next step analysis in Florida

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2022See Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate courts routinely uphold the discretion of trial courts to deny as untimely requests made after ‘meaningful trial proceedings’ have begun.” (quoting United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is reasonable, and entirely compatible with the defendant’s constitutional rights, to require that the right to self-representation be asserted at some time ‘before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,’ and that thereafter its exercise rests wi

2018See id. (finding witness's statements made during 911 call qualified as admissible excited utterances); see also Taylor v. State , 146 So.3d 113 , 114-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (finding victim's statements to law enforcement following shooting were admissible excited utterances because there was no evidence that victim had sufficient time for reflection and the State presented evidence that victim was still in a state of panic as she relayed the events, which had occurred just minutes before); Barron v. State , 990 So.2d 1098 , 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding statements made during 911 call plac

2018The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the statements fall within the excited utterance exception in section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2017). "[T]o qualify as an excited utterance, the *628 statement must be made: (1) 'regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement'; (2) 'before there was time to contrive or misrepresent'; and (3) 'while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.' " Pasha v. State , 225 So.3d 688 , 707 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Hudson v. State , 992 So.2d 96 , 107 (Fla. 2008) ). 3 We find that Mrs. Raymond's statements made

2018See id. (finding witness's statements made during 911 call qualified as admissible excited utterances); see also Taylor v. State , 146 So.3d 113 , 114-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (finding victim's statements to law enforcement following shooting were admissible excited utterances because there was no evidence that victim had sufficient time for reflection and the State presented evidence that victim was still in a state of panic as she relayed the events, which had occurred just minutes before); Barron v. State , 990 So.2d 1098 , 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding statements made during 911 call plac

2007The principle of Terry is that the officers would have been permitted to detain Rios "briefly for an investigatory stop if they ha[d] a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts that [he] ha[d] engaged in, or [was] about to engage in, criminal activity." United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d 913 , 917 (11th Cir.2000); see also Popple, 626 So.2d at 186 ("a police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime"); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006).

2003It did not reach the next step in the analysis required by Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 537 (Fla.1999), and Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 919 (Fla.1985), which is to determine whether the bar of sovereign immunity applied, i.e., whether the actions of the sheriff were discretionary or operational.

2003It did not reach the next step in the analysis required by Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 537 (Fla.1999), and Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 919 (Fla.1985), which is to determine whether the bar of sovereign immunity applied, i.e., whether the actions of the sheriff were discretionary or operational.