleadings define the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” (Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 252 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 ].) The next step in the analysis calls for an evaluation of CalTrans’s effort to meet the burden of showing that plaintiff’s cause of action has no merit or that there is a complete defense to it. | 3 | 4 |
Garcetti v. Ceballosgreen1 sentence2026(Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 146 , fn. omitted; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 418 .) Accordingly, we have no reason to proceed to the next step of the analysis or to consider Lopez’s arguments challenging CDCR’s proffered reasons for disciplining her in the context of her First Amendment defense. 15 III Due Process Notice–Inexcusable Neglect of Duty Lopez argues the SPB violated her right to due process notice, as well as its own precedent, by sustaining the charge of inexcusable neglect of duty. | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. City of Tigardgreen1 sentence2025(See id. at pp. 377, 386-391, italics added.) To satisfy this standard, the permit condition (e.g., impact fee) must have “rough proportionality” to the proposed development’s impact or burden on the government’s land-use interest (here, reducing traffic congestion), and must not require a landowner to give up (here, pay) more than is necessary to mitigate the harm (social costs) resulting from the new development. ( Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 275-276; see Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 388-396; Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612-615, 619 [monetary exactions must satisfy the rough proportio | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024(People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797-798 [“If, however, the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can look to legislative history [citation] and to rules or maxims of construction”].) When we turn our focus there, our interpretation finds ample support. | 1 | 1 |
State Building & Construction Trades Council v. City of Vistagreen2 sentences2016(Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558.) Accordingly, we must proceed to the next step in the analysis to determine whether an actual conflict exists between state law and charter city law. 2016(Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558 .) Accordingly, we must proceed to the next step in the analysis to determine whether an actual conflict exists between state law and charter city law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hofsheierred2 sentences2010This concession is not dispositive of Walgreens’s equal protection challenge but merely constitutes an acknowledgement that Walgreens has met its threshold burden to show that the different types of stores containing licensed pharma *435 cíes are “ ‘sufficiently similar to merit application of some level of scrutiny to determine whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ] (Hofsheier).) The next step in the analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny 2010This concession is not dispositive of Walgreens’s equal protection challenge but merely constitutes an acknowledgement that Walgreens has met its threshold burden to show that the different types of stores containing licensed pharma *435 cíes are “ ‘sufficiently similar to merit application of some level of scrutiny to determine whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ] (Hofsheier).) The next step in the analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny | 1 | 1 |
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.green1 sentence2005The rule generally provides that “[a] cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise ... if the alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did have that duty.” (Doctors’ Co., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 44 ; see also *825 Applied, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 512 ; Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 394 .) In other words, an attorney acting only within the scope of his or her official duties who is not personally bound by the duty viol | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Logginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leybagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Committee to Save the Hollywoodland Specific Plan v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2016(See Committee to Save Hollywoodland, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187 .) III. 2016(See Committee to Save Hollywoodland, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187 .) III. | 5 | 2015–2016 |
City of Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment
green
2 sentences2016The general plan is the charter to which the ordinance must conform.’ [Citation.] The same rule applies to this case.” (City of Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 868, 879 .) Given the above, we conclude that the City may not rely on an exemption from CEQA, it must proceed to the next step of the analysis and conduct an initial threshold study to see if the proposed Amendment will have a significant impact upon the environment to determine whether a negative declaration may be issued. 2016The general plan is the charter to which the ordinance must conform.’ [Citation.] The same rule applies to this case.” (City of Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 868, 879 .) Given the above, we conclude that the City may not rely on an exemption from CEQA, it must proceed to the next step of the analysis and conduct an initial threshold study to see if the proposed Amendment will have a significant impact upon the environment to determine whether a negative declaration may be issued. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Resolving the Ambiguity The next step of our analysis of the meaning of the 1915 Agreement is to resolve the ambiguity about the scope of the verb “maintaining.” (See Scheenstra, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 .) No conflicting extrinsic evidence was presented by the parties 19. and, therefore, “the resolution of the ambiguity is a question of law, which is subject to independent review on appeal.” (Ibid.) Stated another way, we treat “the interpretation of the written contract as solely a judicial function.” (Ibid.) When resolving an ambiguity, a court must consider the word or phrase in co 2023Resolving the Ambiguity The next step of our analysis of the meaning of the 1915 Agreement is to resolve the ambiguity about the scope of the verb “maintaining.” (See Scheenstra, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 .) No conflicting extrinsic evidence was presented by the parties 19. and, therefore, “the resolution of the ambiguity is a question of law, which is subject to independent review on appeal.” (Ibid.) Stated another way, we treat “the interpretation of the written contract as solely a judicial function.” (Ibid.) When resolving an ambiguity, a court must consider the word or phrase in co | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Adams v. MHC Colony Park Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2023(Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 622 .) In this case, that context includes the whole of the 1915 Agreement and the law as it existed at the time the agreement was drafted and signed. 2023(Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 622 .) In this case, that context includes the whole of the 1915 Agreement and the law as it existed at the time the agreement was drafted and signed. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 .) B. 2019Joseph Health System (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 851, 859 , disapproved on another ground in Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 892 .) “Second—if the defendant meets its burden of showing all or part of its activity was protected—then the court proceeds to the next step of the inquiry. | 2 | 2019–2021 |
People v. Perez
green
2 sentences2018(Compare § 1473.7, subds. (b)(1) & (2), (c) with 1473.6, subd. (d)(1) & (2).) Thus, on a plain reading of the statute, it appears a moving party can seek relief under it if he or she satisfies the statute's three requirements." ( Perez , supra , 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 826-827, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 95 .) The next step in the analysis is whether defendant satisfies the required elements to bring a motion under section 1473.7. 2018(Compare § 1473.7, subds. (b)(1) & (2), (c) with 1473.6, subd. (d)(1) & (2).) Thus, on a plain reading of the statue, it appears a moving party can seek relief under it if he or she satisfies the statute’s three requirements.” ( Perez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 826-827.) The next step in the analysis is whether defendant satisfies the required elements to bring a motion under section 1473.7. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Connick Ex Rel. Parish of Orleans v. Myers
green
1 sentence2026(Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 146 , fn. omitted; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 418 .) Accordingly, we have no reason to proceed to the next step of the analysis or to consider Lopez’s arguments challenging CDCR’s proffered reasons for disciplining her in the context of her First Amendment defense. 15 III Due Process Notice–Inexcusable Neglect of Duty Lopez argues the SPB violated her right to due process notice, as well as its own precedent, by sustaining the charge of inexcusable neglect of duty. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025Factors the Supreme Court directs us to consider in addressing this policy issue “include: ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk invol | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.
green
1 sentence2025(See id. at pp. 377, 386-391, italics added.) To satisfy this standard, the permit condition (e.g., impact fee) must have “rough proportionality” to the proposed development’s impact or burden on the government’s land-use interest (here, reducing traffic congestion), and must not require a landowner to give up (here, pay) more than is necessary to mitigate the harm (social costs) resulting from the new development. ( Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 275-276; see Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 388-396; Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612-615, 619 [monetary exactions must satisfy the rough proportio | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rowland v. Christian
red
1 sentence2025Factors the Supreme Court directs us to consider in addressing this policy issue “include: ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk invol | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino
green
1 sentence2023“The pleadings define the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” (Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 252 .) “Summary judgment cannot be granted on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] Conversely, summary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 , italics omitted.) “The next step in the analysis calls for an evaluation of the moving defendant’s effort to 4 meet the burden of showing that plaintiff's cause of action has no merit or | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Gray v. Gray
green
1 sentence2022We begin our analysis with the fundamental principle that a trial court’s order “is presumed to be correct, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent. [Citation.] It is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Gray (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 974 , 977– 978.) The next step in our analysis of Petrolink’s appeal is to determine the applicable standard of review. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2021The failure to appoint counsel in a proceeding under section 1170.95 is an error of state statutory law only, and not a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. ( Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-973.) Accordingly, 3 The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lewis after the parties had filed their appellate briefs in this matter. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
2 sentences2021(See § 425.16, subd. (b); Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 .) The next step in the analysis is to determine whether each of these actions constitutes protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. 2021(See § 425.16, subd. (b); Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 .) The next step in the analysis is to determine whether each of these actions constitutes protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys.
green
1 sentence2019Joseph Health System (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 851, 859 , disapproved on another ground in Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 892 .) “Second—if the defendant meets its burden of showing all or part of its activity was protected—then the court proceeds to the next step of the inquiry. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017At this stage — applying the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test — the court asks “whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 .) An appellate court reviews a trial court‟s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, applying the legal principles and two-prong test discussed above. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare
green
1 sentence2015Sufficiency of the Particular Facts Alleged The next step of our analysis is to review the FAC to determine whether Davis has alleged facts sufficient to support his legal theory that the Facilities Lease was subject to competitive bidding because Fresno Unified failed to satisfy the statutory criterion for use of the buildings by the school district “during the term of the lease.” (§ 17406(a)(1).) Paragraph No. 24 of the FAC alleged that Fresno Unified “does not have the right or practical ability to have beneficial occupancy of the demised premises during the term of the Facilities Lease to | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Chance
green
1 sentence2014Although one step remained—completely entering the bathroom—before Taplin could have committed the battery, our case law does not establish a next-step test but considers whether the actor had the “ability to inflict injury on the present occassion.” (Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1168 .) Based on the entire record, the jury could have reasonably concluded Taplin had the present ability to perform an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to J. 13 III. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lucido v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2013Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable." (Ibid.) In the next step of the analysis, we consider whether Davis's due process arguments must change our conclusion, under applicable rules, that issue preclusion applies and ends this case. 12 IV DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS Even if issue preclusion may properly be applied in Davis's case, we also consider whether the public policy considerations enumerated in Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 343 , should nevertheless permit his desired further liti 2013Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable." (Ibid.) In the next step of the analysis, we consider whether Davis's due process arguments must change our conclusion, under applicable rules, that issue preclusion applies and ends this case. 12 IV DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS Even if issue preclusion may properly be applied in Davis's case, we also consider whether the public policy considerations enumerated in Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 343 , should nevertheless permit his desired further liti | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jessup Farms v. Baldwin
green
1 sentence2013Having resolved the factual issue regarding the cost to repair the elevator in favor of the judgment (Jessup Farms, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 660 ), the next step in the analysis is to compare the repair cost to six months’ base rent. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Zamos v. Stroud
green
1 sentence2010(Zamos v. Stroud, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 965 .) Defendants contend that Smith cannot establish the requisite level of merit because (1) he cannot show that he exhausted his internal and judicial remedies relating to the claim, (2) the claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, and (3) the claim is barred by statutory privileges set forth in the Civil Code. 1.-4. * 5. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pavicich v. Santucci
green
1 sentence2005The rule generally provides that “[a] cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise ... if the alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did have that duty.” (Doctors’ Co., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 44 ; see also *825 Applied, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 512 ; Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 394 .) In other words, an attorney acting only within the scope of his or her official duties who is not personally bound by the duty viol | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2005The rule generally provides that “[a] cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise ... if the alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did have that duty.” (Doctors’ Co., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 44 ; see also *825 Applied, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 512 ; Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 394 .) In other words, an attorney acting only within the scope of his or her official duties who is not personally bound by the duty viol | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Jones v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Lawler green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Hannon green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Jones v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.