next step analysis in Connecticut

1999SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST The next step in the analysis required by § 8-30g is for the court to determine whether the Commission has sustained its burden of proof that "the decision is necessary to protect a substantial public interest in health, safety or other matters which the Commission may legally consider." Where a zoning commission has formally stated the reasons for its decision, the court should not go behind that official collective statement . . . [and] attempt to search out and speculate upon other reasons which may have influenced some or all of the members of the Commission to

1995The next step in the analysis required by Section 8-30g is for the court to determine whether the commission has sustained its burden of proof that "the decision is necessary to protect substantial public interests in health, safety or other matters which the commission may legally consider." "Where a zoning commission has formally stated the reasons for its decision, the court should not go behind that official collective statement . . . [and] attempt to search out and speculate upon other reasons which may have influenced some or all of the members of the commission to reach the commission's

2026State v. McFarland, supra, 353 Conn. 178 ; see, e.g., State v. Pugh, 190 Conn. App. 794 , 810 n.5, 212 A.3d 787 (declining to consider whether delay in arresting defendant was wholly unjustifiable in light of conclusion that defendant did not demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 914 , 217 A.3d 635 (2019); State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373 , 395 n.11, 190 A.3d 1 (same), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 911 , 193 A.3d 559 (2018); see also State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11 , 17–18, 364 A.2d 225 (1975) (“Whe[n] a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck b

2026State v. McFarland, supra, 353 Conn. 178 ; see, e.g., State v. Pugh, 190 Conn. App. 794 , 810 n.5, 212 A.3d 787 (declining to consider whether delay in arresting defendant was wholly unjustifiable in light of conclusion that defendant did not demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 914 , 217 A.3d 635 (2019); State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373 , 395 n.11, 190 A.3d 1 (same), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 911 , 193 A.3d 559 (2018); see also State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11 , 17–18, 364 A.2d 225 (1975) (“Whe[n] a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck b

2026State v. McFarland, supra, 353 Conn. 178 ; see, e.g., State v. Pugh, 190 Conn. App. 794 , 810 n.5, 212 A.3d 787 (declining to consider whether delay in arresting defendant was wholly unjustifiable in light of conclusion that defendant did not demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 914 , 217 A.3d 635 (2019); State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373 , 395 n.11, 190 A.3d 1 (same), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 911 , 193 A.3d 559 (2018); see also State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11 , 17–18, 364 A.2d 225 (1975) (“Whe[n] a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck b

2026State v. McFarland, supra, 353 Conn. 178 ; see, e.g., State v. Pugh, 190 Conn. App. 794 , 810 n.5, 212 A.3d 787 (declining to consider whether delay in arresting defendant was wholly unjustifiable in light of conclusion that defendant did not demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 914 , 217 A.3d 635 (2019); State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373 , 395 n.11, 190 A.3d 1 (same), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 911 , 193 A.3d 559 (2018); see also State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11 , 17–18, 364 A.2d 225 (1975) (“Whe[n] a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck b

2016Typically, the next step in our analysis would be to consider whether the court's failure to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence was harmful; Higgins v. Karp, supra, 243 Conn. at 506 , 706 A.2d 1 ; we need not reach that issue, as it relates to a proper remedy in light of our resolution of the issue in part I of this opinion, which leads us to remand the case for further proceedings.

2016Typically, the next step in our analysis would be to consider whether the court's failure to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence was harmful; Higgins v. Karp, supra, 243 Conn. at 506 , 706 A.2d 1 ; we need not reach that issue, as it relates to a proper remedy in light of our resolution of the issue in part I of this opinion, which leads us to remand the case for further proceedings.

2010The plaintiff cites Pecker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 171 Conn. 443 , in which the court held that “other insurance” clauses were invalid “[o]n the basis of the statutes and regulations of this state . . . .” Id., 452.

2009Uncharged misconduct evidence has been held not unduly prejudicial when “the evidentiary substantiation of the vicious conduct, with which the defendant was charged, far outweighed, in severity, the character of his prior misconduct. ” State v. Zubrowski, 101 Conn. App. 379, 395 , 921 A.2d 667 (2007), appeal dismissed, 289 Conn. 55 , 956 A.2d 578 (2008); id., 395-96 (uncharged misconduct evidence of defendant’s past physically and verbally abusive behavior toward his wife admissible to prove intent in murder case).

2009Uncharged misconduct evidence has been held not unduly prejudicial when “the evidentiary substantiation of the vicious conduct, with which the defendant was charged, far outweighed, in severity, the character of his prior misconduct. ” State v. Zubrowski, 101 Conn. App. 379, 395 , 921 A.2d 667 (2007), appeal dismissed, 289 Conn. 55 , 956 A.2d 578 (2008); id., 395-96 (uncharged misconduct evidence of defendant’s past physically and verbally abusive behavior toward his wife admissible to prove intent in murder case).

2009Uncharged misconduct evidence has been held not unduly prejudicial when “the evidentiary substantiation of the vicious conduct, with which the defendant was charged, far outweighed, in severity, the character of his prior misconduct. ” State v. Zubrowski, 101 Conn. App. 379, 395 , 921 A.2d 667 (2007), appeal dismissed, 289 Conn. 55 , 956 A.2d 578 (2008); id., 395-96 (uncharged misconduct evidence of defendant’s past physically and verbally abusive behavior toward his wife admissible to prove intent in murder case).

2009Uncharged misconduct evidence has been held not unduly prejudicial when “the evidentiary substantiation of the vicious conduct, with which the defendant was charged, far outweighed, in severity, the character of his prior misconduct. ” State v. Zubrowski, 101 Conn. App. 379, 395 , 921 A.2d 667 (2007), appeal dismissed, 289 Conn. 55 , 956 A.2d 578 (2008); id., 395-96 (uncharged misconduct evidence of defendant’s past physically and verbally abusive behavior toward his wife admissible to prove intent in murder case).

1993It seems to me that once the defendant has identified a constitutionally protected property interest in the proper valuation of the deficiency judgment, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether he has had the “opportunity to be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L.

1993It seems to me that once the defendant has identified a constitutionally protected property interest in the proper valuation of the deficiency judgment, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether he has had the “opportunity to be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L.

1987Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 , 97 S. Ct. 2243 , 53 L.

1987Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 , 97 S. Ct. 2243 , 53 L.