7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kellgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 35 , 61 P.3d 1019 ("[WJhile [the statements] may have been prejudicial, they were not inherently prejudicial; they were also highly probative as to his racist beliefs, a fact that went to the motive for the killing and demonstrated his clear premeditated intent. 2008See, e.g., Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 35 , 61 P.3d 1019 ("[WJhile [the statements] may have been prejudicial, they were not inherently prejudicial; they were also highly probative as to his racist beliefs, a fact that went to the motive for the killing and demonstrated his clear premeditated intent. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Higginbothamgreen2 sentences1996The next step of the analysis “requires the prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.” Id. at 548 . 1996In so doing, “ ‘[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Purkett , — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)); see also Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (stating prosecutor’s reason for challenge is facially valid if it “does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent”). | 1 | 1 |
Purkett v. Elemgreen1 sentence1996In so doing, “ ‘[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Purkett , — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)); see also Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (stating prosecutor’s reason for challenge is facially valid if it “does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wardle
green
1 sentence2024Our supreme court has instructed that 20230761-CA 7 2024 UT App 181 State v. Wardle “[t]his three-part showing is a sequential test,” meaning that “a court must not proceed to the next step in the analysis if it determines the [requesting party] failed to meet his or her burden of proof at a previous point.” Id. ¶ 16. ¶17 The district court determined that Wardle could not make the required showing on any of the three parts of the test. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Lenkart
green
2 sentences2020But Mr. Bell fails to satisfy this requirement. ¶17 A condition under rule 506(d)(1)(A) is a state that persists over time that “significantly affects a person’s perceptions, behavior, or decision[-]making in a way that is relevant to the reliability of the person’s testimony.”22 It must be more than “mere expressions of emotion” but “is not limited to diagnosable disorders or illnesses.”23 ¶18 For example, in State v. Worthen, this court found that a patient had an emotional condition when a criminal defendant provided extrinsic evidence of the patient’s significant “frustration” and “hatred” 2020But Mr. Bell fails to satisfy this requirement. ¶17 A condition under rule 506(d)(1)(A) is a state that persists over time that “significantly affects a person’s perceptions, behavior, or decision[-]making in a way that is relevant to the reliability of the person’s testimony.”22 It must be more than “mere expressions of emotion” but “is not limited to diagnosable disorders or illnesses.”23 ¶18 For example, in State v. Worthen, this court found that a patient had an emotional condition when a criminal defendant provided extrinsic evidence of the patient’s significant “frustration” and “hatred” | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Spackman Ex Rel. Spackman v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence2019As we have already noted, the Spackman test consists of three elements: (1) that the constitutional violation the plaintiff suffered was a flagrant violation; (2) that existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries; and (3) that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s rights or redress his or her injuries.78 ¶46 Because Mr. Kuchcinski has identified the County, and not a specific County employee, as the alleged violator of his due process rights, he can satisfy the first, or flagrant violation, prong of this test only by proving th | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kuchcinski v. Box Elder County
green
1 sentence2019It is likely that the district court will need to develop the record further to arrive at its decision. 77 We once again reiterate that in determining whether Mr. Kuchcinski’s constitutional rights were violated through state action, the court need not identify whether a particular state actor caused, or should be held responsible for, the violation—that determination should be made at the next step of the analysis as part of the Spackman test for liability. 24 Cite as: 2019 UT 21 Opinion of the Court ¶45 If the district court determines that Mr. Kuchcinski’s seventeen-day detention constitute | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State
green
1 sentence2009Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 43 , 54 P.3d 1069 ; Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 640 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gallivan v. Walker
green
2 sentences2009Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 43 , 54 P.3d 1069 ; Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 640 . 2009Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 43 , 54 P.3d 1069 ; Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 640 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hernandez v. New York
green
2 sentences1996In so doing, “ ‘[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Purkett , — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)); see also Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (stating prosecutor’s reason for challenge is facially valid if it “does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent”). 1996In so doing, “ ‘[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Purkett , — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)); see also Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (stating prosecutor’s reason for challenge is facially valid if it “does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent”). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Shioji v. Shioji
green
2 sentences1992Id. 1992Id. *201 Instead of analyzing this question, the majority, both in the facts section and in the analysis section, reweighs the evidence and reargues issues of morality and physical abuse. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.